Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II by Hafez, Mohammed M. & Rasmussen, Maria
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2012-02-06
Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of




Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of 




Mohammed M. Hafez 
































Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II 
 
 
Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D. 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Maria Rasmussen, Ph.D. 











This report is the product of a collaboration between the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on 
Contemporary Conflict, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Centre for the Study of 
Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews. 
 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 
or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the 
Department of Defense, or the United States Government.  
 
This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
            
 
 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) 
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for  
Combating WMD (PASCC) 
Project Cost: $319,006 
 














The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict is the research 
wing of the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and specializes in the 
study of international relations, security policy, and regional studies. One of the 
CCC’s programs is the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering 
WMD (PASCC). PASCC operates as a program planning and implementation 
office, research center, and intellectual clearinghouse for the execution of analysis 
and future-oriented studies and dialogues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
 
 
For further information, please contact: 
 
The Center on Contemporary Conflict 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road 

















The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants in the October 6-7, 2011, “Innovation 
in WME Terrorism” workshop in St. Andrews, Scotland, whose presentations and contributions are 
the basis of this report: Prof. Zachary Abuza, Dr. Javier Argomaniz, Dr. Mark Currie, Maj. Paul 
Brister, Dr. Adam Dolnik, Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara, Mr. Thomas H. Johnson, Dr. Michael Knights, 
Dr. Peter Lehr, Dr. Orla Lynch, Prof. Ariel Merari, Col. Richard Morales, Dr. Cerwyn Moore, Prof. 
Andew Silke, Dr. Chris Smith, Prof. Jonathan Tonge, Prof. Charles Townshend, Prof. Peter 
Waldmann, and Dr. Tim Wilson. 
In particular, we would like to acknowledge Mr. David Hamon and Ms. Jennifer Perry, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), for lending their considerable expertise to shaping the 
project’s framework, advising on the selection of cases and experts, and contributing to the 
workshop’s discussion. Dr. Sandra Leavitt, Center on Contemporary Conflict at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Ms. Gillian Duncan, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence at the University of St. Andrews, coordinated diligently and tirelessly the planning and 
execution of this DTRA workshop, supported by Ms. Sara Kaufman, Ms. Angela Archambault, and 
Mrs. Ginger Blanken. Ms. Heather Bentrum and Ms. Nicole Ives-Allison, two doctoral students at 
the University of St. Andrews, acted as workshop rapporteurs. Their notes have been invaluable in 
the crafting of this report. 
We owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. Richard English, Director of the Centre for the Study of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, for co-organizing and hosting this event, moderating some of its 
sessions, and contributing his expertise to the discussion. Prof. English and Prof. Louise 
Richardson, Principal and Vice-Chancellor at the University of St. Andrews, made all the 
participants feel welcome and at home. 
It was with great sadness that we received the news of Prof. Paul Wilkinson’s passing. As the 
founder of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews and a leading expert in the field, he was scheduled to survey the development of key 
innovations in aviation terrorism over three decades. Regrettably, he died a few weeks before our 
workshop. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Workshop Report  !1!
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS !
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY!...................................................................................................................!2!
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES!.....................................................................!8!
SECTION 2: THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS HOSTAGE CRISIS!.....................................!12!
SECTION 5: OBSTACLES TO TERRORIST INNOVATIONS!.............................................!22!
SECTION 6: INNOVATIONS OVER TIME: LTTE IN SRI LANKA!..................................!25!
SECTION 7: INNOVATIONS OVER TIME: CHECHEN INSURGENCY!.......................!28!
SECTION 8: MISSING INNOVATIONS: THE FARC AND LOYALISTS!.........................!31!
SECTION 9: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH!..........................................!34!
APPENDIX I: M. RASMUSSEN AND M. HAFEZ, INNOVATION IN WME 
TERRORISM: A GUIDE FOR WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS!.............................................!36!
APPENDIX II: A. MERARI, 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS HOSTAGE CRISIS!...................!45!
APPENDIX III: Z. ABUZA, RAMZI YOUSEF’S BOJINKA PLOT, 1994-1995!....................!53!
APPENDIX IV: M. KNIGHTS, BORN OF DESPERATION: AQI’S CHLORINE CAR 
BOMBS, 2006-2007!...............................................................................................................................!62!
APPENDIX V: J. TONGE, THE LACK OF LOYALIST INNOVATION DURING THE 
NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT!..........................................................................................!90!
APPENDIX VI: P. WALDMANN, POWERFUL BUT LACKING INNOVATION: THE 
COLOMBIAN FARC!.......................................................................................................................!103!
APPENDIX VII: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS!....................................................................!115!!
!
  
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Workshop Report  !2!
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
On October 6-7, 2011, experts gathered for a workshop at the University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland to discuss the factors that both facilitate and hinder terrorist innovations. This workshop is 
part of a two-year Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) sponsored research project that aims 
to shed light on the preconditions, causes, and predictive indicators associated with terrorist innovation in 
weapons of mass effect (WMEs).1 
Organized jointly by the Center on Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews, the workshop brought together specialists from academia and government who presented 
their research findings on twelve historical and contemporary cases of terrorist innovation, ranging 
from the 1972 Munich Olympics hostage crisis to the current use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also discussed major terrorist campaigns that exhibited 
multiple innovations in WME terrorism, including the cases of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and 
anti-Russian rebels in Chechnya. 
Participants also took on the challenge of explaining failed and foiled WME terrorist 
innovations, discussing a diverse set of cases that included Ramzi Yousef’s 1995 Bojinka plot; the 
True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan’s 1997 conspiracy to blow up a natural gas facility in Texas; and 
Al-Qaeda’s short-lived campaign to use chlorine bombs against Iraqis in 2006-2007. Lastly, 
specialists sought to explain the puzzle of absence of innovation in the cases of maritime terrorism, 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern 
Ireland. 
These case studies deliberately built upon a 2010 DTRA-sponsored workshop and research 
report with a similar mission.2 That workshop generated a number of generalizations about what 
motivates innovation; how terrorists come to innovate; and whether it is possible to anticipate 
innovations in WME terrorism. The 2011 workshop broadened the findings of the previous meeting 
by drawing on new case studies of successful and failed innovations in order to confirm and refine 
earlier expert findings.  
 
Preconditions and Causes of WME Innovations 
 
Preconditions refer to the context in which innovation takes place. This includes political, 
technological, or security developments which make innovation by terrorist groups more or less 
likely. Causes are those internal and external drivers that directly precipitate innovation or accelerate 




In the previous DTRA-sponsored workshop, experts agreed that larger ,  resource-r i ch 
terror is t  organizat ions would f ind i t  eas ier  to innovate  based on the cases that they studied. This 
finding was confirmed repeatedly in the 2011 workshop as different case studies were explored. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The Homeland Security Advisory Council defines WMEs as “weapons capable of inflicting grave destruction, 
psychological and/or economic damage.” For further discussion of the definition of WMEs see Appendix 1. 
2 Maria J. Rasmussen and Mohammed M. Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, 
Causes, and Predictive Indicators.” Report by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (August 2010), accessible at: 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/Terrorist_WME_Spotlight_2010-12.html. 
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• The Black September Organization (BSO) behind the 1972 Munich Olympics operation, 
which became the iconic symbol of 20th century international terrorism and a source of 
inspiration for future attacks on the summer games, was as a front for the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), a centralized, hierarchical organization with tremendous 
resources and a vast network of transnational operatives and state sponsors. Access to these 
resources was central to the abduction of Israeli hostages during the summer games. 
• The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which led a campaign of violence for over 25 
years in Sri Lanka, one that featured many innovations in WME terrorism, was a large, 
hierarchical, and centralized insurgent organization that sought to present itself as a proto-
state. Experts highlighted its ability to tap into financing and technical expertise from the 
Tamil diaspora, which facilitated arms procurement as well as experimentation with different 
forms of terrorism. 
• In the case of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, both experts agreed that financial incentives 
were an important catalyst for innovative IED designs and deployment techniques. 
Insurgents that deployed IEDs unsuccessfully were dropped from the money and munitions 
distribution grid, which created a strong enticement for cells to innovate in the design, 
placement, or delivery of IEDs. 
 
Conversely, organizat ions that were smal l ,  f rac t ious ,  and resource -poor had a harder t ime 
succeeding in the ir  innovat ions (and some did not even try). 
 
• The Loyalists in Northern Ireland, which seemed uninterested in innovation (with or 
without WMEs), and the extreme right movement in the U.S., which had tried several WME 
plots, were made up of highly fractious groups and were generally resource-poor. They 
lacked state sponsors and other external sources of funding. Their cadres tended to be 
undereducated and prone to criminality, and agents of the security services easily infiltrated 
their groups because they were susceptible to financial inducements. Their WME aspirations, 
to the extent they had any, were not matched by their capabilities.   
• Ramzi Yousef’s ingeniously complex Bojinka plot to bring down 11-12 American airliners 
over the Pacific in 1995 by detonating a nitroglycerine-based liquid bomb was ultimately 
hindered by the lack of sufficient resources because he operated independently of any 
organization. He had to concoct the volatile chemical mix in a shabby apartment in Manila, 
Philippines. Luckily, a fire in the apartment exposed the plot and eventually led to the 
capture of the entire cell.     
 
However, researchers argued in 2011 that group size and access to resources are not 
sufficient preconditions for successful WME innovations. Large ,  c entral ized,  and resource-r i ch 
organizat ions do not  automatical ly  innovate i f  they lack the intent  to escalate  the conf l i c t . 
 
• The FARC is a large, hierarchical, and resource-rich organization that has operated in 
Colombia since the 1960s. It has not been particularly innovative, and has never 
countenanced the use of WMEs. It is embedded in a beneficial war economy (drug trade, 
racketeering, kidnapping for ransom, etc.) that could be undermined by undue escalation in 
violence. It favors the status quo of low-intensity conflict and, consequently, lacks the intent 
to escalate through WME attacks. 
• When Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) used chlorine bombs against Sunni tribes that had turned 
against it in 2006-2007, it was a large organization with central leadership and relatively 
abundant access to war resources, including chlorine canisters. AQI abandoned this tactic 
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largely because the original intent to intimidate its enemies was no longer a viable option 
given changes in the security and political environment. It was the lack of intent, not of 
capabilities, that led AQI to abandon its WME innovation in 2007.   
 
There was widespread agreement among the participants in the 2010 workshop that 
l eadership is  central  to innovat ion . In nearly all the cases of WME innovation discussed at that 
workshop, leaders played a key role in motivating, demanding, funding, and justifying deadly 
innovation. The 2011 workshop confirmed the importance of leadership in WME innovations. 
 
• Shamil Basaev, the Chechen rebel leader killed in 2006, was instrumental to most spectacular 
terrorist attacks in the second Chechen-Russia war that began in 1999, including the 2004 
Beslan school mass hostage taking which ended with the tragic death of 334 hostages. 
Basaev’s success as an innovative leader was linked directly to his military experience. He 
was not an “evil genius,” or a religious fanatic but a military man with extensive combat 
experience and pride in his operational acumen. Basaev was also open to new ideas and had 
high tolerance for risk. 
• Abu Iyad, the mastermind of the Munich operation, was partially blamed for the disastrous 
Black September defeat in Jordan and deposed from his high-ranking intelligence position 
within the PLO. The demotion led him in a radical direction in an effort to regain his 
organizational prestige and in order to compete with his rivals within the PLO.  
• Ramzi Yousef and his uncle Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the culprits behind the highly 
ambitious Bojinka plot, were both maniacal entrepreneurs who wanted to make a name for 
themselves in the pantheon of global terrorists. Yousef’s successful design of a nitroglycerine 
liquid bomb would not have been possible had he lacked bomb-making knowledge and 
experience. He had a master's degree in electrical engineering, and technical experience 
developed during months spent in a jihadist explosives camp in Afghanistan. Mohammed’s 
connections to transnational militants enabled him to fund the operation and provide 
Yousef with willing operatives.  
 
Where l eadership qual i t i es  such as technical  knowledge ,  determinat ion,  or charisma were 
lacking,  WME innovat ions did not  mater ia l ize or  resul ted in fa i lure .   
 
• American extreme right groups failed to produce a successful WME attack because their 
leaders were often paid informants of the state. Those who did not collude with the 
authorities often lacked the education or technical acumen to conjure up complex plots and 
bring together the requisite resources for operational success. Their grand ambitions rarely 
matched their capabilities. 
• Leaders of the Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland were too preoccupied by 
personality conflicts and too involved in illegal profit-making ventures. Their drive for 
personal aggrandizement displaced their capacity for innovation. Intra-Loyalist competition 
prevented collaboration and resource sharing, but instead produced constant feuds over 




Experts agreed with the 2010 finding that t error is t  innovat ion is  usual ly  mot ivated by 
problem so lv ing intended to overcome constraints  in the secur i ty  environment ,  or  l imitat ions in 
the pol i t i ca l  one . Terrorists seek new technologies, targets, or opportunities in order to circumvent 
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security measures, revitalize support for their cause, pursue a new strategy to remedy failed ones, or 
simply to escalate a conflict because lower levels of violence are assessed to be ineffective.  
 
• The 1972 Munich Olympics operation was directly linked to the violent expulsion of 
Palestinian guerrilla factions from Jordan at the hands of forces loyal to the Jordanian 
monarchy. The September 1970-July 1971 war, known as the events of Black September, 
deprived the PLO of a front from which to attack Israel, creating a major crisis for the PLO 
and demoralizing its fighters and constituency. The Munich operation was an attempt to 
regain legitimacy for PLO’s senior leaders after an ignominious defeat. 
• AQI’s 2006-2007 chlorine bombings campaign was born out of desperation. A new 
counterinsurgency strategy by Coalition Forces mobilized AQI’s Sunni tribal allies against it. 
Tribal leaders were paid handsomely for recruiting their followers into local militias known 
as “Sons of Iraq” in order to clear their areas of AQI insurgents. This changing environment 
not only threatened AQI’s operational space, it also sought to reconcile disgruntled Sunnis 
with the new Iraqi government that AQI sought to destabilize through sectarian warfare. 
AQI used chlorine bombings to intimidate Sunni tribal leaders, but ultimately it failed. 
• The Bojinka plot relied on a nitroglycerine-based bomb that could be assembled on the 
plane. This tactical innovation, among the first liquid bomb plots against aviation transport, 
was intended to circumvent airline security detection measures against dynamite or plastic 
explosives. Ever aware of intrusive airport security procedures, Yousef wanted to create a 
bomb that could be assembled on a plane rather than to rely on a ready-made one that risked 
detection prior to boarding. (Future plots by Al-Qaeda followed a similar modus operandi).  
 
In the 2011 workshop, experts  provided l imited support  to  the previous year ’s  f inding 
that ideo logy i s  important in inspir ing and leg i t imating WME attacks . It was previously argued 
at the 2010 workshop that groups with grandiose worldviews, millenarian ideologies, or deep 
feelings of humiliation are less likely to impede the use of mass casualty terrorism than those with 
clearly defined objectives. The case studies from this year’s workshop offer conflicting evidence 
concerning this proposition. 
 
• Racist and anti-government ideologies were important in inspiring WME plots in America’s 
extreme right movement, and Ramzi Yousef’s hatred of the United States and affiliation with 
Islamist extremists certainly removed any moral inhibitions on killing hundreds of innocent 
passengers on American airliners. 
• The absence of a strong ideology among Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland may 
help explain their lack of interest in WME innovations. Similarly, the FARC's transformation 
from a revolutionary communist movement to one that is predominantly concerned with 
maintaining its war economy helps explains the absence of WMEs in Colombia. 
  
However, terrorist campaigns by the LTTE and Chechen rebels, two of the deadliest 
insurgent movements in the post-WWII period, featured numerous innovations that led to mass 
casualties, yet experts did not highlight ideology as a primary driver of these deadly innovations.  
 
• In the case of the LTTE, the brutality of the conflict, the access to technical and financial 
support from the Tamil diaspora, and the desire to be seen as a proto-state were much more 
important than ideology in producing innovations. 
• In the case of Chechen rebels, it was noted that Shamil Basaev was hardly motivated by 
ideology; his operational successes were the result of extensive military training, battlefield 
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experience, and environmental factors (brutal civil war, access to arms, and security 
corruption) that facilitated innovation.          
 
These cases and others suggest that ideo logy can be a fac tor in inspir ing WME innovat ions,  but 




Experts in the 2011 workshop gave more weight to the role of safe havens and external 
support in the production of WME innovations than did participants in the 2010 workshop. From 
the cases selected for analysis, it is clear that groups that had safe  havens and external  sources  o f  
support  were more success ful  in innovat ing than those who did not . The Black September 
Organization, the LTTE, Chechen rebels, and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan had the advantage 
of safe havens, or at least vast areas of operation that gave them sufficient space to train, 
experiment, and shelter their weaponry and fighters.  
 
• Black September selected the Olympics in West Germany as a “target of opportunity” 
because of the permissive environment in that country, where Palestinian students and 
émigrés, and sympathetic radical left-wing groups, facilitated smaller attacks in the lead up to 
the Olympics plot. Operational success also depended on the training of terrorists in Libya 
and the collusion of Arab consulates and embassies in smuggling weapons and providing 
forged travel documents to the operatives.  
• The LTTE controlled a third of Sri Lanka, mainly in the north, allowing it to organize its 
own army, navy, air force, police, judiciary, education, and satellite television station. 
Moreover, it benefited tremendously from financial and technical assistance given to it by 
the Tamil diaspora. 
• In the Chechen case, the presence of widespread corruption created what could be called 
“legal safe havens” through which terrorists were able to bribe their way through 
checkpoints and airport security procedures. Moreover, the inclusion of Arab fighters 
opened channels of funding from the Middle East. 
 
Conversely, the case study discussion highlighted that groups that lacked safe havens and 
external sponsors either did not innovate or usually failed in their innovations. This was the case 
with America’s extreme right groups and Northern Ireland’s Loyalist paramilitaries. In both 
instances, these groups encountered community policing, vigilant security services that infiltrated 
their ranks, and hardly any support from external sponsors. 
Ramzi Yousef’s foiled Bojinka plot did have the benefit of external sponsors, but it lacked 
the advantage of a physical safe haven. Had the apartment fire that exposed the plot to the 
Philippines police taken place in Afghanistan under the Taliban, chances are Yousef would have 




Predictive indicators refer to the observable steps and preparatory behaviors leading to the 
innovative terrorist attack that could have revealed the terrorists’ intent had they been investigated 
thoroughly.  
In the 2010 workshop, experts highlighted some predictive indicators that could help flag or 
foil terrorist innovations. They cautioned, however, that the evolutionary nature of innovation, 
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which is marked by gradual learning and adaptation, and the seemingly endless possibilities of 
combining older innovations in new ways make it difficult to pinpoint the trajectory of specific 
innovations. They agreed that intelligence and/or law enforcement work are indispensable for 
detecting and preventing WME attacks. 
The 2011 workshop reinforced these findings and emphasized the importance of human 
intelligence and police vigilance in foiling innovative plots. Where these factors were lacking, as in 
the 1972 Munich Olympics operation, terrorists were successful; when they were present, as in the 
Bojinka plot, terrorists were foiled.  
 
• In the Munich plot, previous Black September terrorist operations in West Germany 
should have led to robust security measures to protect the summer games. The terrorists 
were able to conduct repeatedly hostile reconnaissance of the target as well as gain 
employment in the Olympic Village. Eight terrorists easily scaled the outer perimeter fence 
and smuggled weapons into the site, despite earlier warnings that terrorists could target 
Israeli athletes. 
• In the Bojinka plot, the Philippine police acted with due diligence when they spotted a 
makeshift laboratory in a dingy Manila apartment that was set ablaze by volatile chemicals. 
They monitored the place and arrested one of the terrorists that came back to retrieve 
valuables. This simple vigilant act perhaps saved thousands of lives. 
 
Human intelligence also played a critical role in repeatedly foiling major plots: 
 
• In the case of extreme right terrorists in the U.S., the presence of FBI informants in the 
ranks of American racist and anti-government groups has prevented these extremists from 
executing WME operations on several occasions, including the 1997 plot by the True 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan discussed in this workshop.  
• Deep infiltration of Loyalists in Northern Ireland by the security services was also a factor 
for their lack of innovation. 
 
However, the 2011 workshop attendees were not overly optimistic about our ability to 
develop predictive indicators. Some experts argued that both workshops could help to pinpoint 
whether terrorist innovation is about to occur, but not the direction of innovation. Others stated 
that prediction might be possible in the case of individual terrorist groups, not in the case of 
terrorism in general. 
Experts suggested new avenues for research to build on this two-year study. Specifically, we 
know little about why terrorists show a predilection for some attacks over others. Why do some 
targets become iconic in the eyes of terrorists? Why do they persist in attacking those iconic targets, 
as opposed to attacking targets that might be closer or easier? One recommendation was that we 
should consider the study of terrorist targeting as a follow-on project. 
A second recommendation involved a different focus: the terrorists themselves. Experts 
suggested we should concentrate on the terrorists in order to understand the decision-making 
processes within their organizations. The overall goal of the research would be to observe how the 
terrorists articulate the discussion about innovation, and to uncover restraints on their actions. 
A third recommendation entailed redressing the paucity in research on the diffusion of 
terrorist innovation. We should seize this opportunity to investigate how terrorist innovation spread 
from one organization to another now that we have a better understanding of how innovation 
emerges in the first place. 
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In 2011, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) sponsored a workshop to analyze 
the causes, processes, and preparatory behaviors associated with terrorist innovations in weapons of mass 
effect (WMEs). The objective was to generate predictive indicators that could help counterterrorism 
specialists in law enforcement and intelligence organizations respond to emergent threats in the use 
of WMEs. Organized jointly by the Center on Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews, this workshop built upon a 2010 DTRA-sponsored workshop and research report with a 
similar mission, but drawing on different case studies and expert participants.3 The goals of the 2011 
workshop were two-fold. 
 
1. To broaden the conclusions reached during the 2010 meeting by drawing on new case 
studies that may confirm or challenge earlier expert findings.  
2. To analyze negative cases of innovation, i.e. cases where the terrorists attempted to innovate 
but could not bring their efforts to fruition (failed innovation), or were thwarted in their 
undertaking (foiled innovation), or never attempted to innovate in the first place. 
 
Expanding Previous Research 
 
In 2010, in Phase I of this project, DTRA invited experts to analyze seven historical and 
contemporary incidents of terrorist innovation:  
 
• Airline hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) between 1968 
and 1972. 
• The 1973 assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco by Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA).  
• The 1984 attempted assassination of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA).  
• The 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.  
• The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh. 
• Al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. 
• The July 7, 2005 bombings of the London Underground and bus system by a cell of 
radicalized British Muslims with links to militants in Pakistan. 
 
The experts assessed three categories of terrorist innovation: tactical, strategic, and 
organizational, with emphasis placed on the first two. Tactical innovation usually involves inventing or 
adopting new techniques or technologies to achieve unchanging objectives. Strategic innovation 
entails formulating new objectives, which necessitate the adoption of new operations, targets, or 
technologies to advance those objectives. Organizational innovation involves new ways of 
structuring the terrorist group or inventive methods of drawing recruits and/or popularizing the 
group’s ideas. 
Each specialist was asked to explore the preconditions, causes, and predictive indicators associated 
with terrorist innovation. Preconditions refer to the context in which innovation took place. This 
includes political, technological, or security developments which made innovation by terrorist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Rasmussen and Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations,” 2010. 
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groups more or less likely. Causes are those internal and external drivers that directly precipitate 
innovation or accelerate its progress. Predictive indicators refer to the observable steps and 
preparatory behaviors leading to the innovative terrorist attack that could have revealed the 
terrorists’ intent, had they been investigated thoroughly. 
Given DTRA’s mission of countering weapons of mass destruction, we focused our analysis 
on terrorist weapons of mass effect. We measured WMEs by their lethality (at least 100 fatalities); 
destructiveness (devastation in at least one square mile in urban settings or 10 square miles in rural 
areas); disruptive impact (damage to at least one critical facility, significant interruptions in services, or 
at least 10 billion dollars in economic losses for a major power like the U.S.); and/or severe adverse 
psychological effects on mass publics.4 
For each case study, experts explored independently a set of questions to facilitate 
comparative analysis of patterns across cases: 
 
• What factors internal and external to the terrorist organization motivated innovation? What 
were the incentives to innovate? 
• What were the leadership and organizational requirements for innovation? Did top leaders 
within the organization drive innovation or did aspiring terrorist entrepreneurs outside of the 
leadership hierarchy drive it? Did the structure of the organization shape in any way the pace 
of innovation or receptivity to it? 
• When and in what context did innovation occur in the evolutionary cycle of the terrorist 
group? Were there any particular accelerants of innovation such as technological change, 
social or/and political contexts, ideological shifts, state sponsorship, or/and security 
countermeasures? 
• Was the catalyst for innovation more a result of pressures internal or external to the terrorist 
organization? 
• Looking back, would it have been possible for counterterrorism specialists to observe and 
connect together the developments that made innovation possible? What indicators would 
have enabled security specialists to anticipate the trajectory of innovation? 
• Looking forward, what does your case tell us about how innovation in terrorism takes place? 
How might your case inform future efforts to forecast emergent advances in terrorist 
methods of attack, especially the use of WMEs? 
 
This workshop structure provided an opportunity for competitive analyses and encouraged 
informed dialogue across cases. The goal all along has been to think analytically and systematically 
about the underlying factors—the critical drivers—that bring tactical, strategic, and organizational 
innovations to fruition. The findings from Phase I are included in a separate report, which we urge 
you to read.5 
In 2011, in Phase II of the project, we wanted to test the validity of our earlier findings by 
applying the conceptual and analytical frameworks of Phase I to a new set of case studies. We 
invited discussion of the 1972 Munich Olympics hostage crisis, in which the Palestinian Black 
September Organization (BSO) held, and eventually killed, nine Israeli athletes and officials 
attending the summer games. This was an important case study because it was the first act of 
terrorism against the Olympics, setting a precedent that has, unfortunately, inspired other terrorist 
attempts on this global sporting event. The 1972 Munich Olympics also became the iconic symbol 
of international terrorism in the twentieth century. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For further discussion of the definition of WMEs, see Appendix 1. 
5 Rasmussen and Hafez, “Terrorist Innovations,” 2010.  
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In Phase II, we widened our focus beyond specific incidents of innovation, looking at 
terrorist campaigns by groups that have been particularly innovative over time, such as the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 1976, and the Chechen campaign against Russia 
since 1999. Closer to home, we explored the evolution in the design, delivery, and placement of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan and Iraq in the last decade.  
 
Analyzing Negative Cases 
 
Experts in Phase I of the project recommended strongly that we avoid the trap of looking 
only at successful cases of terrorist innovation. We can learn a lot by analyzing cases of failed or 
foiled innovations as well. Studying such cases enables us to understand the obstacles that stand in 
the way of innovation, and will allow us to derive lessons for counterterrorism. Thus, in Phase II, we 
discussed three failed or foiled plots:  
 
• The Bojinka plot, in which Ramzi Yousef attempted to blow up eleven airplanes over 
Southeast Asia in 1995. 
• The True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan's plot to blow up natural gas storage tanks near Ft. 
Worth, Texas, in 1997.  
• Al Qaeda’s short-lived campaign of chlorine truck bombs in Iraq in 2006-07. 
 
Another recommendation which emerged out of our first workshop was that we should 
analyze why some terrorist groups do not seek to innovate, even when they appear to have the same 
objectives, resources, and organizational structures which have favored innovation in other cases. 
Therefore, in Phase II we explored why terrorist organizations seem uninterested in maritime 
terrorism, despite fears that maritime transport is vulnerable to such attacks. We also looked closely 
at the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a hierarchical and very wealthy 
organization that also controlled roughly one third of the national territory over decades but did not 
seem too interested in innovation. Finally, we studied the Protestant terrorist organizations in 
Northern Ireland, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF, the military wing of the Ulster Defense 
Association) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which were in competition not only with each 
other but also with the highly innovative IRA, and yet confined themselves to a repetitive repertoire 
of actions.  
The table below summarizes the cases selected in Phase II and lists the invited specialists 
that gathered for the workshop at the University of St. Andrews on 6-7 October 2011.6 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Biographical information on each researcher is in Appendix VII. 
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Innovative Attacks and Campaigns 
Time Frame Case Study Organization Researchers 
1972 Munich Olympics  Black September Organization 
Ariel Merari 
Andrew Silke 
1976-2009 Campaign in Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers Chris Smith Shanaka Jayasekara 
1999-2006 Campaign in Chechnya Shamil Basaev’s Network 
Cerwyn Moore 
Adam Dolnik 
2001-2011 IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq Insurgent Groups 
Thomas Johnson 
Richard Morales 
Failed, Foiled, and Untried Innovations 
Time Frame Case Study Perpetrators Researcher 
1995 Foiled Bojinka plot Ramzi Yousef Zachary Abuza 
1997 Foiled plot to bomb natural gas plant in Texas 
True Knights of 
the KKK Paul Brister 
2006-2007 Failed chlorine bombs Al-Qaeda in Iraq Michael Knights 
2006 Government policy as a foil for terrorist innovation N/A Javier Argomaniz 
N/A Absence of maritime terrorism N/A Peter Lehr 
N/A Absence of Loyalist innovations in N. Ireland N/A Jonathan Tonge 
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SECTION 2: THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS HOSTAGE CRISIS 
 
On 5 September 1972, during the Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany, eight terrorists 
from the Palestinian Black September Organization (a cover for the Fatah faction of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization or PLO) entered the Olympic Village and took nine Israeli athletes and 
officials hostage. Two additional athletes were killed while offering resistance. The terrorists 
demanded the release of 233 Palestinian prisoners from Israelis jails and of two Red Army Faction 
terrorists held in West Germany. After Israel refused to accede to their demands, the West German 
security forces devised a hostage rescue plan that went awry, resulting in the death of all nine 
hostages, a German police officer, and five terrorists. The three remaining terrorists were arrested, 
but were freed two months later following another hostage incident. 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
In this panel, Prof. Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, and Prof. Andrew Silke, University of 
East London, discussed the innovative aspects of this attack, analyzed the factors that contributed to 
the formation of Black September, and its decision to strike at Munich. Dr. Mohammed Hafez, 
Naval Postgraduate School, moderated the session. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Both experts agreed that the main innovation in this attack lay in its taboo-breaking target 
selection: the Olympics. As Prof. Silke pointed out, the Olympics had never been attacked prior to 
1972, but virtually every Summer Olympics since that date has been threatened by some terrorist 
plot. Hundreds of millions of live television viewers and radio listeners provided the terrorists with 
the ultimate stage on which to air their grievances and act out their armed struggle against Israel. 
Indeed, this attack became the iconic symbol of terrorism in the 20th century. 
Munich also represented a strategic innovation for Fatah. Prior to this episode, the 
organization had limited its armed struggle to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. The 
shift to international terrorism marked a departure from the local to the global, from the 
conservative to the spectacular. Additionally, Dr. Adam Dolnik (Marshall Center and University of 
Wollongong) noted that Munich represents a tactical innovation. For the first time, the terrorists 
were willing to execute their hostages en masse. However, this innovation was accidental. The 
terrorists had not set deadlines for the execution of hostages. The latter were killed only after the 
security forces opened fire on the terrorists. 
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
According to Prof. Merari, the innovation at Munich must be understood in the context of 
the ignominious defeat of Palestinian guerrilla factions based in Jordan at the hands of forces loyal 
to the Jordanian monarch, King Hussein. The civil war, which began in September 1970 and ended 
in July 1971, became known as the events of Black September (hence the name of the new terrorist 
faction). The Palestinian guerrillas were expelled from Jordan and were thus deprived of a base from 
which to attack Israel. Many of the Palestinian fighters eventually settled in Lebanon, but it took 
them several years to open that front for attacks against northern Israel. The defeat of 1970-71 
constituted a major crisis for the PLO. The events of Black September were highly demoralizing to 
Palestinians, who three years earlier had suffered the defeat of the 1967 Six Day War. “Fatah felt it 
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must do something dramatic,” argued Prof. Merari. Unable to attack Israel from Jordan, Fatah now 
viewed international terrorism as an attractive option. 
More importantly, the events of Black September in Jordan precipitated a period of intra-
organizational strife within Fatah. A younger generation of Fatah cadres, bitter at the incompetence 
of senior “armchair” revolutionaries who led them to defeat in a critical front state, began to splinter 
off into more radical factions, demanding the intensification of the armed struggle for liberation. 
The formation of the Black September Organization and the Munich operation were proactive 
measures intended to keep younger and radical cadres within the organizational fold—albeit under 
the cover of a new faction designed to avenge the events in Jordan. These intra-organizational 
schisms were exacerbated by competition among Fatah’s top leadership in the Central Committee. 
Specifically, Salah Khalaf (better known as Abu Iyad), the mastermind of the Munich operation, was 
partially blamed for the disastrous defeat in Jordan and deposed from his high-ranking intelligence 
position within Fatah. The demotion led him in a more radical direction in an effort to regain his 
organizational prestige and power base. 
In summary, the main push for Munich came from Fatah’s perception that it was losing the 
allegiance of the Palestinian people and needed to boost their morale; and from the need to respond 
to intra-organizational rivalries, fueled by personality clashes among top leaders. However, both 
experts concur that Black September, as a front group for the PLO, was able to draw on the support 
and leadership of a larger, hierarchical and centralized organization that had plenty of financial and 
military resources at its disposal, as well as a long history and extensive experience with a variety of 
terrorist repertoires. This finding conforms to the key judgment of experts from last year’s 
workshop that larger, centralized organizations seem more capable of innovation than smaller, 
resource-poor ones. 
In addition, according to both experts, Munich represented a “target of opportunity” for 
Black September. The presence of Palestinian students and émigrés in Europe familiar with the 
language and operational arena, and of sympathetic radical left-wing groups, provided the terrorists a 
reservoir of local talent from which to draw intelligence and assistance. Perhaps more important for 
operational success, Prof. Merari argues, was the collusion of Arab consulates and embassies in 
smuggling weapons and providing forged travel documents as well as a safe haven to the terrorists. 
Prof. Silke pointed to the “shocking vulnerability of the target” as another precondition for 
the innovative operation. Munich’s security budget, in 2010 prices, was 10 million dollars; whereas 
the 2012 London Olympics have a security budget of over one billion dollars. The lax security of the 
West German authorities was not only shocking in retrospect; there were a number of warning 
signals at the time that should have led to diligent security procedures. The fact that Palestinian 
terrorists had been operating in West Germany for some time prior to the Olympics hostage crisis 
was not the least of these warning signs. 
Abu Iyad had three objectives for the Munich attack: 
 
• To highlight the cause of the Palestinians and remind the world of their plight; 
• To use the extraordinary concentration of mass media assembled for the widely-popular 
Summer Olympics; and 
• To humiliate Israel by forcing it to release Palestinian prisoners. 
 
According to Prof. Merari, there was an ancillary reason why Abu Iyad selected the Munich 
Olympics as a target: the refusal of the Olympic Committee to include a Palestinian delegation in the 
summer games. Abu Iyad reportedly said, “Let’s participate in the Olympics in our own way.” 
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Preparatory Behaviors 
 
The experts disagreed on the duration of the preparations for the operation, with estimates 
ranging from seven weeks to eight months. However, they agreed that the terrorists undertook a 
number of preparatory measures, some of which could have signaled that a terrorist plot was in the 
making. First, the terrorists’ travel patterns should have alerted security operatives that an operation 
was being prepared. Team members carrying poorly forged passports were sent to European 
countries, including Germany, to acquire familiarity with local customs and habits, although they 
were not briefed on the target until later in the planning process. Team members also underwent 
extensive military training in Libya. Second, a more comprehensive security apparatus at the 
Olympic Village would have alerted the authorities. The two Black September commanders 
conducted reconnaissance tours and visited the Olympic Village. According to Prof. Silke, the two 
commanders secured jobs inside the Olympic Village, which points to a poor vetting process. Once 
employed, they frequently visited out-of-bound areas within the compound. 
 
Consequences of Innovation 
 
Both experts agreed that while the 1972 Munich operation did not succeed in releasing 
hostages or achieving the Palestinian goal of statehood, it was seen as a success for the organization. 
According to Prof. Merari, this operation saw the PLO through a dangerous period in which it could 
have lost command of the Palestinian people to competitors inside Jordan as well as the West Bank. 
The PLO was able to recapture the initiative and survive a critical defeat until it built up its guerrilla 
infrastructure in Lebanon by the mid 1970s. Media attention during the operation, and Israel’s 
reprisals after Munich, drove many volunteers into Fatah and gave newfound legitimacy to an 
organization previously beset by factional infighting and second-guessing.
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SECTION 3: ADAPTIVE INNOVATION: IEDS IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 
   
Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have introduced improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) to the battlefield with deadly effect. Initial efforts to counter these homemade bombs have 
produced waves of insurgent innovations in the design, placement, and delivery of IEDs. As a result, 
IEDs have been responsible for the vast majority of deaths and injuries of Coalition Forces in Iraq 
and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. While individual IEDs 
fabricated by insurgents cannot be classified as Weapons of Mass Effect, the cumulative injurious 
consequences of IEDs on American and allied forces have been massive in scale and scope—
physically, psychologically, and economically. Tracing the evolution of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan 
may reveal a great deal about what motivates innovation and how the process of innovation occurs. 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
Mr. Thomas Johnson, an Afghanistan specialist at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Col. 
Richard Morales, United States Army, discussed innovations in IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
the adaptive nature of insurgent actors in those arenas. Dr. Mark Currie, University of St. Andrews, 
chaired this panel. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Both speakers were impressed with the ability of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan to vex 
the world’s superpower with homemade bombs produced out of relatively modest means and 
capabilities. The innovations in IEDs have taken place in a broader context of an asymmetrical 
conflict in which the weaker party had to innovate and adapt against their powerful adversary. 
In Afghanistan, insurgents have been innovative on several fronts. They created a shadow 
government to help local villages address needs (e.g. land and water right disputes) left unaddressed 
by the central government in Kabul. They also used information operations effectively. Displaying 
media savvy, the insurgents’ information operations deploy traditional and new media technologies 
in a systematic strategic communication plan designed to prevent us from winning local hearts and 
minds. Lastly, they conducted sophisticated targeted assassination missions that mimic the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) drone-led targeted killings. 
The Taliban is more adaptive than innovative, argued Mr. Johnson. Its need to innovate is 
muted by the defensive nature of its war. The Afghans have been fighting for decades and have 
nowhere else to go. They have time on their side and are less driven to take the initiative in a war of 
attrition against an adversary that is sensitive to casualties and economic costs. Key to the Taliban’s 
success has been its “local knowledge of social and cultural dynamics and local terrain.” It exploits 
this advantage to the hilt. 
When it comes to IEDs, the media and the general public tend to focus on roadside bombs, 
but insurgents in both the Iraqi and Afghan arenas have been able to innovate in a variety of ways: 
 
• Through car and truck bombs (or vehicle-borne IEDs, VBIEDs) 
• Wiring homes with explosives (house-borne IEDs, HBIEDs) 
• Using suicide bombers of varying ages, genders, profiles, and delivery and detonation 
methods (in Afghanistan, turban [lunge] bombs are increasingly used in suicide bombings) 
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Even the placement of IEDs involved a great deal of learning and innovation. For example, 
insurgents would place IEDs in a visible place so they can be dug out easily, but they would also 
place secondary ones buried deeper below and rigged to explode as the visible ones were removed.  
According to Col. Morales, another important aspect of IED innovation relates to insurgent 
adaptation to countermeasures. Insurgents study the habits, maneuvers, and countermeasures of the 
adversary and react accordingly. He provided a number of examples of variations in EFPs 
(explosively-formed projectiles) which the insurgents employed as they experimented with 
alternative ways to target our armored vehicles. “Within a week they would adjust to our tweaks.”      
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
Col. Morales pointed out that innovation in IEDs was usually preceded by several 
conditions. Overstretched military resources (especially prior to the surge in Iraq) and our poor 
coordination with the locals allowed insurgents to establish safe havens where they could experiment 
and improve on IED designs. (In Afghanistan, the terrain naturally provided a safe haven). In 
addition, the availability of unsecured munitions that could serve as powerful ordnances in IEDs, 
reduced the obstacles to innovation.  
Dr. Michael Knights, an Iraq specialist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
highlighted the role of money in the IED innovation process. Insurgent commanders use money 
effectively to ensure continuous improvements in the design and deployment of IEDs. Those cells 
that succeed get the money, while those that fail repeatedly are cut off from the distribution list. 
Consequently, cells have a strong incentive to innovate on the design and delivery of their IEDs lest 
they lose a lucrative source of income. Jihadi videos that we often view as propaganda are actually 
produced as proof that IEDs have accomplished the task for which money was paid. 
Col. Morales concurred with this assessment, adding that insurgents had a pay structure that 
rewarded cells based on the type of vehicles they were able to destroy or immobilize with their 
IEDs. Mr. Johnson also agreed that money is an important source of innovation in Afghanistan, 
pointing to evidence that Taliban insurgents sent proof of their IED attacks to sponsors inside 
Pakistan to substantiate their proper use of funds.
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SECTION 4: FAILED AND FOILED INNOVATIONS 
 
Making generalizations about innovations in terrorism requires us to investigate cases in 
which innovations failed or were foiled. Looking at negative cases can have both theoretical and 
policy implications. By comparing successful and failed/foiled innovations, we can isolate the 
variables present in the former but not the latter, and argue with confidence that those variables are 
necessary if innovation is to occur. In addition, by studying failed and foiled innovations we may be 
able to identify measures to preclude or block terrorist innovations in the future. 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
This panel discussed two failed plots. Prof. Zachary Abuza, National War College, discussed 
lessons learned from Ramzi Yousef’s 1995 Bojinka Plot and Dr. Michael Knights, Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, discussed Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s short-lived chlorine bombing campaign 
in 2006-2007. The panel also included a foiled plot: Maj. Paul Brister, Naval Postgraduate School, 
discussed the factors that prevented the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from bombing a gas 
refinery outside of Ft. Worth, Texas, in 1997. Dr. Mohammed Hafez chaired this panel. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
   
The Boj inka Plot ,  1995 
 
Bojinka was an imaginative and complex plot by the terrorist mastermind Ramzi Yousef to 
bring down as many as 11 or 12 U.S. airliners over the Pacific. He designed a small nitroglycerine-
based bomb that could be hidden in contact lens solution bottles. The blasting caps were to be 
hidden in the heel of a shoe, while a Casio watch would serve as a detonator. The bomb’s 
components, which would have been able to circumvent extant airport security measures, were to be 
assembled on planes by a team of five terrorists that would board flights, deplane, and transfer to 
connecting ones. Two weeks before execution, however, the volatile chemicals necessary for the plot 
caught fire and the police discovered the makeshift bomb-making laboratory in a Manila, Philippines 
apartment. Police staked out the apartment building waiting for its inhabitants to return. They 
captured one of the team members, who eventually led them to the entire cell. 
According to Prof. Abuza, this case represents tactical, strategic, and organizational 
innovation. Tactically, this was only the third time that any terrorist group had resorted to a liquid 
bomb. Previous terrorist plots relied on dynamite or plastic explosives. Ever aware of intrusive 
airport security procedures, Yousef wanted to create a bomb that could be assembled on a plane 
rather than rely on a ready-made one that could be detected prior to boarding. The use of a 
nitroglycerine-based bomb was an incremental innovation on Yousef’s part. It built on his earlier use 
of this material during the 1993 car bomb attack on New York’s World Trade Center. The Bojinka 
bomb was tested twice in December 1994. The first test was in a movie theater in Manila, which 
wounded several people, and the second in the airline bombing of PAL 434, which killed a Japanese 
businessman. Yousef concluded from these “test runs” that the bomb had to be made bigger to 
ensure the airplane’s complete destruction. Therefore, argues Prof. Abuza, the tactical innovation 
was successful despite the fact that the Bojinka plot never materialized. 
Strategically, this plot, had it succeeded, would have turned common household items into 
weapons of mass effect—killing hundreds of passengers, causing extensive economic disruptions 
and losses in the billions of dollars, perhaps bringing international air travel to a halt. 
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Organizationally, the Bojinka plot was innovative because Yousef marshaled resources 
without creating a formal organization. Contrary to a common misconception, this plot was not the 
product of a lone wolf terrorist. Yousef drew upon a network of operatives, not the least of which 
was his infamous uncle Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). KSM set up front companies to finance 
the operation and mask potentially suspicious chemical purchases. Yousef drew upon regional 
militants through his earlier connections with extremists in Afghanistan and the Philippines, but 
avoided an organizational structure that could constrain his ambitious plots. He was truly 
transnational, but equally independent.  
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
Prof. Abuza pointed out several factors that drove the Bojinka plot forward. The most 
important of these was Ramzi Yousef's skill, experience, and imagination. Yousef had a master’s 
degree in electrical engineering, and technical experience and skills developed during months spent 
in Afghanistan’s Khalidin Camp, where Al-Qaeda and other terrorists acquired extensive training in 
the assembly and use of explosives. His earlier use of nitroglycerine-based bombs allowed him to 
learn from past failures (or partial successes). Designing the perfect bomb became an obsession. In 
addition, Yousef was the “quintessential maniacal entrepreneur” who distrusted organizations and 
wanted to leave an indelible mark through his nefarious deeds. According to Prof. Abuza, Yousef 
“did not just want to be a terrorist, he wanted to be the terrorist.” 
Yousef’s kinship connection to KSM allowed him to tap into transnational financial and 
operational support necessary for a plot conceived by a person who did not wish to be constrained 
by a formal, hierarchical organization. Interestingly, the absence of an organization, argues Prof. 
Abuza, enabled Yousef to think big and act without organizational impediments. 
 
Reasons for Failed Innovation 
 
The Bojinka plot suffered from two major paradoxes: 
 
• Yousef did not wish to be constrained by an extensive organizational structure, but his 
complicated plot failed because of insufficient organizational resources. According to Prof. 
Abuza, the complexity of the bomb—the volatility of its chemicals—required near perfect 
laboratory conditions to fabricate the deadly mix. Forced to execute this operation on the 
cheap, Yousef could not pull it off. Being resource-poor led to the innovation in bomb 
design, but it also led to the fire in the dingy Manila apartment that exposed the plot.   
• Yousef’s larger-than-life imagination inspired this extremely complex plot, yet this 
complexity is beyond the reach of resource-poor terrorists, or those without major safe 
havens or state sponsors. If Yousef had limited his ambition to destroying one plane instead 
of 11 or 12, Bojinka may have succeeded.  
 
Prof. Abuza pointed to a third paradox in the Bojinka plot: Yousef’s bomb design was 
successful, yet no terrorist organization has sought to replicate it. He attributes this failure in 
diffusion to Yousef’s egotistical ambition and distrust of organizations, which were the drivers of 
the plot to begin with. Yousef did not like to share his knowledge because he wanted to be the man 
behind the spectacular act of terrorism. His manuals were technical in nature, not written for the 
average terrorist. Absent an organization, there were no channels for knowledge sharing and 
diffusion.   
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Chlor ine Bombs (2006-2007) 
 
Between 21 October 2006 and 1 July 2007, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) dispatched 19 car and 
truck bombs containing chlorine cylinders, some of which were as large as one-ton pressurized 
chlorine tanks. Their intent was to disperse noxious gas upon detonation. In addition to killing many 
people, these bombs were intended to increase the psychological potency of insurgent operations 
and slow down the rescue effort. First responders were forced to deploy gas masks or wait for the 
poisonous air to dissipate before they could attend to the injured. 
AQI is an extremist Sunni insurgent group with links to the transnational Al-Qaeda terrorist 
network. Its main goal in Iraq has been to spark sectarian warfare and destabilize the Shiite-led 
government so that it could be replaced by a radical Islamist state. One of its former leaders, Abu 
Ayub al-Masri (also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), had called on scientists from the Muslim 
world to develop improvised weapons of mass destruction for use against the United States and its 
allies. The use of chlorine bombs in Iraq was an important escalation in the insurgency because it 
signaled the willingness of insurgents to experiment with chemical weapons on a massive scale. 
Fortunately, chlorine bombs proved ineffective. Chlorine thins rapidly, particularly in strong winds, 
which diminishes its lethal effect. To be deadly, chlorine must be inhaled in large and concentrated 
quantities, which usually requires significant atmospheric stability, low wind speeds, and median air 
temperatures. In addition, explosions tend to burn off the gas, rather than disperse it, further 
reducing its deadly potential. Thus, dispersal by explosives is not the ideal method for terrorists. 
AQI abandoned these innovative bombs. Dr. Knights maintained that the main reason had 
to do with the “intent, not capabilities” of AQI. The latter could have continued to experiment and 
perhaps improve the design of their chlorine bombs, but the intended strategy behind these attacks 
was no longer viable.   
 
• The chlorine bombing campaign was a highly localized phenomenon, mainly around the 
Ramadi and Fallujah districts (13 out of 19 attacks were in those two districts). 
• AQI’s objective was to intimidate Sunni tribal leaders who were making alliances with 
Coalition Forces and the Iraqi government under the auspices of the “Sons of Iraq” 
program, which had as its goal the elimination of AQI and other insurgent groups from their 
Sunni strongholds. 
• AQI realized that the bombs failed to intimidate the intended targets. 
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
According to Dr. Knights, crisis and desperation—and a quest for survival—is what drove 
AQI to innovate in the use of chlorine bombs. Prior to mid-2006, AQI enjoyed a hospitable safe 
haven in Anbar province. However, a new counterinsurgency strategy by Coalition Forces called for 
Sunni tribal alliances against insurgents. Tribal leaders were paid handsomely for recruiting their 
followers into local militias known as “Sons of Iraq.” These militias formed a broader movement 
called the “Anbar Awakening.” The objectives of these militias and local vigilantes was to clear their 
areas of AQI and other insurgent groups, capture their weapons caches, and act as local police to 
secure their areas. The Awakening movement threatened AQI’s operational space. The movement 
also sought to reconcile disgruntled Sunnis with a new Iraqi order that AQI sought to destabilize 
through sectarian warfare with the Shiite majority. Thus, AQI felt threatened physically and 
politically by the Awakening tribal movement. “Desperate times call for desperate measures,” argued 
Dr. Knights. 
AQI sought to regain its aura of intimidation by amplifying its messages of deterrence 
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through deadlier truck bombings against Sunni tribal leaders, militias, and local government 
buildings. The use of chlorine bombs was a sub-set of a larger campaign of intensified bombings 
and assassinations against AQI’s former allies. 
An important precondition to the use of chlorine bombs was the widespread availability of 
unsecured chlorine canisters in Iraq, and in Fallujah (Anbar province) in particular, where Iraq’s 
largest chlorine manufacturing plant is located. Insurgents can acquire chlorine tanks from water and 
sewage treatment plants, where security is lax. 
 
Reasons for Failed Innovation 
 
Dr. Knights maintained that three factors help explain why AQI abandoned its use of 
chlorine bombs after July 2007: 
 
• The tactic proved ineffective for the aforementioned reasons. If the goal was to intimidate 
tribal leaders, the latter proved resilient against these attacks. 
• The tactic was controversial, so much so that AQI never claimed responsibility for its use. 
Rather than intimidate, it further added to the legitimacy of the tribal councils who were 
fighting the “criminal” network. 
• Most important of all, AQI was physically removed from the eastern Anbar province by late 
2007, thus removing any possibility of conducting operations in that area. These attacks were 
too little, too late to save AQI from the tide of the Awakening movement.  
 
Dr. Knights argued that AQI could revert to this tactic if it chose to, thus it is the intent 
behind these operations, not the limits of AQI’s capabilities, that is blocking further innovation in 
the use of chlorine bombs. 
 
The True Knights  o f  the KKK and the 1997 Foi led WME Bombing Plot  
 
In April 1997, the FBI’s North Texas Anti-Terrorism Task Force foiled a plot to blow up a 
natural gas refinery plant near Ft. Worth. According to the Bureau, upwards of 10,000 people could 
have been killed had the plot succeeded. A team of five would-be terrorists, belonging to the 
extreme right True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, conspired to plant bombs under gas storage tanks 
in order to release upon detonation highly toxic “sour gas” consisting of hydrogen sulfide. One of 
the bombs was to be placed in a highly visible location in order to attract a massive police presence. 
The conspirators not only wanted to kill a lot of people, but were also intending to create a colossal 
diversion to enable them to rob an armored cash transport vehicle. The terrorists’ aim was to amass 
money to fund a race war.  
Maj. Brister argued that this plot never stood a chance because the team leader, the Imperial 
Wizard Robert Spence, was an FBI informant. In fact, though numerous extreme right organizations 
in the United States have attempted to innovate with chemical and biological weapons, the FBI 
estimates that 15% of the membership of these groups is paid informants working for local, state or 
federal law enforcement. This plot is emblematic of the inability of extreme right (anti-government 
and racist) movements to bring their innovations to fruition. For example, in 1985 the Covenant, the 
Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA, a survivalist group) attempted to poison the water supplies in 
major U.S. cities with potassium cyanide, unaware that in large reservoirs, the poison would be 
diluted and lose its effectiveness. In 1991, members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a tax 
protester group, developed ricin by following instructions from a mail order catalog. They intended 
to use the toxin on local and federal officials. The wife of a group member contacted the Sheriff's 
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Department before the terrorist plans were fully formed. In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a 
microbiologist and militant in the Aryan Nations and Christian Patriots, developed bubonic plague 
with a view to attacking the New York City subway, but was arrested after an acolyte contacted the 
FBI. 
The plot featured several shortcomings common to other foiled conspiracies by the extreme 
right: The group’s ambitious plans were unmatched by organizational knowledge, skills, and 
resources necessary for successful execution. Law enforcement had infiltrated the organization, even 
at the highest leadership levels. In addition, the extreme right was and is fragmented and its leaders 
are constantly involved in personality squabbles. The extreme right has therefore produced an 
abundance of innovative plots with grand targeting logic, but lacks the organizational resources, 
skills, and experience necessary to bring these ambitious conspiracies to fruition. 
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
Maj. Brister pointed out that since Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah building in Oklahoma City, there have been at least 75 plots by extreme right wing groups, 
the vast majority of which fell below the threshold of WME conspiracies. However, seven of those 
(nearly 10%) could have be classified as WME plots, had they not failed or been foiled.  
This fascination with WME attacks, argued Maj. Brister, is directly linked to three factors: 
 
• Ideology – The ideological underpinnings of anti-government and racist groups preclude 
incremental reforms within existing political structures. Therefore, right wing extremists 
believe that their violence is necessary and could actually spark a revolutionary upheaval that 
would encourage like-minded groups to take up arms against the government or unleash a 
national race war. 
• Deficiency in resources – The vast majority of members of the extreme right movement is 
significantly undereducated and comes from lower socio-economic strata. Being resource-
poor, extreme right groups cannot rely on significant financial and organizational resources 
with which to advance their agendas through conventional political means, especially in a 
context where the government and nongovernmental organizations such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) seek to bankrupt them 
though legal action. Deficiency in resources drives these groups to think innovatively about 
ways to cause mass effect on the cheap. 
• Fragmentation and intra-movement competition – As noted earlier, this competition 
drives groups to differentiate themselves by producing spectacular attacks.  
 
Reasons why the Innovation was Foiled 
 
Major Brister believes that the “gap between intent and capabilities” is too wide for the 
atomized extreme right to succeed in executing WME plots. Unlike the case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 
chlorine bombs, where intent, not capabilities, was the reason for abandoning the WME innovation, 
extreme right groups have manifest intentions to use WMEs, but very few capabilities to do so. This 
movement lacks operational competence and intellectual acumen necessary for complicated 
conspiracies. Furthermore, vigilance by the authorities and effective use of informants facilitate early 
detection of complex plots. Lastly, watchdog nongovernmental organizations, such as the ADL and 
the SPLC, help expose dangerous rhetoric and behavior by extreme right groups, thus rendering an 
invaluable service to law enforcement agencies, especially when the latter are not focused on 
localized emerging threats.   
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Workshop Report  !22!
SECTION 5: OBSTACLES TO TERRORIST INNOVATIONS 
  
Historically, terrorists have been intent on attacking the aviation industry and remarkably 
innovative in this effort. The logic behind this target selection is obvious. As the late Prof. Paul 
Wilkinson, a leading expert on aviation terrorism, once explained, successful airline attacks enable 
terrorists to kill many people, instill fear in millions of airline passengers, impose tremendous 
economic costs on the targeted countries, and garner a global audience through unparalleled media 
coverage. 
Governments have been equally motivated to block aviation terrorism and have 
continuously undertaken new and intrusive security procedures at airports and on airplanes, in order 
to prevent successful attacks on airliners. This cat-and-mouse game between governments and 
terrorists raises two questions: 
 
1. Why do terrorists seem to fixate on certain target sets while remaining uninterested in 
others? 
2. How do governments innovate in countering terrorist innovations? 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
Dr. Peter Lehr and Dr. Javier Argomaniz, both from the University of St. Andrews, tackled 
these questions through two case studies. Dr. Lehr explained why terrorists are uninterested in 
maritime terrorism, and Dr. Argomaniz discussed the European Union’s response to the 2006 plot 
to bring down several airplanes using liquid bombs. Prof. Richard English, Director of the Centre 
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews, moderated the discussion. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Marit ime Terror ism  
 
Dr. Lehr pointed out that terrorists have taken very little interest in maritime terrorism. Only 
two percent of all bombing attacks can be categorized as maritime terrorism, and only two attacks 
were actually successful—the 2000 suicide attack of the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden (Yemen), and 
the 2002 suicide attack on the Limburg, a French supertanker transporting oil through the Gulf of 
Aden. “Why does it not happen more often?” asked Dr. Lehr. The discussion produced three 
possible explanations: 
 
1. Relatively unenticing targets – Unlike airlines, which are iconic targets, attacks on sea 
vessels do not offer terrorists the same advantages highlighted by the late Prof. Wilkinson: 
high kill rates, tremendous economic costs, and global media attention. If they are unable to 
attack the iconic targets (airplanes), terrorists will be drawn to easier targets than maritime 
ones, such as ground transportation (buses, railways, subways).  
2. Limited resources and capabilities – To achieve mass effect through maritime terrorism, 
terrorists will have to engage in “high impact/low probability” operations. The latter would 
require tremendous operational capabilities and resources, as well as sophisticated knowledge 
of maritime environments. These resources and capabilities are beyond the reach of most 
terrorist organizations.  
3. Muted psychological effect – Unlike airlines, ships are not a major source of 
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transportation around the world. The majority of the world’s population will view maritime 
terrorism as a local phenomenon that “will never happen to them” because they do not rely 
on sea transport. Therefore, this form of terrorism will not appeal to groups that seek global 
audiences. 
 
In short, maritime terrorism is neither sufficiently iconic, nor sufficiently easy for terrorists 
to contemplate. It falls somewhere between aviation terrorism (high impact/low probability) and 
ground transportation attacks (low impact/high probability). 
The discussion turned to future scenarios of maritime terrorism by states and sub-state 
actors. Dr. Lehr envisioned four possibilities: 
 
• Acts of piracy, especially ones linked to Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Horn of Africa, could 
develop as a source of terrorist funding or as an attempt to artificially raise the price of oil. 
“Piracy is the biggest threat to maritime security, not terrorism,” according to Dr. Lehr. 
While acknowledging the potential linkage between Al-Qaeda and Somali pirates, he insisted 
that most pirates are motivated by money, not political causes. 
• Deploying sea mines, is a real possibility because it has already been used by the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka to deny Indian and Sri Lankan naval forces unfettered access to their 
waters.  
• Developing mini-submarines to ferry money, illicit goods, people, and weapons is another 
potential scenario. The Colombian FARC has already demonstrated this capability. Dr. Lehr 
argued that mini-subs are not necessary for maritime terrorism unless the target is a high 
value one, in which case the submarine would be easily detected and would have only few 
minutes to engage its target. Mini-subs would probably be limited for transport purposes, 
not actual terrorist attacks.  
• Swarm attacks with small boats is another possibility. According to Dr. Lehr, Iran has 
already deployed this tactic on tankers and has trained personnel on scuba diving attacks. 
The Tamil Tigers have also used these tactics against the Sri Lankan navy.  
 
However, Dr. Lehr cautioned against an exaggerated sense of threat. He concluded that the 
real innovation in maritime terrorism would be for the terrorists to actually “embark on it in the first 
place.” 
 
Counterterror ism Measures in Response to Innovat ion 
 
Dr. Argomaniz discussed the EU’s counterterrorism measures in response to the highly 
innovative, but ultimately foiled, 2006 liquid explosives plot by British nationals linked to Al-Qaeda 
in Pakistan. The conspirators planned to use peroxide-based bombs to bring down 10 airliners over 
the Atlantic, which could have killed up to 7,000 people traveling from the United Kingdom to the 
United States and Canada, and would have certainly brought transatlantic air traffic to a halt.  
This tactical innovation in terrorism, argued Dr. Argomaniz, was driven by the need to 
circumvent post-9/11 airport security measures that made traditional aviation hijackings and 
bombing techniques potentially obsolete.  The essential preconditions that facilitated this plot 
included: 
 
• Access to household goods that could be transformed into explosives 
• Use of easily concealable bomb-making materials 
• Access to Pakistan-based terrorists who supplied the conspirators with training in the 
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manufacture and use of liquid explosives.  
 
Dr. Argomaniz was impressed with the “remarkably swift” implementation of new airline 
security procedures by the British government, which consisted of an initial ban on all hand luggage, 
followed by restrictions on the size of permissible hand baggage, and on the amount of liquids taken 
on board. More impressive, perhaps, is the lightning speed with which the EU countries 
implemented similar security regulations. After the conspirators’ arrests, it took all of three months 
for EU regulations to take effect. In less than six months, the new security rules were adopted 
worldwide, this despite complaints about delays from passengers and the airline industry. 
Dr. Argomaniz concluded that international organizations and institutions can play an 
important role in depriving terrorists of the preconditions for successful innovation. There have 
been at least two major liquid plots since 1995, so this regulation, which will begin to phase out in 
April 2013, probably has played a role in preventing others from developing. Having said that, Dr. 
Argomaniz noted that previously successful countermeasures to protect the aviation industry have 
spurred innovations in terrorist means and methods, as evidenced by the 2009 “underwear bomb” 
and 2010 “ink cartridge bomb,” both of which emanated from Al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen.   
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SECTION 6: INNOVATIONS OVER TIME: LTTE IN SRI LANKA 
 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka was one of the most lethal 
armed groups to deploy terrorism effectively and with mass effects. It sustained a campaign for over 
25 years, attacking by air, train, land, and sea. It is one of the few non-Islamist organizations to use 
suicide bombings consistently and effectively, even against high-value targets. The Tamils innovated 
in the use of suicide vests, promoted a cult of martyrdom, and deployed female human bombs. The 
organization had its own navy (Sea Tigers), air force (Sky Tigers), and uniformed guerrilla army with 
separate units for suicide missions (Black Tigers). The LTTE was a highly centralized, hierarchical 
organization around the cult-like figure of Velupillai Prabhakaran. 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
Dr. Chris Smith, Chatham House, and Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara, Macquarie University, 
discussed the critical drivers behind LTTE’s innovations over two and a half decades. The LTTE 
was a separatist organization that engaged in spectacular terrorist attacks that were as creative as they 
were effective. Dr. Orla Lynch, University of St. Andrews, chaired this panel. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Dr. Smith began his analysis by pointing out that the LTTE was one of the most successful 
insurgent groups since the Second World War. In its heyday, the LTTE controlled a third of Sri 
Lanka, mainly in the north. Therefore, it took a particularly brutal campaign in 2009 to destroy the 
organization, with perhaps as many as 40,000 civilian fatalities. Mr. Jayasekara pointed out that 
bringing about the defeat of the LTTE required a very determined government which continued to 
pour military resources into the offensive, in spite of the fact that as many as 6,000 Sri Lankan 
troops lost their lives in the last 18 months of the campaign. 
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
Dr. Smith and Mr. Jayasekara highlighted several factors that contributed to LTTE’s 
innovations, the most important of which was LTTE’s desire to create a state within a state. 
 
• LTTE ran a proto-state over the vast territory under its control in the north of Sri Lanka, 
organizing its own police force, judiciary, education, and satellite television. 
• The desire to be seen as a viable state for the Tamils contributed directly to the formation of 
state-like military institutions such as a navy, army, and air force. These military structures 
were symbolic of a state in the making. Success of military innovations advanced the profile 
of the LTTE, both internally and abroad. 
 
Both Dr. Smith and Mr. Jayasekara agreed that the LTTE’s safe haven in the north was a 
necessary precondition to innovation. This haven gave them the time and space to innovate, learn 
from their errors, and improve their capabilities as well as their operations. In addition, both 
presenters pointed to the ability of the LTTE to draw upon the vast human resources and financing 
available in the Tamil diaspora. The money, arms, and technical skills from abroad gave the LTTE 
the requisite material basis for innovating, especially since the LTTE did not have a state sponsor to 
provide it with financing and arms.  
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• Dr. Smith explained that the 1983 pogroms against Tamils led to the flight overseas, “setting 
in motion a diaspora who would fund the Tigers in the future.” 
• Many of the Tamils came from the “fishing caste,” which meant that they knew how to use 
the seas to transport goods and people to the south coast of India. 
• The LTTE created an anti-caste culture that promoted the ethos of meritocracy, thus 
drawing into its organization many educated, English-speaking Tamils who were being 
pushed away by Sri Lanka’s discriminatory practices in education and government.   
 
Dr. Smith pointed out that there is little evidence to suggest that the LTTE was innovative 
because it was competing with others. Prabhakaran, LTTE’s leader from the group’s inception until 
he was killed in 2009, eliminated all domestic competitors by the mid-1980s. So innovation was not 
driven by a desire to outcompete rivals. 
 
LTTE’s Sky Tigers as an Illustrative Case Study 
 
Mr. Jayasekara used the Sky Tigers as an illustrative case study of LTTE’s innovation 
process, highlighting three factors necessary for LTTE innovations:  
 
• the existence of maritime smuggling networks  
• the expertise and financing provided by the Tamil diaspora, and  
• the LTTE’s ambition to be viewed as a state in the making.  
 
The Sky Tigers were started by Vythilingam Sornalingam (Col. Shankar), an aeronautics 
engineer working for Air Canada before he joined the LTTE (he was killed in 2001). In the initial 
stages, the Sky Tigers experimented with micro-lights purchased from Australia. Thereafter, they 
purchased Czech-built fixed wing light aircraft and modified them to carry 30-50 kilo bombs with a 
release mechanism controlled by the pilot. The purchase was financed from Canada, but the planes 
were shipped to a flying school in South Africa. Next, they were transferred to Eritrea and 
disassembled for shipment to the LTTE via vessels that transported the planes in international 
waters off the coast of Sri Lanka. “As with all LTTE weapons supplies, the equipment was smuggled 
into Sri Lanka using fishing trawlers.” 
As for training pilots, the role of the diaspora community is also clear: 
 
• In 2005, two Tamils living abroad—one employed by an American airline company, and the 
other resident in Switzerland and working for a Swiss airline—conducted several training 
programs for LTTE pilots. 
• One LTTE pilot was trained in France and the Czech Republic with the help of activists 
from the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC) in Paris. 
• Some pilots were sent to Malaysia and Thailand for training. 
 
According to Mr. Jayasekara, LTTE developed the Sky Tigers to meet three major 
objectives: to develop offensive capabilities; to facilitate logistics operations; and to emulate state 
structures and exhibit the “trappings of a separate state.” 
The Sky Tigers were used in a number of attacks with varying degrees of success. Some 
sorties aimed at fuel storage facilities; others aimed to knock out radar installations and power 
stations in Colombo. At least one attack targeted Colombo’s International Airport, and several went 
after Sri Lankan airbases and military and naval facilities. The final mission was an airborne collision 
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impact attack on the Sri Lankan Tax Office building in Colombo. Mr. Jayasekara described how the 
LTTE built several runways to avoid detection and retaliation by Sri Lanka’s air force. Sky Tigers 
would take off from one runway and land in another, the latter usually covered in sand until a plane 
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SECTION 7: INNOVATIONS OVER TIME: CHECHEN INSURGENCY 
 
The Chechen insurgents fighting for independence from Russia have repeatedly carried out 
spectacular terrorist attacks since the second Chechen War began in 1999, including the 2004 Beslan 
school mass hostage taking which ended with the tragic death of 334 hostages. Similar to the LTTE, 
Chechen insurgents have unleashed a diverse terrorist campaign that brought down airliners, 
destroyed subway trains, and seized thousands of hostages. The Chechen insurgents combined 
traditional tactics with suicide bombings, including female human bombs, to produce high casualty 
rates.  
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
In this panel, Dr. Cerwyn Moore, University of Birmingham, and Dr. Adam Dolnik, George 
C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and University of Wollongong, discussed the 
innovations of the Shamil Basaev network and highlighted the role of his experience and leadership 
in innovative mass casualty terrorism against Russia and its regional allies. Dr. Tim Wilson, 
University of St. Andrews, moderated the discussion. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
According to Dr. Dolnik, Chechens have been much more innovative (and successful) than 
Al-Qaeda. The former has been able to carry out spectacular operations to which Al-Qaeda can only 
aspire. Their innovations have taken place on the tactical, strategic, and organizational levels. 
Tactically, Chechen rebels were among the first to video tape and televise beheadings in 
order to demoralize Russia’s conscript military. Chechen rebels were the first to plant and threaten 
to use radiological dispersal devices against major population centers. Chechen insurgents also used 
suicide bombers to strike in metro stations and on airplanes (they succeeded in bringing down two 
airliners near simultaneously in 2004). They are one of the few Islamist insurgent groups to use 
female suicide bombers, a method later emulated by other Islamists. Chechen insurgents have been 
able to strike at high value targets through targeted assassinations, including planting a bomb in a 
stadium, killing Akhmad Kayrov, a pro-Russia President of the Chechen republic, during a televised 
ceremony. 
Strategically, Chechen rebels have been able to take their war of independence to the heart 
of Russia’s cities, including Moscow. In doing so, they have used terrorist innovations to escalate the 
conflict and draw international attention to a relatively obscure regional struggle for independence. 
Specifically, they used lightning raids to capture hostages en masse and barricaded them in explosively 
rigged buildings while they publically negotiated their demands with the Russian authorities. The two 
most infamous and ultimately tragic barricade and hostage crises were the 2002 Nord-Ost siege, 
better known as the Moscow theater hostage crisis, in which 129 out of 850 were killed during a 
botched rescue attempt; and the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, in which 334 hostages out of 
more than 1,100 were killed in another failed rescue attempt (many of the victims were children).  
Another innovation was their use of female suicide bombers (the Black Widows). They videotaped 
and translated their statements in order to build a propaganda narrative of personal suffering and 
redemptive revenge by women who presumably were raped or otherwise traumatized at the hands of 
Russia’s military offensives. 
Organizationally, Dr. Moore noted, the Chechens effectively incorporated foreign fighters 
into their forces in order to draw financial support from the Middle East. Drawing on experienced 
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fighters with links to the anti-Soviet Afghan camps, they were able to open funding channels as well 
as draw the media support of jihadists around the world. Moreover, Chechen armed groups showed 
a capacity to adapt organizationally given the constraints under which they operated in Chechnya 
proper. Since 2000, they used multi-ethnic support networks from across the North Caucasus to 
enable a continuation of a regional insurgency, but crucially, this also enabled them to circumvent 
federal counterterrorism measures. Shamil Basaev, in particular, demonstrated a capacity to inspire, 
encourage and enable a multi-ethnic regional network called the Riyadh us-Saliheyn to facilitate a 
campaign of terrorism, named Operation Boomerang (December 2002 – September 2004).  
Both experts noted that the Chechen insurgents pioneered the use of the Internet, as a 
resource and a propaganda tool. Chechen armed groups were ahead of Al-Qaeda in filming their 
attacks, copying and distributing materials in a range of formats to a multi-lingual audience, using a 
range of technologies (CDs, video cassettes, handheld camcorders, and satellite links) for training, 
fund-raising and to publicize their message.  
 
Preconditions and Causes of Innovation 
 
Both Dr. Moore and Dr. Dolnik highlighted the role of leadership, particularly that of 
Shamil Basaev, the leading Chechen insurgent leader before his violent demise in July 2006. Prior to 
his death, he built a regional network of highly loyal and effective followers, and established a 
repertoire of attacks that persist to this day. 
According to both presenters, Basaev’s success as a leader was linked directly to his military 
experience, as opposed to ideology, religious fanaticism, or some other motivation. He was not an 
“evil genius,” both experts stressed, but a military man with extensive combat experience, and pride 
in his operational acumen. 
 
• Basaev, himself a product of the Soviet military, surrounded himself with former members 
of the security forces, so he understood the methods and tactics of his adversaries quite 
well.  
• He commanded Chechen volunteers in the “Abkhaz Battalion” in Abkhazia, a region that 
violently broke away as a de facto independent state from Georgia in 1992-1993.  
• Between 1994 and 1996, Basaev served as a front line commander in the First Chechen 
War, fighting fiercely to resist Russia’s takeover of Grozny, the capital of the Chechen 
Republic. He was promoted to General and Commander of the Chechen armed forces in 
2006, after which he succeeded in driving the Russian forces out of Grozny, ending the first 
Chechen-Russian war. 
 
Both experts agreed that the availability of resources—money, weapons, and smugglers—as 
well as the widespread bureaucratic corruption gave Basaev an ideal environment to innovate and 
succeed in otherwise improbable operations. 
 
• Prior to the commencement of the second Chechen-Russian war in 1999, Basaev 
supplemented his regional militant network with a transnational one led by the Saudi-born 
Emir Khattab. The latter gave him access to Arab foreign fighters as well as funding 
channels from the Middle East. 
• The duration of the armed conflict has created a Chechen society accustomed to war, 
creating a vast pool of potential militants with arms.  
• Corruption enabled Chechen rebels to bribe their way past checkpoints, purchase arms from 
poorly-paid conscripts, and even circumvent airport security measures, which made possible 
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the destruction of two airplanes in 2004. Corruption, noted Dr. Rasmussen during an 
intervention, creates a “legal safe haven” just as important as a geographical one.   
   
Both experts pointed out that Basaev was also open to new ideas and had high tolerance for 
risk. A war culture also created high tolerance for revenge and bloodshed, which helps explain the 
spectacular operations against civilians, including children, using what appears to be willing martyrs. 
Mr. Jayasekara also noted the brutality of the conflict and its linkage to cruel insurgent violence in 
the LTTE case study. 
When it came to suicide attacks, Dr. Moore argued that three waves of suicide attacks (June 
2000-June 2002; December 2002-August 2004, and August 2008-present) were directly linked to the 
diminished capacity of Chechen rebels to mount military operations against Russia’s federal forces. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, promoted by Russian propagandists, “martyrdom operations” 
were not a product of Wahhabi-inspired foreign importation. Local groups who lost their ability to 
fight successfully a conventional guerrilla war organized these suicide attacks, both experts 
explained.   
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SECTION 8: MISSING INNOVATIONS: THE FARC AND LOYALISTS 
 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a hierarchical and resource-rich 
leftist guerrilla organization that has been in control of vast territories over its five decades of 
existence, does not seem too interested in innovation, certainly not in weapons of mass effect. The 
absence of innovation in the FARC is puzzling given that it has little moral inhibition against 
targeting civilians and seems to exhibit many of the organizational features of terrorists that did 
innovate. Similarly, Protestant terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland (known collectively as 
Loyalists), which killed over 1,000 people (mainly Catholic civilians) between 1969 and 2002, were 
equally uninterested in innovation, this despite the fact they were in competition with each other as 
well as with the highly innovative Irish Republican Army (IRA). Loyalist paramilitaries resemble the 
extreme right wing movement in the U.S., except perhaps in their intent to use weapons of mass 
effect. What explains this lack of interest in terrorist innovation? 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
Prof. Peter Waldmann, University of Augsburg, and Prof. Jonathan Tonge, University of 
Liverpool, explained the puzzling absence of innovation among the FARC and Loyalist 
paramilitaries, respectively. Both noted that the counterfactual nature of the question—why no 
innovation?—makes it difficult to offer definitive explanations. However, each pointed to a number 
of plausible factors rooted in the structure of the conflicts and political alignments in Colombia and 
Northern Ireland. Dr. Maria Rasmussen, Naval Postgraduate School, chaired this panel. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Revolut ionary Armed Forces  o f  Colombia – FARC  
 
Prof. Waldmann highlighted several structural factors that obviate the need for innovation 
within the FARC. Firstly, Prof. Waldmann argued that the political culture in Colombia hinders 
acceleration or escalation of the conflict. There is a strong orientation toward pacts and negotiated 
equilibria, he explained, “not toward the elimination of the adversary.” In addition, the Colombian 
state does not exercise a monopoly over the means of coercion. Violence in Colombia is used widely 
for private as well as political gains.  
The FARC is not purely an ideological movement willing to do anything to achieve its aims, 
maintained Prof. Waldmann. The organization is also (and has been for a quarter century) vigorously 
involved in the illegal economy -- drugs, racketeering, kidnapping for ransom, and so on. Over the 
years, FARC has seen its more innovative rival, the urban terrorist group April 19th Movement (M-
19), engage in spectacular attacks such as the seizure of the Palace of Justice in 1985. With these 
terrorist spectaculars, M-19 went beyond the unspoken but very clear limits on the violence that 
Colombian civil society will tolerate. The FARC understands this. It is not in the organization's 
interest to contemplate any action that would affect its bottom line. Undue escalation through the 
use of WMEs might threaten this environment that benefits the FARC and its local population alike. 
Why “kill the goose that lays the golden egg?” asks Prof. Waldmann.  
 
• In the late 1990s the income of the FARC, stemming mostly from kidnappings and drug 
trafficking, was estimated to be around $600 million annually. This money allows the FARC 
to buy modern weapons, pay generous bribes, establish a network of spies and informants, 
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and pay their guerrilla army salaries.  
• The FARC has developed the kidnapping industry to perfection, establishing tight relations 
with informants, urban banks, and insurance employees. This elaborate war economy has 
many beneficiaries with vested interest in maintaining the status quo, which in turn militates 
against an abrupt departure from a low intensity conflict through the use of WMEs. 
 
Another structural condition the makes innovation unlikely is the nature of the FARC and 
its peasant social base. Peasants have a “conservative mindset that is not tolerant of excessive risk 
and experimentation,” according to Prof. Waldmann. Moreover, secure in its vast rural territories, 
the FARC views time as being on its side. There is no need to escalate and speed up the historical 
process leading to revolutionary change.  
 
Loyal is t s  in Northern Ire land 
  
When it came to explaining the lack of innovation between the two main Loyalist 
paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland (the Ulster Volunteer Force or UVF and the Ulster 
Freedom Fighters or UFF), Prof. Tonge began by noting that unlike the IRA, which fought an 
offensive war to drive the British out of Northern Ireland, the Loyalist paramilitaries fought a 
“defensive” pro-state war to maintain the status quo. Therefore, they felt less of an urgent need to 
escalate through innovative violence because the security forces (the police, army, and intelligence 
services) were already carrying the bulk of the effort to defeat the IRA. The Loyalists simply wanted 
to deliver two messages through their violence: 
 
• There will be a civil war in Northern Ireland if the British withdraw. 
• Those who support the IRA will face dire consequences. 
 
These two objectives could be met with levels of violence that fall short of WME attacks. 
Most of the Loyalists' operations involved killing Catholic civilians and bombing or shooting up 
pubs in Catholic neighborhoods. A number of other factors also help explain the lack of innovation 
among Loyalist paramilitaries: 
 
• Difficulty in procuring weapons due to the absence of state sponsorship and international 
financing (the IRA had plenty of both). 
• Difficulty in identifying a clear enemy among the Catholic community of Northern Ireland 
since the IRA operated as an underground organization.  
• Community policing and lack of Protestant public support for Loyalist violence, since this 
support generally went to the British forces, not the irregulars. 
• Absence of a safe haven in which to experiment and develop weaponry. 
 
Prof. Tonge went on to highlight three features of the Loyalist paramilitaries that are acutely 
similar to those of America’s extreme right movement. 
 
Demographics  – the Loyalists drew their members from the lower socio-economic strata. 
Many of its members had little education and a “tendency towards criminality, especially 
racketeering and drug-dealing.”  Even their leaders, explained Prof. Tonge, “were seen as gangsters 
and/or drunks with little talent other than to coerce.” 
Inf i l t rat ion  – the Loyalists, like the extreme right in the United States, were easily 
penetrated by the security services. The state did not hesitate to manipulate the legal system, in this 
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case by conducting “supergrass” trials in which dozens were convicted on the testimony of one 
informer. (Those convictions were eventually reversed). 
Rivalry  – Intra-Loyalist competition prevented collaboration and merger of resources, but 
instead descended into feuds over territorial control and racketeering. As Prof. Tonge explained, 
personal aggrandizement displaced the Loyalists’ capacity for adaptation.  
Perhaps just as important is the fact that one of the Loyalist groups operated as a legal entity 
until 1992. In addition, both Loyalist groups colluded with the British authorities in targeting the 
IRA. Any escalation in violence that would embarrass the British authorities threatened the 
paramilitaries’ legal status and their extra-legal collusion with the British security services. 
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SECTION 9: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
During the concluding session, workshop participants reflected on the lessons they derived 
from the two-day meeting. It was generally agreed that key themes that emerged in Phase I (2010) 
had also become relevant to the discussion of Phase II (2011) cases. In particular, innovation 
appeared consistently as the product of crises and problem solving. Terrorist groups that are not on 
the run, battling government repression, or in need of fresh political initiatives, are much less likely 
to innovate. This second workshop also confirmed the key role that resources play in terrorist 
innovation—not only financial resources, but also technical knowledge. New important resources 
appeared in Phase II, in the form of diaspora contributions and safe havens. Finally, Phase II 
confirmed the central importance of leadership in the process of innovation. 
 
Participants and Objectives 
 
In this panel, Prof. Charles Townshend, Keele University, and Mr. David Hamon, DTRA, 
shared their impressions on the key themes that developed during the workshop, and posed a 
number of questions to the assembled subject matter experts as a way to open the discussion. Prof. 
Richard English, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews, chaired the panel. 
 
Discussion and Findings 
 
Discussion focused to a large extent on whether the workshop could yield a list of predictive 
indicators of terrorist innovation. Experts were split on this question. Some argued that we need a 
narrower focus, with more rigorous definitions of terms such as “innovation” and “WME” that 
would make cases more comparable, and findings more conclusive. Others argued the opposite: a 
focus solely on WMDs as opposed to WMEs would be unduly limiting because most terrorist 
innovation takes place below the WMD threshold. 
Some participants believed it is possible to generate indicators of terrorist innovation. For 
example: 
 
• The group’s messaging to its supporters could reflect its interest in using escalatory weapons 
and new technologies for nefarious purposes. 
• The group’s strategy, capabilities for escalatory violence, and its leader’s ambitions and 
appetite for risk could signal the potential for innovative terrorism. 
• The group’s access to advanced technology, scientific expertise, or suppliers of weapons of 
mass destruction could lay the groundwork for escalatory terrorism.  
 
Others argued that these indicators are useful, but they would not be able to envisage the 
specific direction of innovation. Moreover, prediction might be possible in the case of individual 
terrorist groups, not in the case of terrorism in general.  
Experts raised a number of questions for further consideration: Why do terrorists show a 
predilection for some attacks over others? Why do some targets become iconic? We have 
documented the general terrorist fascination with airplanes, Aum Shinrikyo’s obsession with 
chemicals, or Basaev’s fixation on mass hostage taking, but this attachment to a target set remains 
largely underexplored. One recommendation was that we should consider the study of terrorist 
targeting as a follow-on project. 
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A second recommendation involved a different focus: the terrorists themselves. Experts 
suggested that we should concentrate on the terrorists in order to understand the decision-making 
processes within their groups. Specifically, we could draw on terrorist memoirs and interviews, or 
even create simulation exercises involving former terrorists and experts in which both groups 
respond to a scenario. The object of the exercise would be to observe at what point the participants 
feel the need to escalate and resort to WMDs. The overall goal of the research would be to observe 
how the terrorists articulate the discussion about innovation, and to uncover restraints on their 
actions, whether the terrorists are aware of these or not. 
Experts urged us to examine the assumptions that terrorists make about the likely impact of 
their actions on publics, and especially on governments. We also need to know about the lessons 
that terrorists learn when they observe the behavior of other terrorists. Finally, experts noted that 
there are no extant models to explain the diffusion of terrorist innovation. We should seize this 
opportunity to investigate how terrorist innovation spread from one organization to another now 




The following appendices include selected research papers written by the workshop organizers and 
participants.
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APPENDIX I: M. RASMUSSEN AND M. HAFEZ, INNOVATION IN WME 
TERRORISM: A GUIDE FOR WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
 
For the second year in a row, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is sponsoring a 
workshop to discuss innovation in terrorism. This white paper outlines the project’s objectives and 
the definitional and conceptual issues surrounding terrorist innovation. It should serve as a guide to 
all participating scholars as they prepare their papers and workshop presentations for the University 
of St. Andrews meeting. We have divided this paper into the following sections: 
 
1. A background to this project which outlines how the research was structured last year, and 
how we plan to focus discussion this coming October. 
2. A section that defines the term “weapons of mass effect.” All cases discussed in Phase I fell 
under this rubric, as do most of the cases that we will discuss in Phase II this October. 
3. A section that defines what we consider to be innovation in terrorist organizations. 
4. A section outlining the questions and issues we would like you to consider as you prepare 
your papers and presentations. In Phase I we were very fortunate in that all scholars 
followed this section rigorously. Our discussion was therefore broadly comparative and 
allowed us to observe how different factors played out across terrorist groups and across 
different decades. Our goal for Phase II is to encourage informed dialogue across cases with 





In 2010, in Phase I of this project, DTRA invited experts to analyze seven incidents of 
terrorist innovation:  
 
1. Airline hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) between 1968 
and 1972. 
2. The 1973 assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco by Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA).  
3. The 1984 attempted assassination of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA).  
4. The 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.  
5. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh. 
6. Al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. 
7. The July 7, 2005, bombings of the London Underground and bus system by a cell of 
radicalized British Muslims with links to militants in Pakistan. 
 
The invited experts assessed the preconditions, causes, and preparatory behaviors associated 
with terrorist innovation. The objective was to generate predictive indicators that could help 
counterterrorism specialists in law enforcement and the intelligence community respond to 
emergent advances in the use of weapons of mass effect (WME). The findings from Phase I of this 
study are included in a separate report. One of the key recommendations from that study was the 
need to expand our research focus in three interrelated directions. 
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First, last year’s meeting suggested we widen the focus of our analysis by looking not only at 
specific incidents of innovation but also at campaigns by groups that have been particularly 
innovative over time. Following that recommendation, in Phase II we will discuss two additional 
incidents, the 1972 hostage taking of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by the 
Palestinian Black September Organization, and the delivery of Improvised Explosive Devices in 
Afghanistan after 2001. We will also look at innovation within two separate groups over time, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 1976, and the Chechen campaigns against Russia 
since 1999. Finally, because innovation appears to be an incremental process, involving gradual 
learning and adaptation, we will look at the evolution of airline bombings over time. 
A second suggestion that emerged from our first workshop was that we should look not 
only at successful innovation, but also at cases where the terrorists attempted to innovate but could 
not bring their efforts to fruition (failed innovation), or were thwarted in their efforts (foiled 
innovation). Looking at failed and foiled innovations will enable us to understand the obstacles that 
stand in the way of innovation, and will allow us to derive lessons for counterterrorism. In Phase II, 
we will discuss three failed or foiled plots: the Bojinka plot of 1995, in which Ramzi Yousef 
attempted to blow up eleven airplanes over Southeast Asia, Al Qaeda’s several attempts to develop a 
chlorine bomb in Iraq in 2006-07, and the various attempts by right wing terrorists in the United 
States to develop chemical or biological weapons since the 1990s. 
A third recommendation which emerged out of our first workshop was that we should 
analyze why some terrorist groups do not seek to innovate, even when they appear to have the same 
objectives, resources, and organizational structures which have favored innovation in other cases. In 
Phase II, we will look at the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a hierarchical and 
very wealthy organization that also controlled portions of the national territory over decades but did 
not seem too interested in innovation. We will also look at the two Protestant terrorist organizations 
in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 
which were in competition not only with each other but also with the highly innovative IRA, and yet 
confined themselves to a repetitive repertoire of actions. 
In Phase I, we invited two experts to write papers and make presentations on each of the 
seven incidents of innovation under study. Our hope was that competitive explanations would 
enrich the final analysis, and clearly the participants agreed this had been the case. For Phase II, we 
maintained the structure of competitive analyses for all the new incidents and campaigns we will 
discuss at the University of St. Andrews, but not for the failed and foiled plots. In this case, we felt 
we should strive for greater breadth. 
The choice of cases is driven by a number of considerations. First and foremost, we want to 
break out of the current focus on radical Islamist movements. The current threat emanating from 
violent Islamist extremists has produced a near myopic concentration on the dynamics of this 
movement. Innovation in terrorism is a universal process that warrants comparative regional and 
group analysis. Given our interest in developing broader models of innovation, we think there are 
many lessons to be drawn from earlier waves of terrorism. These earlier cases offer an advantage 
because they have receded from the headlines. These historical cases can be studied with greater 
objectivity, and accessibility to a wealth of relevant sources, including terrorist memoirs and oral 
history, trial records, extensive investigative journalism, and government reports. 
An equally relevant consideration is variation on cases. The cases we have selected provide 
us with a variety of attack types: hostage taking, mass casualty bombings, suicide attacks, airline 
bombings, IEDs, and chemical attacks. In addition, we are selecting cases that exhibit successful and 
failed innovations, as well as ones with no interest in innovation. This variation allows us to test 
variables that purportedly contribute to innovation by seeking out those variables in cases where 
innovation did not materialize. Finally, this selection of cases provides us with a spread across 
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different decades. 
Some of the cases represent innovation by established hierarchical organizations like the 
LTTE; others by networked organizations and groups like the Chechen rebels, Al-Qaeda in Iraq and 
the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Some cases involved complex coordination and operational 
planning (the Bojinka plot) while others did not require high levels of complexity (the chlorine 
bombs). Some of these cases were not just innovative in their tactics per se, but did constitute a 
strategic innovation because of the choice of symbolic targets (Munich 1972). Others were awe-
inspiring because they represented completely new repertoires of action (the Bojinka plot). Given 
our interest in contexts of innovation, we think these cases that span several regions, time periods, 
and ideological motivations can help us understand how political, technological, and normative 
environments can shape the dynamics of innovation.  
 
How do we define weapons of mass effect? 
 
The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) defined WMEs as “weapons capable of 
inflicting grave destructive, psychological and/or economic damage” (HSAC, 2006: 10). A DTRA-
sponsored study followed a similar approach but refined it further. It outlined at least six dimensions 
of a terrorist attack, any one of which would result in mass effects (Yengst, 2008: [2-5] 4, 5): 
 
1. At least 1,000 fatalities. 
2. A large area devastated – 10 square miles in rural areas, and one square mile in urban 
settings. 
3. Damage or destruction to at least one critical facility, be it a power plant, government center, 
transportation hub or control system. 
4. A loss of at least $10 billion to the economy of the United States or another major power, 
with smaller financial burdens in developing nations. 
5. A significant (but undefined) interruption in services, industries or quality-of-life functions. 
6. A manifest “degree of terrorism” – a qualitative, subjective but nevertheless present 
psychological and/or emotional impact on the population. 
 
We would lower the fatality threshold since we feel the figure of 1,000 is excessive. We 
searched the Global Terrorism Database managed by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and found a total of 111 terrorist incidents with 
over 101 fatalities. Of these, 41 took place during the civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s in El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique, and 12 took place in Iraq after 2003. Only 2 
incidents resulted in 1,000+ fatalities: September 11th and a Hutu attack on the Tutsis during the 
Rwandan conflict, which we consider to be an act of genocide distinct from traditional definitions of 
terrorism. One attack in Nepal resulted in 518 fatalities, but this was a conventional attack by Maoist 
guerrillas against government forces in the town of Bedi, and it was the guerrillas who suffered 500 
of the total 518 fatalities. Two attacks (one of which is also connected to the Rwandan conflict) 
resulted in 400+ fatalities, and all other incidents resulted in 400 fatalities or less. Only 27 incidents 
not connected to the civil wars mentioned above resulted in 150-400 fatalities. Therefore, we would 
lower the threshold to 100 fatalities. This does not seem too low, considering that other scholars 
work with a figure of 25 (Quillen, 2002: 280-82). 
We also realize that points 4-6 are difficult to quantify and must therefore be evaluated 
subjectively. Property damage may be quantified, and to some extent, so can the loss of “human 
capital.” It is more difficult to quantify security-related expenditures, or long-term effects on the 
economy (Hewitt, 1993: chapter 2). The evaluation of psychological effects is fraught with problems. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix I  !39!
A logical assumption is that popular concerns about terrorism are directly related to the level of 
terrorist violence. This seems to be verified in the case of opinion surveys after Oklahoma City and 
September 11th (Hewitt, 2003: 109-100). However, we know of at least one case, Spain, where the 
perceptions of the terrorist problem seem unconnected to the intensity of the terrorist violence 
(Hewitt, 1992: 182). In addition, individual stress or psychopathology following a terrorist incident 
will be influenced by a veritable host of factors (Sprang, 2003: 135-38), and it is also difficult to 
measure the psychological effects of different types of terrorist operations. Since 9/11, political 
psychologists have linked evidence of PTSD to the scale of the operation, and our media exposure 
to it (Melnik, 2002; Cohen Silver, 2002), but there is ample evidence that ETA and the IRA expected 
to provoke a major psychological effect with one individual assassination, that of a head of 
government (McGladdery, 2006: 125-140; Agirre, 1975). These may be some of the factors that led 
Martha Crenshaw (2000: 406) to point out that the study of the psychology of terrorism hadn’t 
advanced much in a decade. 
 
How do we define innovation in terrorism? 
 
The study of innovation in terrorism is not new, but it is hardly systematic, comparative, or 
oriented toward theory building. There is only one book-length study on this topic (Dolnik, 2007); 
other scholarly claims about innovation in terrorism are usually embedded within broader studies on 
terrorist tactics, strategies, and motivations. As a result, there is hardly an explicit scholarly dialogue, 
much less consensus, on this important issue. 
Frequently, terrorism scholars use the term “innovation” without attempting to define it. 
Among those who do, Dolnik calls it “the adoption of a tactic or technology that the given 
organization has not used or considered using in the past. This can take the form of the introduction 
of a weapon or tactic that is entirely new, or that has already been used by other organizations in the 
past” (Dolnik, 2007: 6). Martha Crenshaw adopts a similar definition of innovation – “the adoption 
of new patterns of behavior” (Crenshaw, 2001: 3) – and broadens the scope further by 
distinguishing between strategic, tactical and organizational innovations. 
Strategic innovations are game-changers, according to Crenshaw, because they involve the 
development of new objectives for the terrorist organization, and therefore of different operations 
to reach those objectives. Strategic innovation involves significant shifts in how groups frame their 
goals, and may thus require new forms of violence, target sets, or audiences to influence. One 
familiar strategic innovation was Al-Qaeda’s shift from aiding insurgencies against “near enemies” 
(secular regimes in the Muslim world) to attacking the “far enemy” (Western countries). Crenshaw 
lists several cases of strategic innovation: the Irgun’s campaign against British authorities in Mandate 
Palestine in the 1940s; airline hijackings in the 1960s; Hizballah’s campaign of suicide bombings in 
the 1980s; and Aum’s sarin attack in 1995 (Crenshaw, 2001: 5-6). 
Tactical innovation involves significant shifts in technologies and techniques of terrorism 
without a concomitant change in objectives. Crenshaw avers that changes in weapons or targets 
happen more frequently in the life of terrorist organizations than does a fundamental strategic shift. 
Among the examples she offers are the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, the first time an 
international mediator was murdered, or the IRA’s switch from attacking Ireland to attacking the 
British mainland. Organizational innovation involves new ways of structuring the terrorist group or 
inventive methods to reach new recruits. 
In this project we follow Crenshaw’s definition of innovation, which is to say that we deem as 
innovative any strategy, tactic, or organizational method that constitutes a departure from earlier patterns of behavior 
for a given terrorist group. We assume that this departure could come about dramatically or gradually, and it may be 
planned or serendipitous. At the same time we recognize that there are issues that the literature has never 
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clarified. Is there a difference between innovation and adaptation? Some use both terms as 
synonyms (Jackson, 2006: 161). Others seem to argue that terrorist innovation involves a series of 
adaptations to changing circumstances, most notably government policies (Faria, 2006: 47-8; 
Crenshaw, 2000: 416). Finally, others seem to be saying that adaptations occur continuously in the 
life of terrorist organizations and are always gradual, whereas innovations represent major 
breakthroughs in experimentation and development (Jackson, 2001: 203). 
Another question left unanswered in the literature is: Can innovation occur without 
escalation? Faria (2006: 54) and Morgan (2008: 123) assume that terrorist innovation will bring 
escalation, and Crenshaw (2001: 3, note 6) states that innovation need not involve escalation, but 
does not discuss it further. Though it is possible to conceive of terrorist innovation without 
escalation, in the context of this project, and given our definition of WMEs above, we would argue 
that innovation in the direction of WME terrorism would almost inevitably involve escalation. Our 
goal, however, is not to close the debate completely over these conceptual disagreements. It may 
well be that close examination of the different cases and the analytical presentations lead us to a 
reappraisal of the relationship between adaptation, innovation and escalation. 
 
What are the critical variables we would like you to explore? 
 
It is important to go beyond the mere narration of details surrounding past episodes of 
innovative terrorism; the goal of this project is to think analytically and systematically about the 
underlying factors—the critical drivers—that brought these tactical and strategic innovations to 
fruition. To that end, we are asking the participating researchers to use the questions and issues 
raised below as a guideline for the analysis of their individual case in order to generate focused and 
structured comparisons across cases. Broadly speaking, we are asking all participants to address three 
general questions: 
 
1. What motivates terrorists to innovate and how does innovation come to fruition? 
2. What determines the success and failure of terrorist innovations? 
3. How can we anticipate the trajectory of terrorist innovation over time? 
 
Whether you are discussing a specific incident, a failed or foiled incident, a campaign, or an absence 
of innovation, we ask that you attempt to address preconditions, causes, and preparatory behaviors.  
 
Precondit ions  
 
Preconditions are those characteristics of terrorist organizations and of the environment in 
which they operate which make innovation more or less likely. For example, researchers have 
pointed out that among the Aum Shinrikyo cadre, there were a significant number with highly 
technical or scientific university degrees (Kaplan and Marshall, 1996: 2-3, 26-8, 77-8, 296-7). The 
existence of personnel with the requisite scientific knowledge would help any terrorist organization 
solve complex technical problems. When we talk about preconditions, we are thinking of trends or 
structural factors evolving over time. 
What are the leadership and organizational requirements for innovation? Are certain types of organizations 
more likely to innovate than others? Is innovation driven by leaders atop the organizational hierarchy or by aspiring 
terrorist entrepreneurs outside of the core leadership? For example, Tucker argues that “entrepreneurial 
leadership is the key to understanding terrorist innovation”, and believes that entrepreneurs are 
more likely to appear in small and newly formed groups than in large, established organizations 
(2000: 13; see also Crenshaw, 2001: 16-19).  Jackson (2001: 201), by contrast, argues that resources 
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will facilitate innovation, and therefore, financially robust organizations like the IRA or Hizbullah, 
are more likely to innovate. Along similar lines, de la Calle and Sánchez Cuenca argue that “the 
capacity for killing is directly related to the resources the organization has, and resources depend on 
popular support” (De la Calle and Sánchez Cuenca, 2006: 17, see also 26). 
Did the structure of the organization shape in any way the pace of innovation or the receptivity to it? 
Jackson (2006: 161) argues that organizational characteristics such as the group’s capacity to learn, 
technological awareness, openness to new ideas, and attitude toward risk influence its ability to 
innovate, and that larger organizations would therefore be in a better position to innovate. Along 
similar lines, Dolnik (2007: 150-52) shows that organizations with a safe haven or territorial 
stronghold are more likely and/or willing to innovate, and Tucker (2000: 8) avers that domestic 





Causes are those factors that directly influence the group’s decision to innovate. These may 
include new security environments, factional competitors, or a new strategic direction that requires 
an escalation in the violence. We are not concerned here with the general causes of the violence, in 
other words, with the factors that precipitated the launch of the terrorist organization or the terrorist 
campaign. Rather, we are more narrowly concerned with the direct precipitants of change, in tactics 
or strategy. 
 
Causes of innovation internal to the terrorist organization 
 
C.J.M. Drake argues that, though a variety of factors explain the terrorists’ target selection, 
the ideology of the group is of paramount importance in interpreting the world, defining the enemy 
and targeting it. Dolnik followed along similar lines by arguing that changes in the group’s 
worldview will provoke a will to innovate (Drake, 1998: 54, 56, 78; see also Dolnik, 2007: 146-150). 
Moghadam (2008) makes the case that a particularly virulent form of Sunni Islamism—Salafism—
was the key driver behind Al-Qaeda’s widespread use of suicide terrorism against Western civilians 
and their coreligionists. 
Beyond ideology, we would like you to think about the internal dynamics of the terrorist 
organization you are discussing. Twenty years ago, Crenshaw argued that organizational forces were 
more likely to explain the behavior of terrorist groups than ideology or stated strategy (Crenshaw, 
1985 and 1988). In particular, two organizational issues might drive innovation. The first would be 
the existence of factionalism within the group. The second would be the existence of a rival terrorist 
organization that is disputing territory or supporters. In either case, innovation might be a way to 
exercise control or dominance over organizational rivals (see also Bloom, 2004). 
 
Causes of innovation external to the terrorist organization 
 
Do governments unwittingly encourage innovation, and if so, in what way? Faria (2006: 47, 
54), Jackson (2006: 165), Dolnik (2007: 152ff) and Byman (2007: 134) argue that counterterrorist 
strategies drive innovation as terrorists seek to circumvent new security procedures. Enders and 
Sandler (1993) show that security measures can lead to terrorists substituting tactics and targets. 
Jackson and Trujillo (2006: 62) in turn state that it is the environmental uncertainty, defined as not 
knowing what the security forces will do next, that will drive the process. Morgan et. al., (2008: 118) 
state that in a conflict with insurgents, the state will frequently escalate first in the push for victory, 
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and that this will in turn push insurgents to escalate also.  
Does civil society encourage innovation? Here we are thinking of normative contexts that 
may inhibit or encourage deadly forms of innovation. Waldmann (1982, 213-19), for example, has 
argued that in Argentina, the decade that preceded the emergence of the Montoneros and People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ERP) terrorist organizations was one in which societal norms relaxed, political 
antagonism was rife, and violence became more acceptable socially, which in turn made the decision 
to turn to terrorism easier. Hafez (2007) argued that the widespread use of suicide attacks in Iraq 
was in part driven by earlier Muslim clerical support for this tactic against Israel.  
 
Preparatory Behaviors  
 
Once the group has decided it wishes to innovate, there may be activities that the group 
needs to undertake in preparation, observable behaviors or conducts. In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, 
for example, prior to the subway attack the Japanese police had received reports from the neighbors 
that a distinct smell was emanating from the Aum compound. Had the police acted promptly on this 
information, it might have interrupted the workings of Aum’s laboratory (Kaplan and Marshall, 148-
49). 
Looking back, would it have been possible for counterterrorism specialists to observe and connect together the 
developments that made innovation possible? What indicators would have enabled security specialists to anticipate the 
trajectory of innovation in your case? Since 9/11, many analysts have argued about the importance of 
intelligence in counterterrorism, and especially about human intelligence. In some cases, notably 
Israel and Northern Ireland, human intelligence in the form of informants or agents within terrorist 
organizations has allowed the security forces to foil plots and prevent deadly attacks (Horowitz, 
2004; Geraghty, 2000: especially Chapter 9; Dillon, 1999: chapters 12, 14). Such penetration of 
terrorist groups is not always possible. But once the terrorist group has decided to innovate, a 
number of actions may alert law enforcement personnel that something is about to happen. There 
are cases when terrorist organizations must commit common crimes as they prepare for a terrorist 
atrocity.  But the group may simply need to move weapons, bombs or personnel from one point to 
another, and in the process, attract attention from law enforcement or from alert citizens, which is 
what happened with several of the 9/11 hijackers (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004: 
chapter 7).  
 
Final Considerations and Questions 
 
We realize that there are differences among the cases we will discuss at the University of St. 
Andrews, and those differences will influence the writing of your individual papers. Some of you are 
looking at concrete incidents of innovation, and will be able to address most of the issues and 
questions we raised above. Some of you are looking at failed or foiled innovation. You will want to 
explain why the innovation failed to materialize or failed to achieve its objective, and you may even 
be able to discuss competing or alternative explanations of that failed or foiled innovation. In 
addition, if you are discussing a case of failed or foiled innovation, you will be able to talk about 
preconditions and causes, but you may or may not be able to talk about preparatory behaviors. 
Finally, some of you are discussing entire campaigns, by an individual terrorist organization or by 
nebulous networks. If you are discussing a campaign, we ask that you focus on the most salient 
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APPENDIX II: A. MERARI, 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS HOSTAGE CRISIS 
 
On September 5, 1972, at 4:30 AM, eight terrorists wearing track suits and carrying hand 
bags containing AK 47 assault rifles, Tokarev pistols and hand grenades, climbed over the fence 
surrounding the Olympic Village in Munich and made their way directly to the apartments where 
members of the Israeli athletic team stayed. The terrorists broke into the apartments, killing in the 
process two Israeli athletes who tried to prevent them from entering. In the apartment, they seized 
nine Israeli athletes and coaches as hostages.  
When Bavarian law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, the terrorists, members of the 
Black September Organization (BSO), demanded the release of 233 Palestinian prisoners by Israel 
and two others held in jail in Germany, and threatened to kill the hostages if their demands were not 
met. West German officials, who were aided by the Tunisian Ambassador to Bonn, Mahmud al-
Mestiri, conducted negotiations with the terrorists. Israel refused to comply with the hostage takers' 
demands and also refused to allow the transferring of the hostage takers and hostages to Egypt.  
The West German authorities devised a plan to rescue the hostages by a surprise assault. 
They led the terrorists to believe that they would be flown to Tunisia with their hostages. Two 
helicopters flew the terrorists and the hostages to the military airport of Fürstenfeldbruck, where a 
Boeing 727 was waiting for them on the tarmac. The German rescue team planned to shoot the 
hostage takers as they were walking from the helicopters to the Boeing airplane. German border 
police officers disguised as a flight crew were supposed to be waiting on board, so as to make the 
terrorists believe that the airplane was ready for takeoff.  
The policemen, however, refused to risk their lives and left the plane. Furthermore, only two 
of the terrorists went to check the airplane while the other six remained in the helicopters with the 
nine hostages. Having checked the airplane, the two terrorists realized that there was no crew and 
the plane was not ready for flight. On their way back to the helicopters, the German police snipers 
opened fire. The terrorists returned fire, sprayed the hostages with bullets and threw hand grenades, 
which set the helicopters on fire. All nine hostages and one German police officer were killed. Five 
of the terrorists were also killed and the remaining three were arrested.  
The bodies of the five dead terrorists were flown to Libya, where they were received in an 
official ceremony. On October 29, 1972, less than two months after the attack in Munich, two BSO 
members hijacked a German Lufthansa airliner en route from Beirut, Lebanon to Ankara, Turkey.1 
They demanded the release of the three surviving Munich terrorists. The hijacked airplane was flown 
to Zagreb, Yugoslavia. The West German government complied immediately and the three were 
flown to Zagreb, where they boarded the hijacked plane. The plane then was flown to Libya, where 
the terrorists received a heroes’ welcome.  
 
What is Innovative about the Munich Olympics Hostage Crisis? 
 
The Munich attack was not the first barricade-hostage incident.2 Neither was it the first 
incident in which terrorists carried out attacks outside their home country. Still, in terms of its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  The Arab National Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, an offshoot of the BSO sponsored by Libya, 
claimed responsibility for the hijacking.  
2  On June 9, 1970, PFLP members took over the Philadelphia and Intercontinental hotels in Amman. They seized about 
60 hostages, most of them Americans and Britons, and demanded that the Jordanian Army stop the shelling of PLO 
positions in refugee camps. The hostages were held for three days. In announcing their release, PFLP leader George 
Habash said to the hostages in one of the hotels: “Believe me – and I am not joking – we were determined to blow up 
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impact this was one of the most significant attacks in the history of modern terrorism. At the time it 
was carried out and for many years afterward the strike in the midst of the Olympic summer games 
was, by far, the most dramatic terrorist event, even though several other attacks claimed higher 
casualties. If the essence of terrorism as a mode of warfare is to create a psychological impact, then 
the Munich attack was unprecedented. The strike at the Olympic summer games – the most salient 
event with hundreds of millions of TV watchers and radio listeners around the world – was an 
amazing gambit to draw attention to the perpetrators’ cause. Shocked by the Munich attack, 
governments around the globe hastily established hostage rescue units and negotiating teams.  
The working definition of terrorist innovation, adopted by the workshop’s organizers, reads:  
 
[W]e deem as innovative any strategy, tactic, or organizational method that constitutes a 
departure from earlier patterns of behavior for a given terrorist group. We assume that this 
departure could come about dramatically or gradually, and it may be planned or serendipitous.3 
 
By this definition, the Munich attack was the peak of a major (albeit temporary) change in the 
perpetrating organization’s strategy. Until the defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
in Jordan in 1970-1971, Fatah, the main Palestinian resistance group, refrained from carrying out 
violent attacks outside Israel and the Occupied Territories. The adoption of international terrorism 
signified a major strategic change for Fatah and also involved organizational adaptations. For Fatah 
itself, therefore, the Munich attack was the climax of a process of innovation.  
 
Causes of Innovation 
 
After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Palestinian resistance groups’ base of operations was in 
Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom was the country that served the groups as a safe haven for 
recruiting, training and organizing. Jordan, with its long border with Israel, was also the main 
launching pad for terrorist and guerrilla attacks inside Israel and the Occupied Territories. Enjoying 
popular support throughout the Arab world, as well as the support of radical Arab countries, the 
Palestinian groups felt growing confidence in their power. They also enjoyed the support of the 
Palestinians in Jordan, which constituted the majority of the Jordanian population. Some of the 
Palestinian groups, especially the quasi-Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP),4 called openly for the 
regime’s overthrow in Jordan and the establishment of a radical Palestinian government instead. 
Palestinian forces increasingly challenged the Jordanian government’s authority, creating a state 
within a state.  
In September 1970, armed clashes between Palestinian groups and government forces 
erupted. Government forces prevailed by July 1971, when PLO forces were finally defeated in Ajlun 
and Jerash in northern Jordan after thousands of Palestinians were killed. All forces and 
organizational infrastructure of the Palestinian resistance groups were expelled from Jordan. The 
disaster in Jordan was a severe blow to the morale of Palestinians in general and members of the 
resistance groups in particular. In addition to the humiliation of being defeated, they suffered 
numerous casualties; some of them had families and homes in Jordan, and now they had to relocate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the hotels with the hostages in them if we had been smashed in our camps.” Quoted in Lester A. Sobel, ed. Political 
Terrorism (New York: Facts on File, 1975), p. 34.  
3  See Appendix I in this report. 
4  The PDFLP later dropped the “popular” from its name and was called “Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine” (DFLP).  
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to other Arab countries.5 Moreover, having lost their bases in Jordan, the ability of the Palestinian 
groups to carry out attacks into Israel was severely curtailed.  
The blow was particularly hard because the disaster and humiliation happened abruptly 
following a period of several years during which the Palestinian resistance groups and their members 
felt great pride because they were admired throughout the Arab world. Now, their honor and self-
respect were shattered.6 Furthermore, there were indications that the weakening of the resistance 
movement began to corrode its status among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. Thus, in 1971 a group of local leaders in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied 
Territories, contrary to the PLO’s position, which insisted on a Palestinian state in the whole area of 
mandatory Palestine. This threat to the exclusive leadership position of the PLO was a cause of 
serious concern to the PLO. The worry was further exacerbated by the Israeli plan to hold municipal 
elections in the West Bank, thus threatening to create an elected Palestinian leadership independent 
of the PLO, as well as by King Hussein’s suggestion in early 1972 to establish a United Arab 
Kingdom on both banks of the Jordan River.7 
Under these circumstances, the leadership of the resistance groups and especially that of 
Fatah, the largest and most influential group, had to take whatever measures necessary to regain the 
initiative, restore the group’s morale and, no less important, to salvage the resistance's image in the 
eyes of the Palestinian people. For these ends, the groups had to show that they were able to 
continue the struggle and even escalate it. But the ability to carry out incursions into Israel from 
Jordan was lost; Syria and Egypt did not allow the Palestinian groups to carry out cross-border 
attacks from their territory; and the massive Palestinian territorial base in Lebanon was not in place 
yet.8 With these constraints in mind, Fatah leaders decided to operate in an arena in which it had not 
operated before: the territories of neutral countries, mainly in Western Europe.  
In his memoir, Salah Khalaf (better known as Abu Iyad), who was the head of BSO, 
explained the reasons for establishing the organization by saying that it acted as the resistance 
movement’s ancillary force, at a time that the movement could not fully implement its military and 
political missions.9 He also explained: “Unable to continue the traditional guerrilla operations and 
penetrate Israel, [Fatah’s young fighters] tended to engage in a different kind of revolutionary 
violence, that others describe by the general name of ‘terrorism.’ They wanted to harm not only the 
Zionist enemy, but also Arab murderers and traitors, who became Israel’s helpers. To prevent the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  Abdallah Franji, who served as the PLO representative in Bonn at the time of the Munich attack, wrote: “The defeat 
of July 1971 [in Jordan] brought the PLO to the verge of collapse. Not only were its military units defeated and 
fragmented but the political and social work of the previous three years was practically destroyed.” A. Franji, The PLO 
and Palestine (London: Zed Books, 1983) p. 118. The collapse of the PLO’s social services was, presumably, a 
contributing factor to the dissatisfaction among Fatah rank-and-file members.  
6  A. Merari, and S. Elad, The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1986). 
7  Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 307.  
8  John Amos cites the numbers of claimed Palestinian commando operations against Israel during the years 1969-1972, 
as published by Filastin al-Thawrah, the central PLO periodical:  
 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
2390 NA 545 327 
 
See: John Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 220.  
9  Abu Iyad, Lelo Moledet [Without a Homeland] (Jerusalem: Mifras, 1979), p. 147. This is the Hebrew translation of a 
series of interviews that Abu Iyad gave to the French journalist Eric Rouleau, which were originally published in French 
as Palestinien sans Patrie (Fayolle, 1978). 
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danger that this violence would take a private and anarchic character, we had to direct the rage to the 
desired channel, to organize it and provide it with a political content.”10 Abu Iyad in an interview 
quoted by Sayigh states that as early as 1972 “…‘to ensure our survival and await better 
circumstances’ meant extending Palestinian attacks ‘to the external arena…we must follow new 




Two kinds of intra-organizational pressures precipitated Fatah’s decision to carry out 
spectacular attacks in the international arena. The first was the revolt among the younger generation 
of Fatah members, who challenged the old leadership after the fiasco in Jordan. Abdallah Franji 
described the mood among Fatah members after the disaster in Jordan as follows: “Intense 
bitterness and resentment now became widespread. Faith in their own leadership was badly shaken 
and they had only contempt and mockery for their ‘Arab brothers.’ Many of these young men began 
to realize that the resistance had not been radical or hard enough – and in the leadership of al-Fatah 
and the PLO these feelings fell on fertile ground.”12 Amos underscores this theme in more detail:  
 
[T]he resistance was bitterly divided over the events of September, and the leaderships of every 
organization were challenged. From this point on, a number of radical organizations, all 
dedicated to some form of international terror, split off from almost every major resistance 
group. And the issues were usually the same: younger, more militant members challenged the 
‘historic leaders’ on the grounds that they were armchair revolutionaries…The result was either 
an actual split or, as in the case of Fatah (and apparently the PFLP), the creation of a new group 
affiliated organizationally with the parent group but publically separate from it – the BSO and its 
offshoots, and a number of offshoots off the PFLP.13  
 
The dissent was expressed openly in Fatah’s Congress, which was held in Damascus in 
August-September 1971. Several writers have maintained that the decision to establish the 
clandestine sub-organization that later became known as BSO was reached in that congress.14 To 
quote Amos again:  
 
Initially the BSO served as an organizational safety valve, and outlet for Fatah radicals who 
would otherwise have directed their activities at overthrowing its leadership; a technique for 
satisfying the Fatah wing that wanted to adopt a terrorist strategy. Later, the BSO took on an 
impetus of its own. It became a key issue in the struggle between the left and the right in Fatah. 
Ultimately, BSO members (such as the Black June faction) began acting on their own, 
irrespective of any Fatah direction.15 
 
According to one claim, initially BSO operations were carried out on the initiative of 
relatively low-level operatives. According to Sayigh, Ali Hasan Salama organized on his own 
initiative the assassination of Wasfi Tal, the first attack that brought BSO to public attention. Sayigh 
explains that Salama was embittered about being criticized for his performance in Jordan during the 
war, hinting that his wish to regain respect drove him to initiate the spectacular assassination. As 
described by Sayigh, “Salama quietly recruited former Rasd [Fatah intelligence apparatus] members !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  Abu Iyad, Lelo Moledet, p. 145. 
11  Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 309, quoting Abu Iyad interview in al-Wihda, 1 June 1972.  
12  Franji, The PLO, p. 119. 
13  Amos, Palestinian Resistance, p. 222.   
14  Amos, Palestinian Resistance, p. 223. Merari & Elad, The International Dimension, p. 27. 
15  Amos, Palestinian Resistance, p. 226.  
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to his cause (it is not clear if Khalaf helped) and named his group the Black September Organization 
(BSO).”16 By this description, a major strategic change was initiated by personal hurt feelings. Even 
if this account is true, however, it should be remembered that this single attack was adopted by the 
whole organization as a new strategic line only because the soil was fertile for such a change. 
Furthermore, in his confession broadcast in Jordan after his arrest, Abu Daoud described the 
assassination of Wasfi Tal as project headed by Muhammad Yusuf Najjar, head of Fatah Special 
Operations and Intelligence apparatus, a much more senior figure than Ali Hasan Salama.  
The other pressure within Fatah had to do with inter-personal competition inside Fatah’s 
leadership, mainly between Abu Iyad on the one hand, and other members of the central committee, 
including Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Muhammad Najjar, and Kamal Udwan on the other hand.17 
During Fatah’s congress in Damascus in September 1971, Abu Iyad was deposed from his role as 
head of Rasd. He wanted to build another power base to augment his prestige, especially among the 
young generation, by organizing spectacular attacks.18 
It is not clear, however, whether BSO was an ordinary hierarchical organization within 
Fatah, having a single top leader and departments such as recruiting, training, intelligence, 
operations, logistics, etc. Most sources regard Abu Iyad as BSO’s top leader. However, Abu Daoud’s 
confession, made public by the Jordanian authorities after his arrest in 1973, listed several top 
leaders of Fatah as responsible for different BSO operations: Abu Iyad was in charge of the Munich 
attack, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) organized the takeover of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 
December 1972, and Yusuf al-Najjar specialized in assassinations.19 If this description is correct, it 
means that rather than one cohesive group, BSO was a more diffuse entity and operations claimed 
under its name were actually orchestrated by different Fatah chieftains, each one of them using 
resources available to him. Such a situation would presumably be grounds for intense competition 
among the chieftains, a competition that would drive each one them to surpass the others in 




Presumably, the leadership of Fatah feared that in the absence of spectacular attacks, 
frustrated young Palestinians would turn to the PFLP. That organization, which operated in the 
international arena, was able to continue the struggle whereas Fatah’s operations against Israel from 
neighboring countries were severely curtailed. Fortunately for Fatah, the PFLP leadership apparently 
agreed to cooperate in the establishment of a joint apparatus of international terrorism – BSO – 
under Fatah leadership. A simple comparison of the number of international attacks attributed to 
the PFLP before and after the establishment of BSO suggests that the PFLP by and large ceased 
claiming credit for international operations under its own name while it continued operations under 
the BSO banner (see Table 1). Thus, the creation of BSO saved Fatah from a hard competition that, 







16  Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 307. 
17  Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 306.  
18  Amos notes that Abu Iyad supported international terrorism even before Black September (p. 51). 
19  Amos, Palestinian Resistance, p. 223.  
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Table 1: Number of international attacks attributed to the PFLP and the BSO, 1968-1974 
 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
PFLP 2 9 8 1 2 2 3 
BSO - - - 3 16 12 1 
 
 
Facilitating Factors  
 
Until the events of Black September in Jordan, international Palestinian terrorism was the 
PFLP’s playground. Fatah, on the other hand, influenced by the models of the wars in Algeria and 
Vietnam, insisted that the struggle must be held in the Occupied Territories and Israel. This position 
was at least partly motivated by the organization’s wish to maintain international respectability as the 
representative of the Palestinian people, and its unwillingness to embarrass Arab countries known to 
be the PLO’s sponsors. Because Fatah was by far the largest organization in the PLO and Fatah 
leaders made the bulk of the PLO’s leadership, politically and diplomatically the two organizations, 
Fatah and the PLO, were almost one and the same in international perception.  
The PFLP, on the other hand, had no such constraints. Starting in July 1968, this group 
pioneered modern international terrorism in a series of hijackings of commercial airliners and other 
attacks, mainly on civil aviation in Western Europe.20 For the PFLP, carrying out attacks in Europe 
had clear tactical advantages: Palestinian students and émigrés in European countries provided a 
large reservoir of youngsters familiar with local languages and customs; as a radical left-wing group, 
the PFLP enjoyed support and assistance from European left-wing circles; lax security measures in 
West European countries made travel and access to targets easier, as well as facilitated escape after 
the operation; and lenient attitude of the local authorities in case of capture reduced the level of 
danger to the perpetrators. These factors had a great weight, especially when compared with the 
meager success of terrorist and guerrilla operations in Israel. 
What was more important than tactical considerations was the fact that these operations 
gained much greater publicity and therefore had much greater psychological impact than attacks 
inside Israel or the Occupied Territories. In a famous interview he gave to Oriana Fallaci, George 
Habash, leader of the PFLP said: “We believe that to kill a Jew far away from the battleground has 
more effect than killing 100 of them in battle; it attracts more attention. And when we set fire to a 
store in London, those few flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim because we force 
people to ask what is going on.”21 In the wake of the disaster in Jordan, international terrorism 
seemed the only option that could salvage the image of the resistance as a powerful fighting political 
entity. The salience of this option was certainly augmented by the glaring example provided by the 
PFLP with its record of successful operations in Europe.  
Moreover, the possibility of international operations seemed attractive also because the 
PFLP already had a terrorist infrastructure in place in Western Europe, including a set of local 
supporters who belonged to radical left-wing circles in several West European countries.22 
Cooperation with the PFLP thus saved Fatah much time in implementing the decision to go !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Three other Palestinian groups, in addition to the PFLP, carried out terrorist attacks in Europe before 1971. These 
were: the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command.  
21  Life, June 12, 1970, p. 33.  
22 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), p. 148; Merari & Elad, The International Dimension, pp. 43-44. 
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international. The leaders of the new international terrorism apparatus were high ranking Fatah 
members, but its field operatives included members of other groups, especially the PFLP. 
Another facilitating factor was the aid provided by Arab countries through their diplomatic 
delegation, as well as by PLO missions (which in the 1970s did not have a recognized official 
diplomatic status in most West European countries but functioned under the auspices of the Arab 
League offices). Supporting Arab countries provided invaluable assistance by allowing the use of 
their diplomatic pouches for weapons shipments and providing false passports, as well as offering 
safe havens to the perpetrators before and after the operations.  
 
BSO’s Road to Munich  
 
The first attacks carried out by the BSO were aimed at taking revenge against Jordan. The 
name “Black September Organization” first appeared in the news in claiming responsibility for the 
assassination of Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo, on November 28, 1971. The murder 
was presented as an act of revenge against one of the main Jordanian officials responsible for the 
defeat and expulsion of the PLO forces from Jordan. Before the assassination in Cairo, Fatah 
members carried out several small-time attacks against Jordanian targets in Europe and the Middle 
East.23 All these attacks were insignificant. They did not cause casualties (except for one of the 
perpetrators) and did not create a notable public impact. Thus, they did not serve the purpose of 
boosting Palestinian morale. They were possibly carried out before the daring and highly capable 
apparatus of the BSO was laid in place.  
In the following months BSO added to its roster attacks on Israeli and West European 
targets. Still, most of the attacks were unimportant. With one exception they were merely nuisance 
that did not make big headlines. The only dramatic attack carried out by the BSO before the Munich 
operation was the hijacking of a Belgian Sabena airliner en route from Brussels to Tel Aviv that was 
forced to land in the Israeli airport under the command of the BSO hijackers, who thus posed a 
direct, bold challenge to the government of Israel. The hijackers – two men and two women – 
demanded the release of 317 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. The world held its breath while 
Israeli authorities negotiated with the hijackers over 22 hours. Then Israeli commandoes stormed 
the plane, killing the two male hijackers and arresting the two females. One passenger was killed and 
three wounded. The event was generally perceived as an Israeli victory and a defeat of the 
Palestinian resistance in general and BSO in particular. The organization now needed desperately a 
dramatic success for salvaging the resistance image both internally and internationally.24 To ensure 
success, the group had to make meticulous preparations.  
According to Abu Iyad, the Munich attack was designed to attain three objectives: to remind 
the world that there is a Palestinian problem; to use the extraordinary concentration of mass media 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  A bomb exploded on board of a Jordanian Alia airliner in Cairo on April 24, 1971; an attack on Jordanian Alia airlines 
office in Rome on July 20, 1971; a firebomb was thrown at the Jordanian Embassy in Paris on July 23, 1971; a bomb 
exploded in an empty Alia airliner in Cairo airport on July 24, 1971; a bomb explosion in the lavatory of an Alia airliner 
at Madrid airport before boarding, on August 24, 1971; on September 8, 1971 an Alia airliner en route from Beirut to 
Amman was hijacked and forced to land in Benghazi, Libya; two attempts to hijack Alia airliners en route from Beirut to 
Amman were prevented by sky marshals on September 16 and on October 4, 1971; and on October 6, 1971, a time 
bomb exploded in the luggage of an Alia employee as it was loaded on the plane. 
24  Abu Daoud who, according to his own testimony was in charge of the Munich attack, said in an interview in 2002 
that after the failure of the Sabena hijacking incident Arafat was desperate to boost morale in the refugee camps by 
showing that Israel was vulnerable. See: Alexander Wolff, “The Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002, available 
at: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/si_online/news/2002/08/20/sb2/, accessed September 28, 2011. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix II  !52!
in the Olympic games; and to gain the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.25 In 
describing the course of the attack, however, Abu Iyad notes that the perpetrators would have been 
willing to exchange the hostages for just nine prisoners held by Israel, suggesting that humiliating 
Israel was more important than the release of a large number of prisoners.  
As a reason for choosing the Olympic summer games as the site of the attack, Abu Iyad 
mentioned that the Olympic Committee ignored two requests of the PLO to allow the participation 
of a Palestinian delegation in the Munich Olympics.26 In an interview he gave to the Associated 
Press in 2006, Abu Daoud supports this point: “I remember Abu Iyad looked at me and said: ‘Let’s 
participate in the Olympics in our own way. Let’s kidnap (Israeli) hostages and swap them for 
prisoners in Israel.”27 Hence, the symbolic meaning of the attack: We shall not let you ignore us. 
Presumably, however, the assured immense publicity was the critical factor in choosing the 




In the case of BSO, motivation for innovation was driven by both pressure from below and 
leaders’ initiative after an intense crisis that shook their legitimacy in the eyes of their members and 
constituency. The turning to the international arena in general and the spectacular Munich attack in 
particular were Fatah’s remedy for the severe morale problem in its ranks in the wake of the disaster 
in Jordan, and a solution for the group’s curtailed ability to carry out cross-border attacks in Israel. 
Arguably, the structure of the PLO as an umbrella organization that incorporated several 
independent groups, contributed to both the readiness of Fatah leadership to accept the idea of 
carrying out terrorist attacks in the international arena and to the ability to implement this shift more 
easily.  
The Munich attack seems to support the notion that centralized leadership is required for 
carrying out a complex innovative operation. The attack was a rather demanding operation, requiring 
the assigning of fighters with appropriate qualifications (language capabilities, weapons training, 
suitable personality characteristics), smuggling of weapons, and other logistical needs. Careful 
planning and execution were a must for the success of the operation. Only a centralized, hierarchical 
organization can carry out a complex operation of this kind. According to Abu Iyad preparations for 
the operation began at least eight months before the Olympic games. First, two fighters were 
selected as commanders for the planned operation. The other six members of the assault team were 
selected from among 50 young fighters who were summoned to undergo intensive training. The 
chosen six were then sent to various European cities to get used to Western customs. The two 
commanders of the operation carried out a long reconnaissance tour in Germany, including a visit to 
the Olympic village.28  
In hindsight, there were not many overt indications that could have led law enforcement 
agencies in Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany to take measures that would have foiled the 
Munich attack without the help of an informant.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  Abu Iyad, Lelo Moledet, p. 158. 
26  Ibid.  
27  Associated Press, “Abu Daoud: No regrets for Munich Olympics.” New York Times, February 23, 2006.  
28  Abu Iyad, Lelo Moledet, pp. 158-1160.  
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APPENDIX III: Z. ABUZA, RAMZI YOUSEF’S BOJINKA PLOT, 1994-1995 
 
Ramzi Yousef’s 1994-1995 Bojinka plot was - at that point - the boldest and deadliest 
terrorist plot ever conceived.  Following the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, 
Yousef fled to Karachi, Pakistan.  He made his way in late-2003 or early-2004 to the southern 
Philippines, where he trained members of a violent Islamic secessionist group, the Abu Sayyaf, in 
bomb making.  In mid-1994, he moved to Manila where he was joined by his uncle and close friend, 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. There, the two began to work on a plot that would simultaneously down 
11 or 12 US-flagged jetliners as they flew across the Pacific.  Yousef had designed very small 
nitroglycerine based bombs that could be hidden in contact lens solution bottles, and assembled on 
the plane.  The blasting cap was hidden in the hollow in the heel of a shoe, while a Casio watch 
served as the detonator.  The fact that the bomb could be assembled from components that could 
easily pass the existing security procedures, and be assembled on the plane, marked a significant 
innovation in terrorism.  Five individuals were to make two or three flights on the US jetliners, 
deplaning during layovers and getting on another US-flagged carrier, each time leaving a time 
delayed bomb strategically placed under a seat near the fuel reservoirs in the wings. The five were to 
rendezvous in Karachi, Pakistan. 
Yousef acquired chemicals throughout the fall of 1994, and tested both his bomb design as 
well as his detonator.  The planning was deliberate and methodical. He made two test runs. The first 
was a scaled down bomb in a Manila theater. The second was a bomb on a Philippines Airline flight 
434 from Manila to Cebu to Tokyo, Japan.  
Yet, on the night of 6 January 1995, just two weeks before the planned attack, the volatile 
chemicals that Yousef was mixing in rented room 603 of the Dona Josefa Apartment building on 
Quirino Avenue in Malate, Manila, caught fire.  He and two accomplices, Abdul Hakim Murad and 
Wali Khan Amin Shah, fled the apartment as poisonous smoke filled the air.  The Manila fire 
department arrived and put out the fire. Noting the suspiciousness of the scene, they notified the 
police who were already on heightened alert in preparation for the Pope’s visit on 12-16 January.  
The police made a surreptitious entry and discovered large number of chemicals and other 
components for an IED.  Believing that this was a plot directed at the Pope, they staked out the 
apartment.  Yousef and his accomplices waited near by.   
After the fire department left and they saw no police or anything suspicious, Yousef cajoled 
Murad to enter the apartment in the early hours of 7 January to recover his laptop.  Police were 
waiting inside and wrestled him to the ground. He was taken to police headquarters where he was 
interrogated and revealed a broader plot than the assassination of the Pope, including the Bojinka 
plot and the December 1994 bombing of PAL flight 434.  Wali Khan Amin Shah was arrested four 
days later, after police had learned of and followed his girlfriend. Shah was arrested with bomb-
components, IED cookbooks, firearms and a riflescope, and documents that linked him to a 
transnational terrorist network.   
Yousef fled the country on 7 January, flying to Singapore, Bangkok and then to Karachi, 
where he was arrested in February 1995 in a joint US-Pakistan operation. He was rendered to the 
United States where he stood trial for both the airline plot and the February 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center that killed six and wounded more than a thousand.  He was sentenced for life 
for the former and 240 years for the latter.  The reality is the bulk of the trial focused on the 
February 1993 World Trade Center attack, not the conspiracy to down US jetliners.   
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The Bojinka plot never happened.  But it is inaccurate to say that it was “thwarted.”  It is 
also wrong to say that the attack was a failed innovation.  Indeed, I will argue in this paper that 
Yousef made several successful innovations in tactics, strategic objectives and organization.   
For one thing, and we cannot overlook this, the December 1994 bombing was successful.  It 
was a combination of five factors that prevented a catastrophic crash of the Boeing 747 and a loss of 
all 293 people on board.  First, Yousef had requested a certain seat based on the seating on previous 
flights on 747s.  This plane, however, had been re-configured after Philippine Airlines had 
purchased it from SAS.  Thus seat 26K was in front of the wings, not by the fuel tanks. The bomb 
could still have ignited the fuel tanks had it been placed facing a different direction.  The explosive 
force went down into the baggage hold - rupturing the cargo door.  If the bomb had been placed on 
its side, facing diagonally behind him, it could have been far more devastating. Third, the flight was 
delayed by 38 minutes. Combined with the guestimate that he set the timer, at the time of 
detonation, the plane was in range of a US military airfield in Okinawa, Japan.  Finally, the blast did 
significant damage to the plane, including to the steering cables.  The pilots deserved inordinate 
credit in their ability to control the plane.  As it was only one person, a Japanese businessman, was 
killed and 10 were wounded. But had any of those five factors gone the other way, the remaining 
272 passengers and 20 crewmembers would have also been killed.  In short, the design of the bomb 




The Bojinka Plot exhibited three separate tactical innovations. The first was the bomb design 
itself.  Most bombs that damaged airlines to that point were either comprised of dynamite or 
military-grade plastic explosives, such as C4, RDX, PETN or Semtex.1 Military-grade plastic 
explosives are readily available to groups with state-sponsorship or states that perpetrate terrorism. 
For example the Libyan agents who brought down Pan Am flight 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
killing 270 people used roughly one pound of PETN.  The 1985 twin attacks on Air India flights by 
Sikh nationalists were done with sticks of dynamite hidden in stereos, detonated with blasting caps.2  
Both dynamite and military-grade explosives are considered “secondary explosives”.  They are very 
stable, although they require a larger charge to detonate. 
Only on two occasions had someone tried to use liquid explosives.  On 29 January 1987, two 
North Korean agents blew up Korean Airlines flight 858, a Boeing 707, from Baghdad, Iraq.  
Although they did use the liquid explosive PLX, which is extremely volatile, as an accelerant hidden 
in liquor bottles, the actual bomb was a plastic explosive hidden in a radio.  The following year is the 
first instance of using a liquid explosive.  In this case, involving a South African jet, a small 
ammonium nitrate bomb was detonated by nitroglycerine. But this attack was labeled a criminal plot, 
not a case of terrorism.3  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This comes from a chronological review of airline bombings from 1948-2001, compiled by the European Community, 
and can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/security/studies/doc/2004_aviation_security_appendix_b.pdf.  
2 On 23 June 1985, Sikh militants blew up Air India flight 182, a Boeing 747 flying from Canada to India via the United 
Kingdom.  All 329 were people killed on this flight.  One hour later, a second bomb detonated at Tokyo’s Narita Airport 
on a lay over en route to Bangkok, Thailand, but as the Air India flight 301 had been delayed, the bomb only killed two 
baggage handlers.  
3 This comes from a chronological review of airline bombings from 1948-2001, compiled by the European Community, 
and can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/security/studies/doc/2004_aviation_security_appendix_b.pdf. 
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The bomb Yousef developed and tested on PAL flight 434 in December 1994 was 
designated as a “Mark II microbomb,” comprised of nitroglycerine in a 30ml bottle of contact lens 
fluid.  It was detonated by the charge generated from a Casio watch through wires and a blasting cap 
that he had hidden in the hollow of the heel of his shoe.  All of the components were able to pass 
through security screening at the airport, and no screening system in the Philippines at that time was 
capable of foiling that plot.  Unlike the majority of bombs used on planes to that point that were 
placed in checked luggage, the bomb was assembled in the lavatory during the flight and placed 
under a seat.  The time-delayed bomb was set for the second leg of the journey after Yousef 
disembarked in Cebu. 
The nitroglycerine bombs were fashioned out of commercially available chemicals.  While 
not readily available, they were easy enough for him to acquire without raising any suspicion through 
the establishment of a front trading company and money wired into the Philippines from a 
registered company in Malaysia (Konsojaya). 
Yousef had some experience working with nitroglycerin.  It was used as part of the 
detonating device for the 1993 World Trade Center bomb, largely a mixture of urea-based fertilizer 
and sulfuric acid with diesel fuel, surrounded by three cylinders of compressed hydrogen. Blasting 
caps attached to four large containers of nitroglycerine detonated the bomb.  In the Bojinka plan, 
the nitroglycerin was the bomb.  When the bomb failed to destroy PAL flight 434, Yousef decided 
to simply make the bomb slightly larger to adjust for less than ideal placement. 
The second tactical innovation was the sheer complexity of the operation.  The plot involved 
incredible logistical planning, involving 11 or 12 US-flagged carriers departing from various South 
and East Asian cities, making layovers where Yousef and his accomplices could disembark.  This 
was a highly thought out plan.  This required a thorough understanding of routes and timetables and 
complex logistical planning. 
The entire plot took significant timing, planning and testing. The plot was conceived in the 
summer of 1994 when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed joined his nephew in Manila.  They started to 
procure chemicals that summer.  Yousef worked on both the bomb design and detonator through 
the fall.  He and his uncle returned to Karachi, Pakistan in September, where they recruited Wali 
Khan Amin Shah into the plot. Though KSM remained in Pakistan, Yousef returned to the 
Philippines. In November Yousef was able to purchase large quantities of the necessary chemicals, 
enough for at least 13 bombs. In December 1994, he carried out two tests of his device. The first 
occurred on 1 December 1994 at the Greenbelt movie theater in Makati, Manila, when a scaled 
down bomb wounded several people. Then on 11 December the dry run on PAL flight 434. 
Philippine National Police believe that Yousef was mixing chemicals at the house of Tareq Javed 
Rana, a Pakistani national, which caught fire in late December 1994.4  Yousef and his assistants were 
again mixing the chemicals in early January 1995, at the apartment in Malate, Manila, preparing for 
their wave of attacks in mid- to late-January 1995.  The planning and execution were methodical and 
deliberate.5 
Finally, we often overlook the fact that in addition to the nitroglycerine bomb Yousef was 
simultaneously building two other completely different types of bombs.  The first was a large pipe 
bomb made of acetone peroxide in the apartment to be used to target the Pope’s motorcade.  The 
bomb was to be detonated using a radio frequency. Though Yousef did not expect the bomb to kill !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Philippine National Police, After Intelligence Operation Report, 27 February 1995, 6. 
5 United States v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, No. 98-1041(L) United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 4 April 
2003, p. 13, at news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/usyousef40403opn.pdf or 
http://www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=gdig&sear
chTerm=eijf.dafa.aadi.Yabd&searchFlag=&l1loc=FCLOW.  
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the Pope, he was looking for a media opportunity to air political grievances. When police originally 
began to break up the cell from 7-11 January they really thought that the primary operation was 
targeting the Pope, who was scheduled to visit Manila from 12-16 January 1995, not bringing down 
12 jetliners.  Indeed, it was not until Philippine National Police cyber experts were able to break the 
encryption on Yousef’s laptop that they were really able to learn that the plot went way beyond 
assassinating the Pope and that he was linked to the December 1994 bombing of the PAL jetliner.6     
Yousef developed the third bomb specifically for cargo planes.  This bomb was to be made 
of nitrocellulose – a highly volatile chemical more commonly referred to as flash powder or gun 
cotton – again using his Casio watch detonator.  The nitrocellulose was to be embedded in crates of 
jackets and flammable textiles.  After Yousef fled the Philippines and returned to Pakistan, in 
January 2005, he continued to work on this bomb and was in the final stages of executing a plot.7  
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the person he was trying to recruit to perpetrate the 
attack out of Thailand was the individual who provided authorities the tip to Yousef’s whereabouts 
and ultimately to his arrest in a Karachi guesthouse in February 1995. Yousef shared this bomb 
design with his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who, according to the 9/11 Commission Report took 
it to Osama bin Laden in Tora Bora in 1996, as part of a menu of proposed terrorist operations.  Bin 




Ramzi Yousef had always thought in terms of massive terrorist plots.  He did not want to 
detonate a bomb in New York; he wanted to bring down the World Trade Center. He didn’t want to 
just blow up a plane; he wanted to blow up 11-12 simultaneously.  To that point there had only been 
two instances of attacking two planes near simultaneously: the 1985 bombings of the Air India 
flights and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s bombing of airliners over Austria and 
Switzerland in February 1970.9  
So he was trying to do something on a scale nearly six times larger than what had ever been 
successfully done.  A single attack on a plane sends tremors through the airlines industry and causes 
panic.  But a successful attack on this scale would have brought the global airline industry to a 
standstill.  This was a terrorist attack that would have a massive global economic impact; truly a 
“weapon of mass effect.”  This was the first case of targeting such a critical node of the global 
economy to affect political and diplomatic change with global consequences. If one also considers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 There is no evidence that the Philippine National Police had any evidence before the 7 January 1995 arrest of Abdul 
Hakim Murad that tied the plotters to the bombing of PAL flight 434.  The PNP’s after intelligence report, written in 
February 1995, acknowledges that only with the arrests of Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah on 11 January 1995, as well 
as the recovery of Yousef’s laptop, were they able to solve the bombing of PAL flight 434. 
7 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, while in Qatar in February 1995, “KSM and Yousef consulted by telephone 
regarding the cargo carrier plan, and Yousef proceeded with the operation despite KSM’s advice that he hide instead.” 
See n 8, 489.  In another note the report corroborates this: “Evidence gathered at the time of Yousef ’s February 1995 
arrest included dolls wearing clothes containing nitrocellulose.”  See n 7, 488.  The full report is available online at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/.  For more on the vulnerability of cargo planes, see P.J. Crowley and Bruce 
Butterworth, “Keeping Bombs Off Planes: Securing Air Cargo, Aviation’s Soft Underbelly,” Center for American 
Progress, May 2007, at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/05/pdf/air_cargo.pdf.  Pages 1 and 9 reference 
Yousef’s plot. 
8 9/11 Commission Report, n 8, 489. 
9 This comes from a chronological review of airline bombings from 1948-2001, compiled by the European Community, 
and can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/security/studies/doc/2004_aviation_security_appendix_b.pdf. 
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his bomb design to target cargo planes, he would have done catastrophic harm to the global 
economy. 
It was also an ideological innovation.  Yousef perpetrated the December 1994 attack in the 
name of a group that had absolutely nothing to do with the attack, the Abu Sayyaf.  Perhaps it was a 
false flag, but he did believe in the principle of a transnational alliance of like-minded militant 




Simon Reeve had it wrong when he described Ramzi Yousef as a “new jackal,” a solely 
independent operator.10  Yousef, according to KSM was never a member of Al Qaeda, and indeed 
KSM himself did not become a member until he was actively planning the 9/11 attacks.11  Yousef 
was really at the forefront of what Al Qaeda was trying to do.  Al Qaeda’s real innovation was 
twofold: First, it shifted the focus of groups from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy” and, second, 
it tried to create an international network of likeminded groups; recall bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa was 
issued in the name of the International Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders.  Yousef’s 
operation was the vanguard of both of those, and his success may have inspired Al Qaeda.  Indeed 
KSM acknowledged that bin Laden agreed to meet with him probably because of his relationship to 
Yousef, more than the fact that they had fought together in Afghanistan in 1987.12 
Yousef was not a lone operator. His operation was only possible because he could work with 
a variety of individuals and nascent organizations.  This was his modus operandi. For example, when he 
was in the US preparing for the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, he relied on 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Afghan refugee networks. In the Bojinka plot, he worked closely with 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who later wired money to him based on his connections in Pakistan, 
long before he joined Al Qaeda. Other funding for the operation came through a Malaysian-
registered company, Konsojaya, which was established by a JI leader and a close associate of Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali.  The money and actual 
ownership of the corporation came from Middle Eastern Al Qaeda operatives.  As the 9/11 
Commission Report noted, “According to KSM, the plot was to receive financing from a variety of 
sources, including associates of co-conspirator Wali Khan and KSM’s own funds.”13   
Other funding for his operation came through Mohammed Jamal Khalifah, the brother-in-
law of Osama bin Laden, who moved to the Philippines in 1989, from Peshawar, Pakistan, where he 
was working for the Muslim World League supporting the anti-Soviet Mujiheddin.  In the 
Philippines, Khalifah established branches of Saudi charities the International Islamic Relief 
Organization and the Muslim World League. He would later open a branch of the Al Qaeda 
financial vehicle Muwafaq.  He established a number of local charities and worked closely with 
Muslim rebels from the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 
Philippines.  Yousef, himself, had worked with these groups before moving to Manila, instructing 
them in bomb making.  He relied to a limited extent on operatives from these groups to assist him 
in the Bojinka planning.  His two main accomplices were from Pakistan. One, Wali Khan Amin 
Shah was a very close associate of Osama bin Laden’s during the anti-Soviet mujiheddin era, whom 
KSM met while in Afghanistan.  Hakim Murad, was another associate of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed’s.  Yousef pulled together this network, but he did not establish an organization. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (New York: Northeastern, 2002). 
11 9/11 Commission Report, n 10, 489.  
12 9/11 Commission Report, 149. 
13 9/11 Commission Report, n 7, 489. 
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Yousef did not want a large organization.  Indeed he seemed to think that was a liability.  He 
was trying to make as small a footprint as possible, relying on just a handful of trusted colleagues.  
His goal was to be able to quickly move on and replicate the attacks.  Yousef was truly transnational 
in his approach; he had no singular territorial ambition. He wanted to go after the “far enemy” in 
support of Muslim causes around the world.  Like KSM, he valued his independence. 
 
Drivers of Innovation 
 
What made these innovations possible? At a personal level, there was Yousef himself.  He 
had a master’s in electrical engineering from the University of Swansea. He had also studied 
chemistry.  Moreover, In 1991-92, he trained at the most advanced bomb-making course at the 
Khalden terrorist camps in Afghanistan.  He was intellectually capable and schooled over a long 
period of time.  The cookbooks for the nitroglycerine bombs were not for the layperson, nor were 
the cookbooks that his accomplice brought into the United States for the 1993 attack.14 
But it was more than intellect.   He was highly driven and exceptionally entrepreneurial by 
nature. He was single-minded and determined.   He had an entrepreneur’s very high tolerance for 
risk.  He also had an enormous ego that was every bit as large as his hatred of the United States.  He 
didn’t want to be a terrorist, he wanted to be the terrorist who perpetrated attacks on scales that had 
never been seen before, and which had global consequences.  He was the quintessential maniacal 
entrepreneur. 
Second, he had no ready supply of military grade explosives that organizations with state-
sponsorship had.  He needed to work around this.  It is possible that he was looking for an 
alternative as governments, as a result of the Lockerbie bombing in December 1988, were looking 
for better ways to detect plastic explosives and had increased scrutiny of consumer electronics being 
checked in the cargo holds.15 
The third driver was the absence of an organization. Yousef acted with the help of few 
assistants. Although there was a wider network, he was the leader, bomb maker and operational 
planner.   There were neither structural impediments to innovation nor bureaucratic layers.  Indeed 
he seemed very inquisitive and willing to experiment with various designs.  
The 2010 DTRA-sponsored conference on terrorist innovation highlighted the importance 
of leadership.  And here we need to focus on his relationship with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (KSM).  The two were actually only two years apart and quite close friends.  While 
Yousef had the requisite technical skills, KSM had the international connections to bring the plot to 
fruition. It was his contacts that funded the operation and set up the front companies.  He eagerly 
encouraged Yousef in the Bojinka plot and actively encouraged him to innovate with other bombs 
for follow on attacks.  They were fellow travelers who thought big, who were preparing for a long 
reign of terror.  As the previous conference report noted about KSM: “His maniacal fascination with 
fantastic terror operations preceded the 9/11 attacks and was critical to conceiving them.”16  The 
reason KSM went to bin Laden and ultimately joined Al Qaeda was that he believed only Al Qaeda 
had the resources to perpetrate the type and scale of attacks of which KSM dreamed.17   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Immigration authorities stopped both Yousef and his accomplice, Ahmed Ajaj, upon their arrival in the US and the 
bomb-manuals were discovered.  Sadly, the two were later freed. Yousef admitted that his travel documents were 
forgeries and requested asylum.  The bomb-manuals were released to them.  See 9/11 Commission Report, 72. 
15 The Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective, 1903-2008, 87, at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/media/historical_perspective_ch7.pdf. 
16 Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Conference Report, August 2010, 30. 
17 9/11 Commission Report, 149. 
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Fourth, a theme in the first phase of the conference was that terrorist innovation happens 
slowly and over time.  As mentioned above, Yousef had used some nitroglycerine in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bomb.  He clearly found the explosive appealing and worth innovating. 
And that brings me to the final point: Yousef was short of funds for the 1993 operation.  He 
famously quipped to the FBI agents when he was flown back to the United States from Pakistan and 
passed the World Trade Center in their approach to the airport, that if he had more money, they 
wouldn’t be standing. The bomb worked, it was a good design, but it was just too small.   And 
maybe that was an important factor in the Bojinka design.  By focusing on a small liquid-based 
bomb, he would need relatively fewer financial resources. He was simplifying the WTC bomb and 
making it smaller, more manageable, though no less destructive or consequential.  He calculated 
what would be enough to get the job done, with the correct placement. To me, that is very refined.   
 
The Limits of Innovation 
 
The critical question for me is why no one tried to replicate his plan.  Even after authorities 
learned of the Bojinka plot there were no real meaningful countermeasures put in place in the global 
aviation sector that could have prevented a similar attack.  Protocols and counter-measures were 
developed but they were never implemented globally.  It was not until Richard Reid’s shoe bomb in 
December 2001 that passengers were routinely required to have their shoes screened, while it was 
not until the 2006 trans-Atlantic bomb plot that passengers were not allowed to bring liquids on 
board.  Global rules changed within months of these two attacks. So why was his plot not 
replicated? Why did others not utilize his design?  There are two key reasons for this. 
First, Yousef was an arrogant and reticent operator.  He kept everything to himself.  He was 
a control freak who showed no interest in transmitting his knowledge.  He was not trusting. Abdul 
Hakim Murad said in his interrogation that when he arrived in the Philippines, Yousef took his 
passport “for safe keeping”,18 and it was Yousef who forced Murad to return to the apartment after 
the fire was put out to recover Yousef’s laptop.  His cookbooks were a mix. Some were straight 
from chemistry texts so that no one without a masters-level degree in chemistry could discern.  They 
were not for the layman. Other cookbooks were written in the vernacular, but in shorthand.  There 
is no evidence that he ever tried to teach anyone the process.  Indeed, although he spent time in the 
southern Philippines teaching bomb making, he is unlikely to have taught anything remotely this 
complex. No bomb of the MILF or ASG has been remotely as complex; none that I know of has 
ever involved liquid explosives.    
I would note this in contrast to Dr. Azahari bin Husin the master bomb-maker of Jemaah 
Islamiyah and former educator whose cookbooks and manuals were written in a plain 
straightforward manner that anyone, with even a rudimentary education, could understand.  Now it 
is possible to speculate that had Yousef not been captured so soon after his return to Pakistan, he 
would have gone back to the Khalden training camp where he was originally trained. Indeed, after 
1996 when Al Qaeda set up bases in Afghanistan, he would have had more opportunities to train 
others. Again this is speculation, but more importantly, it seems out of character.  He was not a 
teacher, but a doer.  This attack was at the beginning of the Internet era, and it is possible that had 
the Internet been the global medium that it is today, that he would have disseminated his designs.  
But, again, his ego seems to suggest otherwise. 
The second reason probably has to do with the complexity of the process itself.  In his book 
on aviation terrorism, John Harrison, asserts, “One of the more worrying developments over the last !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Philippine National Police, “Tactical Interrogation Report of Abdul Hakim Murad,” 9 January 1995. 
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decade and a half has been the maturation of liquid explosives.”19 And it should remain a concern.  
But it does not mean that it is easy to pull off.  To wit, no similar plot using a liquid-based explosive 
was hatched until the 2006 trans-Atlantic plot 11-years later.20  Home made chemical and liquid 
bombs are very different than lighting a detonating cord, using a manufactured military or mining-
grade explosive, or even mixing diesel fuel with ammonium nitrate. 
Liquid explosives are extremely volatile and difficult to manufacture.  Just because a range of 
chemical explosives can be made from readily available retail store bought chemicals and other 
components does not mean that they are easy to make.  The formulas, ratios, cooking temperatures 
and times must be exact.  While Yousef was able to do it once successfully in a small apartment 
kitchen in Manila with mundane household equipment and utensils, it was still a very difficult 
substance to handle.  Indeed, that was what brought the plot down: the chemicals could not be 
cooled quickly enough and caught fire.  Otherwise the plot would likely have proceeded as planned.  
A dingy apartment kitchen in a third world country with regular electric blackouts is not the ideal 
place to mix volatile chemicals.  
The chemical refining process to purify store bought chemicals is difficult. For example, the 
trans-Atlantic bombers were trying to develop their bombs on hexamethylene triperoxide diamine 
(HMDT), which is based on hydrogen peroxide. But store bough hydrogen peroxide is too diluted 
and thus it must be highly concentrated to become a component of HMDT.  As The New York Times 
wrote about the trans-Atlantic plotters: “A chemist involved in that part of the inquiry, who spoke 
on the condition of anonymity because he was sworn to confidentiality, said HMTD, which can be 
prepared by combining hydrogen peroxide with other chemicals, ‘in theory is dangerous,’ but 
whether the suspects ‘had the brights to pull it off remains to be seen.’”21  Likewise, the TATP shoe 
bomb of Richard Reid failed to go off, as did the second round of London bombings in July 2007, 
again using TATP.  The attempted 2006 bombing of a German high-seed train went awry because 
the bomb-makers got the ratios slightly wrong and the bombs fizzled out; and in this case they were 
using a much simpler bomb design based on diesel fuel detonated by alarm clocks.22  
The manufacture of liquid explosives requires significant education and training, but also a 
controlled environment.  After the August 2007 trans-Atlantic plot was thwarted by British security, 
and measures were put in place to restrict all liquids and gels on carry- on luggage, agents of the US 
Government Accounting Office, were able to manufacture liquid explosives and improvised 
incendiary devices from retail stores for roughly $150 dollars and smuggle the explosives through 
airport security.23  They proved that airlines are still vulnerable to liquid bombs that can be 
assembled from components carried on by passengers. But trained scientists manufactured the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 John Harrison, International Aviation and Terrorism: Evolving Threats, Evolving Security (New York: Routledge, 2009), 54. 
20 In this case chemicals were hidden in hollowed out batteries hidden in a camera. They were to be injected into bottles 
of sports drinks with chemicals hidden in false bottoms. The two chemicals would create an explosion.  For more on the 
August 2006 trans-Atlantic plot, see the New York Times website for the incident at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/t/terrorism/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plot/index.htm
l?scp=1&sq=uk%20transatlantic%20bomb%20plot%202006&st=cse. 
21 Don Van Natta Jr., Elaine Sciolino and Stephen Grey, “In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary, Details of the British Terror 
Case,” The New York Times, 28 August 2006. 
22 Andreas Ulrich, “Failed Bomb Plot Seen As Al-Qaida Initiation Test,” Der Spiegel, 9 April 2007. 
23 Government Accounting Office, Statement of Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney, “Aviation Security: 
Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA’s Passenger Screening Process,” Testimony before the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives,” 15 November 2007, at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0848t.pdf.  For the video of the bombs they manufactured, see 
http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-08-48t/. 
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bombs in controlled labs.  As someone in the first phase of the DTRA conference noted, scientists 
can become terrorists, but terrorists do not become scientists.24   
There is another parallel between Yousef’s and the 2006 trans-Atlantic plot that speaks to 
the limits of innovation.  Both plots were enormous in scale and logistical complexity.   The trans-
Atlantic plot sought to down eight planes en route to North America, which if successful would 
have killed between 2,500-5,000 people.  Both sought to bring down multiple planes simultaneously, 
causing massive shock to a fragile world economy, the airline industry and the public psyche.  While 
much of terrorism is symbolic, these plots went well beyond symbolism. They were weapons of mass 
effect.  Yet, such complexity is beyond the reach of most terrorist groups. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Yousef’s Bojinka plot, though it never was fully implemented, displayed 
considerable tactical innovation, as well as innovations in strategic objectives and organization.  
These innovations were made possible primarily due to Yousef’s own entrepreneurial drive and ego, 
but also because of the small network, not organization, that he established to perpetrate the attacks.  
There is a paradox: the decentralized nature or lack of an organization allows for innovation, but 
limits the resources that the group has access to, or the resources that the group can bring to bear. 
His plan was ingenious, and only due to the technical complexity of the bomb design has it not been 
more widely replicated.  Nonetheless, international aviation will continue to be a high priority target 
for politically motivated terrorists for the eight reasons John Harrison notes in his book.25  As such 
liquid chemicals, with components hidden in carry-on luggage, are likely to be further refined and 
employed in the future.  Better training, screening and wider use and further development of 
explosive trace detection equipment is necessary to combat this. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Conference Report, August 2010, 10. 
25 1. Aviation provides a powerful symbolic target; 2. It provides a unique multi-national stage; 3. It offers unrivaled 
media exposure; 4. Operations against it are relatively simple; 5. It has enormous economic consequences for both the 
carrier and the targeted nation; 6. It can create political embarrassment for the intended targets; 7. It is a useful tool for 
revenge; and 8. It is effective.  Harrison, International Aviation and Terrorism, 49. 
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APPENDIX IV: M. KNIGHTS, BORN OF DESPERATION: AQI’S 




Between 21 October 2006 and 1 July 2007, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) launched at least twenty 
car bombings in Iraq in which tanks of chlorine were deliberately used to create chemical weapon-
type effects. Chlorine car bombs appear to have been used as a specialized sub-set of the general car 
bombing activities by a cluster of AQI cells. Chlorine bombs were thus primarily used to target anti-
AQI tribal leaders in the security forces and local governance. Propagation by car bomb was a 
spectacularly bad method of dispersing chlorine gas and most of the chlorine-laced car bombs 
generated very limited toxic-by-inhalation hazards. Chlorine attacks were a highly localized 
phenomenon: the majority of identified chlorine attacks (fourteen of twenty) took place in Ramadi 
and Fallujah districts, west of Baghdad. Chlorine attacks were also limited to this time period: 
searches of extensive US military and civilian datasets from 2003-2011 do not show any chlorine 
attacks before October 21, 2006 and only one after July 1, 2007.  
This paper aims to draw together the available data on the chlorine attacks and draw some 
tentative conclusions regarding AQI’s adoption of chemical weapons. The chlorine attacks differed 
from other attempts by Iraqi insurgents to develop chemical weapons. Whereas previous chemical 
weapons research programs undertaken by the insurgents had faltered due to a lack of chemical 
agents or delivery mechanisms, the option of chlorine attacks had always been available to the 
insurgency due to the ease of access to chlorine tanks. It appears that chlorine use was limited to a 
certain moment in time, in a certain place, by a certain group of people. This makes it important to 
turn to the local political and operational context in the areas where the bulk of chlorine attacks 
were undertaken.  
In the case of AQI’s adoption of chlorine bombs, the primary driver appears to have been 
desperation as the organization fought to survive in eastern Anbar in late 2006 and early 2007. In 
particular, AQI needed to quickly regain the aura of intimidation it had maintained in eastern Anbar 
for years. If car bombings and assassinations were message sending, the chlorine attacks were a way 
of turning up the volume and regaining some of the shock effect that might break the will of the 
Awakening sheikhs. Quite literally, desperate times called for desperate measures.  
As the raw materials were widely available and there was no technical barrier to undertaking 
chlorine attacks, the key factor restraining such attacks was the intent of the attacker. AQI’s decision 
not to continue using chlorine-laced bombs after July 2007 may have been because such attacks 
were considered too ineffective or too controversial (or both) to employ more widely.   
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Figure 1: Eastern Anbar. The chlorine attacks were mainly concentrated in this area. The map shows the main roads, 
including Alternate Supply Route Golden, connecting eastern Anbar to the old Baathist heartlands of Tikrit and Salah al-
Din province. In early 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) maintained a powerful base of operations in the area between 
Ramadi, Fallujah and Karmah. By the end of 2006, tribal groups under Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi (Abu Risha) were using 
government arms and US money to fight AQI in Ramadi city. In the spring of 2006, AQI faced uprisings from 
nationalist insurgents in outlying tribal areas near Ramadi as well as Fallujah and Amiriyah.  The Al-Tai and Zobai tribes 




Between 21 October 2006 and 1 July 2007, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) launched at least twenty 
car bombings in Iraq in which tanks of chlorine were deliberately used to create chemical weapon-
type effects. At that point, chlorine-laced car bombs had not been used before in the Iraq conflict, 
despite the detonation of thousands of car bombs in the years between 2003 and 2006, and despite 
the widespread availability of chlorine canisters. Nor were chlorine-laced devices used after July 2007 
(except in one isolated case), despite the use of hundreds of car bombings and ongoing availability 
of chlorine containers.1 The adoption of chlorine-laced car bombs was, therefore, arguably a 
deliberate tactical and operational innovation, quite localized in design and execution. It offers an 
interesting case study of the conditions that drove one sub-state group to adopt chemical warfare as 
a tactic – and also to ultimately discontinue the tactic.  
The aim of this paper is to highlight the available evidence concerning the series of chlorine 
car bombings and to draw tentative conclusions from this evidence. This paper utilizes no classified !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There was one chlorine-laced bombing outside the period – an attack that was foiled on the Syrian-Iraqi border at 
Husaybah on 22 November 2009. Other than this outlier, there is no other chlorine bombings recorded in the Coalition 
Significant Actions (SIGACTs) datasets held by Olive Group, and made available to the author for this academic not-
for-profit research. These records do not show any chlorine attacks before October 21, 2006 or after July 1, 2007 (aside 
from the Husaybah attack). Nor are there any open source reports of chlorine attacks outside this date range. Such 
attacks may have taken place but due to the unusual nature of such attacks they probably would have been detected and 
reported. This suggests that the phenomenon was indeed entirely limited to this time period.  
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materials, to the best of the author’s knowledge. The author does not hold a US security clearance 
and has made no use of any classified data. The author has not directly interviewed any AQI 
detainees or seen any classified detainee transcripts that may be held by government agencies. 
Instead, the author has used journalistic means to determine the facts. The private security industry 
has maintained Significant Action (SIGACT) databases in collaboration with Multinational Forces 
Iraq (now US Forces Iraq) since 2003, and the author has access to some of those datasets.2 
Likewise, the private security industry has undertaken analytical studies on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its 
tactical evolution (including chlorine bombings), and the author has collected many of these 
documents. Finally, much has been written in open sources about the chlorine bombings and the 
status of AQI in 2006-2007, including new reporting and some specialized analyses in publishing 
houses such as Jane’s.3 Interview material has been used to supplement these sources, where time 
and availability of interviewees allowed.4  
 
Identifying chlorine attacks 
 
By interrogating the SIGACT database held by Olive Group, a security provider continually 
operational in Iraq since May 2003, and comparing this dataset to open source and private industry 
reporting of chlorine bombings, it is possible to identify twenty incidents that appear to have been 
deliberate chlorine car bombings (successful or foiled). The author defines chlorine-laced car 
bombings as any use of a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) where chlorine 
canisters were deliberately included in the payload with the apparent intent of causing additional 
casualties via a toxic inhalation hazard.5  
It is worth differentiating between these attacks and incidents where chlorine tanks may have 
been added to car bombings purely to increase the explosive or incendiary payload of a device. From 
the beginnings of the insurgency in Iraq, attackers had “boosted” car bombs with all manner of 
combustible materials. Heaps of ordnance, including valuable military items like functional Man-
portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) warheads, were loaded into trucks and detonated.6 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders, used in most Iraqi homes as cooking gas, were frequently 
added to car bombs as a “booster”, though such cylinders tended to be blown from the blast site 
without detonating, often without even being ruptured. Oxy-acetylene welding cylinders were also 
used occasionally in car bombs, once again to “boost” the size of the main charge and perhaps for 
anticipated incendiary effect.7  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The SIGACT database maintained by Olive Group, the longest serving private security company in Iraq, contains over 
three hundred thousand individual geolocated SIGACTs. These can be displayed on commercial geospatial information 
systems like Google Earth and overlaid on military mapping, compared to other datasets of military and civilian 
placemarks, and blended with information on human terrain such as tribal mapping. Some of the SIGACT data held by 
companies like Olive is similar to the records released in the Iraq War Logs section of the Wikileaks datasets.  
3 Special thanks should go to Jeremy Binnie, editor of the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) and Richard 
Evans, founding editor of JTIC and now a Strategic Communications Consultant and Visiting Fellow at the United 
Kingdom Defense Academy. He specializes in the use of strategic communication to counter violent extremism.  
4 Special thanks should be expressed for all the persons who have supported this work, including both those who can be 
identified and those who are serving in government and cannot be quoted by name.   
5 Chlorine presents a toxic-by-inhalation hazard to humans. When pressurized, chlorine is a liquid but upon 
depressurization it becomes a heavier than air vapor cloud. The gas causes irritation to sensitive tissue in the human 
body such as the eyes, nasal passages and lungs. Prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the gas results in 
incapacitation and can cause death.  
6 Michael Knights, “Unfriendly skies: Iraq’s Sunni insurgents focus on air defence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2007, p. 
16.  
7 Olive’s datasets describe numerous car bomb payloads containing pressurized cylinders, usually LPG bottles or oxy-
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Thus it is possible that car bombs had included chlorine tanks prior to October 2006, with 
chlorine cylinders misidentified as other forms of pressurized cylinder or merely lumped in with 
other explosive matter and scrap metal. One of the two main types of chlorine cylinders in Iraq, the 
150lb variety, is a tall cigar-shaped canister that is similar in appearance to other types of industrial 
gas canister (such as some oxy-acetylene or butane tanks). Some oxy-acetylene or butane tanks are 
also bright yellow, like chlorine canisters. In some cases, trucks carrying chlorine canisters to water 
purification sites were damaged, resulting in chlorine releases.8  Accidental releases of chemical 
agents by insurgents has occurred occasionally since 2003: Saddam-era chemical weapons artillery 
rounds appear to have been unintentionally used in roadside bombings and others may have been 
unintentionally used in car bombings.9 
As neither AQI nor its newly established umbrella movement, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
claimed operations involving chlorine-laced car bombs in 2006-2007, is it possible that the attacks 
were another unintentional use of hazardous chemicals by a bomb-making cell with a stock of 
chlorine tanks on hand? This is unlikely for a number of reasons:  
 
• First, the toxic inhalation hazard caused by the chlorine-laced car bombs was immediately 
publicized by Multinational Forces Iraq ands by the Iraqi government, yet AQI cells 
continued to utilize the tactic for at least a further four months, during which time a further 
seventeen chlorine attacks were launched.10  
• Second, insurgents had been experimenting with chemical payloads for car bombs in the 
lead-up to the chlorine attacks. Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno the commander of Multinational 
Corps-Iraq, stated on February 22, 2007, “we have found over the last year or so, couple of 
years, attempts of them to try to use all different types of chemical mixtures in order to try 
to make VBIEDs more lethal, and this is just another way to do it.” 11  
• Third, chlorine-laced car bombings in the first half of 2007 included very large one-ton 
pressurized chlorine tanks rather than the smaller 150lb tanks. These vessels are very difficult 
to misidentify and require a considerable effort to transport. Their capacity, unlike the small 
150lb tanks, is sufficient to release major concentrations of chlorine gas in intentional 
chemical weapons attacks.12  
 
Taking these factors into account, it is somewhat incredible to imagine that AQI was 
unaware of the toxic inhalation hazard caused by their devices, and in fact they seemed to be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
acetylene canisters.  
8 Olive’s SIGACT database shows a roadside bomb attack on February 4, 2005 at 0740hrs in Hillah. The attack occurred 
near an industrial complex and shortly afterwards, there appeared to have been a chlorine gas release due to damage to a 
passing tanker.  
9 See multiple examples in Michael Knights, JTIC Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency 
Centre, February 28, 2007. 
10 The toxic effects of January 28, 2007 attack in Ramadi were evident to all, with US forces and Iraqi troops wearing gas 
masks at the site for days after the attack. The US military began to publicize incidents during February. See the 
statement by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver, Multinational Forces spokesman, reported in Damien Cave and 
Ahmad Fadam, “Iraq Insurgents Employ Chlorine in Bomb Attacks,” New York Times, February 22, 2007.  
11 DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno From Iraq, U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, February 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3893. 
12 The 150lb and one-ton chlorine tanks are identifiable to most menfolk in Iraqi towns as they are such a common 
feature of village and urban life, with government trucks replenishing the stocks at local water treatment plants on a 
regular basis. Other types of container, such as oil drums and the drums used to store corrosive or toxic agents such as 
nitric acid, look markedly different in shape and color.  
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deliberately (and at some added effort) including multi-ton consignments of chlorine in a portion of 
their car bombings each month in the first half of 2007.  
 
 
Figure 2: One-ton (840 liter) chlorine tanks at a major water treatment plant in Iraq. Almost all one-ton tanks found in 
Iraq are this model and are painted yellow. 
 
 
Figure 3: One-ton chlorine tank found in AQI bomb-making cache in Karmah on February 21, 2007.  
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Figure 4: Multiple one-ton chlorine tanks loaded onto a rigged truck bomb that was intercepted on March 23, 2007. 
 
The sequence of chlorine attacks in 2006-2007 
 
The spreadsheet in Annex 1 provides a listing of the chlorine car bomb attacks that were 
identified to a good degree of certainty by the author. As stated, there may be more attacks than 
have been detected, and some foiled attacks may never have been detected. A few attacks – notably 
the first and last – may not have been initiated with serious intent to cause toxic effects.  
For instance, the first listed chlorine bombing on October 21, 2006 utilized a small amount 
of chlorine gas canisters and does not appear to have caused toxic-by-inhalation injuries. Was the 
attack an intentional chlorine-boosted chemical weapon strike? Did an accidental use of chlorine 
give Al-Qaeda in Iraq the idea to use chlorine? Or was a deliberate decision made to add chlorine 
tanks to a VBIED? Was the pause in recorded chlorine attacks (between October and January) 
significant? Unless documentary or interrogation data exists in some classified file and is one day 
released, we may never know the answers to these questions about the start of the sequence of 
chlorine bombings.  
January 28, 2007 is a more reliable start point for the sequence of chlorine attacks. On that 
day a large a suicide car bombing targeted a new Emergency Response Unit (ERU) barracks in 
Jazeera neighborhood, northern Ramadi, and the device incorporated a one-ton chlorine tank.13 
Another attack then took place on February 19, 2007 at a checkpoint just 2.7km from the prior !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 As later sections note, the ERU were a newly formed set of units that permitted tribal and local collectives to hunt 
down Al-Qaeda within their local communities, independently of the US military.  
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attack. It is unclear whether the checkpoint was the target of the attack or, more likely, had flagged 
the driver down and prompted him to pre-detonate the device. This attack also utilized a one-ton 
chlorine tank.  
Immediately after this event, a series of chlorine-related incidents took place in and around 
western Baghdad. On February 20, a large chlorine truck bomb (two one-ton containers) detonated 
at a truck stop on Expressway 1 north of Baghdad. It is unknown whether the device may have 
malfunctioned in transit or whether the truck stop was the target. On February 21, one car bomb 
detonated at a fuel station in western Baghdad with 150lb chlorine tanks on board. Around the same 
time, car bomb factories were discovered on February 20 and 22 near Karmah (a key AQI logistical 
hub northwest of Baghdad) and another in Fallujah on February 21. All of these locations contained 
one-ton chlorine tanks.14  The US military claimed that the car bomb locations contained Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq propaganda materials and manuals.15 Another car bomb containing 150lb chlorine tanks was 
recovered from a cache in western Baghdad on March 3. A final Baghdad car bomb workshop with 
chlorine tanks is uncovered at an undisclosed date in late March after the discovery of a massive 
five-ton chlorine device in Jazeera neighborhood, northern Ramadi on March 23. One day earlier, 
the Islamic State of Iraq – the umbrella movement controlled by AQI – formally denied that the 
movement was involved with chlorine attacks.16 
Amidst scattered chlorine attacks between March and July 2007, the triple bombing on 
March 16, 2007 stands out. This attack saw the homes of three key tribal leaders targeted by AQI, 
though none of the three attacks was successful. The March 28 double chlorine VBIED attack 
against the Fallujah municipal center was also notable. In late April and May, occasional chlorine 
attacks occurred west of Ramadi in the lands of Abd’al-Sattar al-Rishawi (Abu Risha), the tribal 
sheikh leading the fight against Al-Qaeda. The sequence of identifiable chlorine attacks in Anbar 
ends on July 1 with an attempted double suicide bombing against a bridge. In this case, the use of 
chlorine tanks appears to have been relegated once again to a mere afterthought – a few small tanks 
added to a massive explosive main charge alongside other items such as oxy-acetylene canisters. 
Two chlorine attacks occurred in May and June that fell outside the eastern Anbar and 
western Baghdad area. These were both in Diyala province, a key AQI battleground northeast of 
Baghdad. On May 15, a chlorine bomb was detonated at a Shiite market in Abu Sayda and, on June 
3, a very large chlorine device was used to blanket a US base with toxic fumes. A large cache of 
chlorine containers was found in an AQI cache in Diyala on February 1, 2008.17 
 
Tactical analysis of the attacks 
 
Chlorine car bombs appear to have been used as a specialized sub-set of the general car 
bombing activities of AQI cells in the western and northwestern arc of the Iraqi capital. Aside from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Kamryn Jaroszewski, "509th PIR nets cache, saves lives," Alaska Online, March 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.usarak.army.mil/alaskapost/Archives2007/070309/Mar09Story3.asp . Also see  
Bill Roggio, "Another chlorine truck bomb found near Ramadi," Long War Journal, March 27, 2007. Available at 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/another_chlorine_tru.php#ixzz1YSKyMVo1 ;  
Donna Miles, "Iraqi Tips Lead to Bomb Factory Discovery," American Forces Press Service, February 26, 2007, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/24/us-iraq-chemicals-qaeda-idUSPAR44485120070224 . 
15 Silvia Aloisi and Robin Pomeroy, "U.S. says Iraq chlorine bomb factory was al Qaeda's," Reuters, February 24, 2007, 
available at http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/2/25/worldupdates/2007-02-
24T190800Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_-289057-1&sec=Worldupdates . 
16 "Islamic State of Iraq Issues Statement Regarding Chlorine Attacks, Operations in Amiriyat al-Fallujah," SITE 
Intelligence Group, March 22, 2007, available at 
http://siteinstitute.wsone.com/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications264807&Category=publications&Subcategory=0 . 
17  Richard Tomkins, "Report: GIs Exposed to Chlorine Gas," Washington Times, January 31, 2008. 
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outlying cases in Baghdad and Diyala, the majority of identified chlorine attacks (fourteen of twenty) 
took place in Ramadi and Fallujah districts, west of Baghdad. This concentration points to a highly 
localized adoption – and perhaps localized genesis – of the chlorine car bomb, a type of attack that 
has been notably absent in other key AQI operating areas (Mosul, northern Babil and Wasit, the 
Western Euphrates River Valley and the Hamrin mountain range).  
It is difficult to be certain regarding the exact target selection of every planned or executed 
chlorine bombing.  Four of the twenty known chlorine incidents saw the devices detonated at 
checkpoints or transit locations that may not have been the intended targets. Four devices were 
found and defused. Of the remaining incidents with identifiable targets, five attacks were targeted on 
tribal sheikhs, one on a police unit graduation attended by tribal leaders, and one on a municipal 
government center (where anti-AQI sheikhs had just been appointed into leadership positions). 
Chlorine bombs were thus primarily used to target anti-AQI tribal leaders in the security forces and 
local governance.  
It is clear that chlorine bombings did not achieve spectacular destructive results in terms of 
casualties. In most of the cases, large conventional explosive charges accounted for the bulk of the 
casualties inflicted. As a February 2007 article noted, “Chlorine thins rapidly, particularly in strong 
winds, and needs to be released in dense clouds to have lethal effect. The rapid expansion of 
explosive gases seems to have rapidly dispersed the relatively small amounts of the gas used in recent 
VBIEDs. The heat of the explosions also may have burned off the gas, reducing its effect.”18 
Propagation by car bomb was a spectacularly bad method of dispersing a gas that function 
most effectively with significant atmospheric stability, low wind speeds and median air temperatures. 
Five attacks resulted in over fifty casualties, but the blast effects caused the bulk of these injuries in 
all but one case (the deviant case being the attack on the US base in Diyala, when over sixty US 
soldiers reported breathing difficulties). The actual numbers of persons suffering from skin or eye 
irritation and breathing difficulties in the other incidents will probably never be known but it is 
unlikely that many victims experienced greater than the thirty to sixty parts per million (ppm) of 
chlorine gas required to cause permanent lung damage.  
AQI varied the chemical payloads it used in different attacks. The payload could not be 
identified in six cases, but in others the Olive SIGACT database indicates the size of canisters used. 
Five cases involved multiple 150lb chlorine canisters, usually two cylinders.   Four attacks included 
single one-ton containers. In two cases the attackers planned to use a pair of one-ton containers. 
One major attack foiled on March 23 involved a device with four tons of chlorine on board. For all 
this effort, it is notable that the most effective form of dispersion – a gradual release of chlorine gas 
in an urban area at night, perhaps taking advantage of cooler air and an absence of wind – was never 
utilized by AQI. Extrapolating from studies undertaken in the west, a five-ton chlorine release under 
optimal conditions could have produced high numbers of casualties, including perhaps as many as a 
thousand fatalities in a densely populated area.19 Thus, rather than developing true chlorine dispersal 
devices, AQI undertook chlorine-laced car bombings. 
It is also notable that almost none of the devices detonated at the optimal distance from 
their targets, and almost half the devices did not reach their detonation point at all due to being 
discovered or intercepted en route. This is a testament to the density of checkpoints and their 
effectiveness when run by local community police auxiliaries guarding their own “turf.’ The high !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Michael Knights, JTIC Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, February 28, 2007. 
19 See the modeling in Benjamin H. Brodsky, Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine, James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 31, 2007, pp. 30-31. This suggests that 17 tons 
of chlorine released under optimal conditions might cause between 4,000 and 30,000 fatalities. I have used the lower 
figure to base my rough calculation.  
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix IV  !70!
interception rate may have been aided by the conspicuous appearance and size of chlorine cylinders. 
This low delivery rate may also be a reflection of US-Iraqi disruption of AQI networks and car-
bombing workshops in particular.  
Summing up the “chlorine campaign” that mainly took place between February and April 
2007, it appears that a cluster of geographically related car bombing networks adopted chlorine-laced 
devices in a significant proportion of their attacks. (It should be noted that, according to Olive’s 
datasets, of 58 VBIEDs in Ramadi and Fallujah districts between January 28 and July 1 2007, 
thirteen were chlorine-laced, see Annex 2.)  
The use of chlorine was a prolonged campaign that spanned multiple months. It was a 
determined effort and was not abandoned quickly. The primary targets for the chlorine bombs were 
Iraqi tribal leaders from the Sunni Arab community in Ramadi and Fallujah. The most determined 
and ambitious use of chlorine payloads occurred in March 2007 with the attempted March 16 triple 
attack, the large five-ton device found on March 23 and the March 28 attack on the Fallujah council. 
Thereafter the campaign slowly ground to a halt.   
However, the AQI networks seemed equivocal in their faith that chlorine attacks would be 
tactically effective. In their use of chlorine-laced car bombs rather than chlorine dispersal devices, 
they clearly did not embrace the notion of “pure” chemical warfare attacks designed to disperse 
chlorine in the most efficacious manner possible. Instead they incorporated chlorine into their tried 
and tested tactics of ½ to one-ton suicide-initiated car bombs. The “chlorine effect’ may have been 
viewed as a bonus effect and there is no evidence that bomb-makers sought to evolve their devices 
or tactics to produce better chemical weapon effects.  
 
Internal causes / drivers 
 
With the sequence of events established, and certain tactical trends identified, this paper will 
turn to the main question: why did AQI innovate by fielding the chlorine-laced car bomb? In terms 
of internal causes and drivers, the genesis of the idea could have come from either Saddam-era 
military personnel, or foreign and Iraqi Al-Qaeda fighters, or some civilian chemical industry expert, 
or some combination of these, or none of these.   
 
Former regime insurgents and chemical warfare 
 
The chlorine attacks were not the first time that Sunni insurgent factions in Iraq had dabbled 
in chemical warfare. More than most nations, Iraq had a legacy of experience in chemical warfare. 
During the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, the Saddam-era military made extensive battlefield use of 
blister agents such as mustard gas and blood agents (nerve gases) such as Sarin and Tabun. Indeed, 
insurgents appear to have accidentally utilized incorrectly labeled chemical artillery shells in roadside 
bombs.20  On 2 May 2004, explosives ordnance disposal troops located a roadside bomb consisting 
of a 155mm artillery round in Abu Ghraib (between Baghdad and Fallujah). It was leaking some 
form of liquid and subsequent analysis showed that the shell contained mustard gas. Coalition 
personnel showed some signs of exposure – blurred vision and nausea – but appear to have escaped 
serious effects because the munition did not explode and because of the degradation of the agent 
over time.21 As late as August 2008, US military records describe an “AQI cache” being recovered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, US Government, Washington DC, 
March 2005. p. 20. Available at  http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/isg-
addendums_mar2005.pdf. 
21 Michael Knights, JTIC Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, February 28, 2007. 
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that included 26 filled 155mm chemical weapon artillery rounds (probably mustard gas), including 
fourteen leaking rounds.22  
Perhaps building on Baathist-era military experience, some elements of the Sunni insurgency 
seems to have sought out a means to undertake chemical weapon bombardments of US bases in 
Iraq. According to the Iraq Survey Group, the al-Abud network of the Jaish Muhammad militia 
recruited an inexperienced Baghdad chemist in late 2003 to develop chemical and biological agents 
using precursors bought from Baghdad’s chemical souk and from farmers who looted malathion 
pesticide from state companies. The organization tried unsuccessfully to manufacture the blood 
agent Tabun as well as mustard gas before successfully making small amounts of Ricin shortly 
before the network was uncovered and disrupted. Jaish Muhammad – an insurgent group drawn 
from the former regime and its military – sought to develop reliable delivery systems as well, 
including functional binary mustard gas mortar rounds. Fortunately, most of Iraq’s pre-1991 stocks 
of chemical weapon warheads (for instance 122mm Borak warheads) were either destroyed before 
2003 or were successfully recovered in buyback operations in 2004. 23  
Between 2005 and 2007, Sunni insurgents claimed to be able to use chemical weapons to 
bombard US bases on a number of occasions. On September 11, 2005, the Army of the Victorious 
Sect threatened to use “non-conventional and chemical weapons” against government targets unless 
a US security operation in Tall Afar was suspended.24 On September 13, the same movement 
claimed to have launched five “chemical rockets” at the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the police academy and the International Zone in Baghdad.25 On September 14, 2005, the 
Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) a at that time still affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s movement – 
claimed to have attached a US base in al-Madain district with "ten 120mm Hawn chemical mortar 
rounds.”26  
A US military report from June 10, 2006 notes that insurgents planned “to attack a forward 
operating base in Karmah with chemical weapons…The insurgents plan to deploy their chemical 
weapon using mortars as a delivery system.”27 On January 10, 2007, as the chlorine attacks began, 
Sunni militants continued to experiment with chemical rockets. On that date, the Salahadin al-
Ayyubi Brigades, the military wing of JAMI, Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya l'il-Muqawama al-‘Iraqiyya, 
claimed to have fired four 57mm rockets loaded with chemicals against a US base in Samarra. The 
organization posted a film showing militants wearing gas masks and filling the missiles with a liquid, 
which the organization claimed was an unspecified chemical weapon.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Iraq War Logs, Redacted Report 4-2, August 16, 2008, available at http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/PDF/4/2.pdf . 
23 Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, US Government, Washington DC, 
March 2005. p. 20. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/isg-addendums_mar2005.pdf. 
24 Evan Kohlmann, “Communiqué from the Army of the Victorious Sect,” September 11, 2005. Available at 
http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0905/taefamansoura0905.pdf. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Evan Kohlmann, “Communiqué from the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI),” September 14, 2005. Available at  
http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0905/islamicarmy0905.pdf. 
27 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Al Qaeda in Iraq seize Saddam’s chemical weapons,” October 14, 2010, available 
at http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/2010/10/14/aqi-and-chemical-weapons/. 
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Figure 5: Screen grabs from January 10, 2007 video purporting to show 57mm S-5K rockets being 
mounted with improvised warheads that are filled with an unidentified chemical agent.  
 
 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq, chemical weapons and Fallujah 
 
The Sunni insurgency also drew on latent interest in chemical weapons by some elements of 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq. From 1998 onwards a range of Al-Qaeda ideologues gave their rhetorical support 
to the development of chemical and biological weapons.28 Since 2002 a range of jihadist elements 
have been accused of developing chemical or biological weapons. Traces of both ricin and 
botulinium were found at the Ansar al-Islam hamlet of Sargat in April 2003 and German reporters 
recovered a handbook pointing to successful development of ricin and cyanide gas, although 
attempts to produce mustard gas and VX nerve agent appear to have failed. 29 
This interest was carried forward after 2003 by elements of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  When parts of 
Fallujah fell to US forces on November 23, 2004, US forces uncovered what was described as a 
chemical weapons factory, collocated with an explosives workshop.30 Against a backdrop of the 
banner of Abu Musab Zarqawi’s group Tawhid and Jihad, the rudimentary laboratory contained 
Mujahedeen “How to Cook Book” guidebooks downloaded from the internet on the creation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 For a good review of these statements see René Pita, Assessing al-Qaeda’s Chemical Threat, Athena Paper, Vol. 2, No 2, 
Article 3/5, April 17, 2007, available at www.athenaintelligence.org . 
29 Michael Knights, JTIC Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, February 28, 2007. 
30 For images from the workshop, see "Fallujah Update: Insurgent Chemical/Explosives Weapons Laboratory," 
Multinational Forces Iraq, November 26, 2004, available at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/.../fallujah-
cw_cpic_26nov2004.ppt . 
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chemical weapons and notebooks in Arabic where details concerning anthrax and blood agents had 
been transcribed. Precursors for the blood agent hydrogen cyanide were found in the laboratory, 
including potassium cyanide and hydrochloric acid.  Potassium Cyanide is a severe poison solid 
compound that, when mixed with an acid, produces a poisonous gas. Hydrogen cyanide is extremely 
poisonous in both vapor and liquid form. 31 
The insurgents were preparing for a second assault on the city of Fallujah and were seeking 
to develop all and any means of defending the area. As the Iraq Study Group’s 2005 addendum 
noted: “an insurgent captured in Fallujah stated, “If we had chemical weapons, we would have used 
them.”32 The aforementioned materials are believed to have been intended for use in improvised 
chemical devices (ICDs). In March 2007, as the chlorine bomb attacks were drawing attention to the 
issue of chemical warfare, an unnamed US military official told a reporter, “We’ve seen them use 
caustic acid with improvised explosive devices to burn the skin,” adding that although the acid does 
not increase the lethality of a bomb, it does make it “nastier.”33 
As noted previously, on February 22, 2007 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno the commander of 
Multinational Corps-Iraq, also noted “attempts of them to try to use all different types of chemical 
mixtures in order to try to make VBIEDs more lethal.” 34 
Arguably the chemical warfare research being undertaken in Fallujah was fit-for-purpose 
considering the priorities of the movement – i.e., to undertake a major stand in the fast-approaching 
second battle of Fallujah. Zarqawi’s followers sought a far lower level of capability than the former 
regime elements that attempted to create chemical artillery capable of hitting US bases. Instead the 
jihadists were aiming to utilize a mixture of cyanogens chloride (CK), hydrogen cyanide (HCN), and 
hydrochloric acid (HCl) to create a crude chemical weapon that could be activated either by an 
explosion or by simply throwing or dropping it. Such devices would work best when detonated in a 
contained inside area making them potentially very useful in a static urban fight such as the defense 
of Fallujah. The mixture would disrupt the oxidative processes of the body and act as a local irritant 
to the eyes, the upper respiratory tract, and the lungs.35   
Were the chlorine attacks in any way linked to this earlier process of innovation by AQI? In 
one sense, yes: the wellspring of innovation again appears to be Fallujah and surrounding areas 
judging by the positioning of car bomb-making workshops and attack sites involving chlorine 
payloads. The idea of using a simple choking or irritating agent also might have been influenced by 
the research undertaken in Fallujah in 2004.  
 
The chlorine industry and Fallujah 
 
Alternatively, the use of chlorine may have resulted from issues unrelated to the earlier Al-
Qaeda chemical warfare experiences in Fallujah. For instance, the Fallujah area was, for many years, 
the location of Iraq’s largest chlorine manufacturing plant. Weapons inspectors throughout the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibid. 
32 Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, US Government, Washington DC, 
March 2005. p. 22. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/isg-addendums_mar2005.pdf. 
33 Sharon Behn, "Chlorine cache found in Iraq," Washington Times, March 23, 2007. 
34 DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno From Iraq, U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, February 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3893 . 
35 Michael Knights, JTIC Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, February 28, 2007. 
Tawhid and Jihad elements were also accused of planning to use a chemical IED in Jordan in 2004. Suspected militants 
arrested in Jordan told interrogators that they were informed they would take part in the "first chemical attack by al-
Qaeda,” though no further substantiation was provided. 
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1990s at the Fallujah II facility strictly monitored Iraq’s limited chlorine production. The facility 
housed stocks of chlorine that Iraq had over-produced and was being restored to its earlier capacity 
as war broke out in 2003.36  Persons with experience of chlorine’s dangerous effects – locals or 
industrial workers – could have inputted ideas.  
 
 
Figure 6: Chemical industry locations near Fallujah. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Fallujah II / Habbaniyah II, GlobalSecurity.org, Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/fallujah_2.htm . 
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Figure 7: Fallujah II site in detail. 
 
 
Figure 8: One-ton chlorine canisters unsecured at Fallujah II in October 2003. Note the presence of the two 
main types of one-ton container as well as 150lb cylinders.  
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Yet whilst this special connection between Fallujah and chlorine use might have been 
significant, it should not be overstated. Chlorine is used in every Iraqi city and major town within 
water treatment plants. As stated, the bright yellow 150lb cigar-shaped cylinders and 1-ton chlorine 
tanks are familiar pieces of equipment across Iraq. Chlorine tanks were dispersed across the country 
at water plants and were largely unguarded (and remain unprotected to this day).37 The toxic risk 
posed by chlorine was well understood in most Iraqi communities before 2003 when accidental 
releases of chlorine gas regularly caused injuries. Even today, major chlorine leaks are a regular 
occurrence. On July 13, 2011 a chlorine tank accidentally ruptured in Sadr City, Baghdad, injuring 
two hundred people, and on September 3, a leak killed two people in Baqubah, Diyala.38   
 
Former regime/AQI hybrid? 
 
One interviewee with good access to former insurgents offered very specific information on 
the genesis of the chlorine attacks. Attributing the information to “an Iraqi intelligence officer” 
asked specifically about the genesis of the chlorine attacks, the interviewee stated: 
  
The chlorine bombs were the work of Dr. Ziyad Tariq Taha al-Jabouri, a chemical engineer, born 
1967, worked in biological weapons in the Military Industrialization … He is from a proper Baghdadi 
family, from Karkh, who settled here in the 1800s. His present family home in the Beijiya 
neighborhood near Mansour. His sisters, until recently, weren’t wearing headscarves, so the family 
was quite liberal. Ziyad’s wife began to wear the hijab only in 2004. Since 1997, he began frequenting 
the nearby Ali al-Salih mosque, where the preacher was “Abu Abdullah”, Sheikh Ibrahim Awwad 
Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samara’i, who is now “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”, leader of the ISI. In August 2005, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established a “factory” for Ziyad to begin producing these chlorine bombs, in 
a chicken farm in the Sheeha area of Taji. The principal source for their chlorine was the Baghdad 
water treatment plants, one of which, I think, is near them. They would also buy this on the open 
market.39  
 
The data cannot be checked against other sources, but does point to a credible scenario: that 
a scientist active under the former regime provided assistance to AQI in their chlorine attacks. This 
piece of information would suggest that AQI believed that chlorine could be utilized as a chemical 
weapon from as early as 2005.  
There seem to be plenty of internal causes and drivers to interest AQI in chemical warfare 
and specifically in chlorine attacks in the Fallujah area. But this does not explain why Al-Qaeda 
chose to adopt chemical warfare when it did. If insurgents wanted to undertake chlorine attacks, 
they could have done so at any time, and still could today, yet there has been just one report of 
chlorine attacks outside the October 2006 to July 2007 period.  
A further internal factor restraining the use of chlorine may have been an underestimation of 
its potential lethality if used as a weapon, which is far higher than might be suggested by the 
numbers of casualties experienced in accidental releases.  In comparison, most groups were doing 
well enough with conventional weaponry and may not have felt the need to innovate. Another 
disincentive might have been the difficulty of deploying such a weapon against US forces without !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 The Olive Iraq datasets include multiple descriptions of water treatment plants with minimal protection and include 
many images of 150lb and 1-ton chlorine tanks located at unguarded rural sites.  
38 “Chlorine gas leak strikes Iraq’s Sadr city,” Euronews Agency, July 13, 2011, available at  
http://www.euronews.net/2011/07/13/chlorine-gas-leak-strikes-iraq-s-sadr-city/  . Also see “Two killed in violence, 20 
poisoned by chlorine gas in Iraq's Diyala,” Xinhua Agency, September 3, 2011, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-09/03/c_131095837.htm . 
39 Michael Knights, email interview with Iraq analyst, October 15, 2011. 
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affecting large numbers of civilians, recalling that insurgents previously sought to use chemical 
weapons against US forces in their bases (via artillery or rocket fire) or in civilian-free environments 
such as besieged Fallujah.  
Yet the chlorine bombing campaign shows that these restraining factors were overcome in 
one particular area (eastern Anbar and western Baghdad) and during one period (January to July 
2007). In fact, AQI went further than ever before by deliberately targeting chemical weapons of 
Sunni Arab civilians (not US forces). Why? It appears that chlorine use was limited to a certain 
moment in time, in a certain place, by a certain group of people. This makes it important to turn to 
the local political and operational context in the areas where the bulk of chlorine attacks were 
undertaken.  
 
External causes and drivers: local context in eastern Anbar, 2006-2007 
 
The situation in eastern Anbar in late 2006 and early 2007 provides key insights into the 
pressures that AQI were facing as they adopted chlorine attacks. Desperation and a bitter fight for 
survival seem to have been an important driver of AQI’s use of chemical warfare. The crux of the 
matter was the rapid and shocking collapse of AQI’s position in Ramadi during the last months of 
2006. At the start of the year, traditional power brokers had been driven out of Ramadi and Al-
Qaeda proxies controlled the city. From May 2006 onwards, a newly-arrived US brigade struck up a 
strong alliance with Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi (Abu Risha) in Ramadi. The joint venture quickly 
bore fruit, as Najm Abed al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen stated: 
 
In July 2006, the US Army brigade in Ramadi seemed serious about police recruitment, saying the 
Iraqi police (IP) could work in their areas of residence to ensure the safety of their families. The 
Anbar Revolutionaries and other vigilantes answered the call and joined the Ramadi IP. They did this 
to make their fight against al Qaeda official, to get paid by the Ministry of the Interior, and to avoid 
targeting by the Americans. In August 2006, when Sheikh Abdul Sattar was building police stations in 
his tribal areas outside of Ramadi, the stigma of working with the Americans was lessened.40 
 
On September 9, 2006, twenty-five Ramadi tribes joined the Anbar Awakening (also known 
as the Ansar Salvation Council) and formally sided with the US military and the Iraqi government 
against AQI. Between September and December, these tribes fed some of their manpower directly 
into the police service and were permitted to stand up other formations of police auxiliaries – the 
Emergency Response Units (ERU) – to hunt down AQI in operations carried out independently of 
the police or the US forces.41    
US and Iraqi forces cleared Ramadi of AQI militants. In October 2006, AQI was still 
confident enough to hold public rallies in Ramadi city and overrun police stations. In November, US 
and Iraqi forces defeated AQI in a major stand-up battle in eastern Ramadi city (Sofia district). In 
November, December and January, around seven hundred to a thousand recruits joined the security 
forces in Ramadi each month. Between mid-November and mid-January, US forces established a 
major reconstruction program that employed local sheikhs as subcontractors.42   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” Prism, Volume 2, 
No. 1 (December 2010), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/iraqi-aqi-roles.html . 
41 The ERU units were approved by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, paid wages by the US military and received weapons 
and ammunition from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.  
42 Michael Knights, telephone interview with Sterling Jensen, translator to Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, September 15, 
2011.  
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Caches discovered in Ramadi through tip-offs from the public increased from an average of 
twenty a month in 2006 to an average of ninety a month in the first half of 2007. As Figures 9 and 
10 show, the growth in security forces was mirrored by a decline in enemy activity. US forces 
activated numerous Iraqi Police stations and instituted a census and ID card system to register 
Ramadi residents. On March 13, 2007, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made his first visit to Anbar, 
travelling to Ramadi to meet with Anbar Awakening leaders. After a final desperate surge of ten car 
bombings (including one chlorine attack) in February, AQI collapsed in Ramadi city during March 
2007. From April 2007 onwards, AQI activity in Ramadi dropped off almost completely.43  
The action then shifted to Fallujah, outlying areas north of Ramadi and the western Baghdad 
suburbs like Abu Ghraib as the Awakening dynamic was replicated in these areas. The new 
commander of Multinational Forces Iraq, General David Petraeus, gave the 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force commander, Major General John Allen, new direction to engage the local 
powerbrokers in Fallujah. Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s October 2006 announcement of the Islamic State of 
Iraq had pushed many of the insurgent groups between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib into open conflict 
with AQI by February 2007. Groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaish Muhammad and the 
1920 Revolution Brigades were linked into local tribal structures. 44 From March to June, AQI 
ramped up the number of car bombs it deployed against population targets in Fallujah district, 
seeking to intimidate tribal leaders and populations. Whereas previously the group had used one or 
two car bombs per month in Fallujah district center and none in the tribal hinterlands around the 
city, AQI used five car bombs in March, eight in April, seven in May and five in June. Of the three 
attacks deep within the tribal areas, all three attacks were chlorine devices.45 The deployment of the 
five-ton chlorine device and the double chlorine attack on Fallujah government center, both in late 
March, marked the high point of AQI’s last-gasp intimidation campaign.  
 
 
Figure 9: Growth in Anbar security forces. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Ibid. Also see Michael Knights, telephone interview with Nibras Kazimi, September 14, 2011. 
44 Michael Knights, telephone interview with Sterling Jensen, translator to Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, September 15, 
2011. 
45 All data derived from the Olive Iraq dataset.  
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Figure 10: Ramadi monthly attack levels, August 2005 to June 2007. 
 
The fine-grain detail of the targeting of conventional VBIEDs, chlorine car bombs and other 
attacks suggests a strong connection between the pressure felt by AQI and its decision to innovate 
with chemical weapons. The October 21, 2006 chlorine attack – though we know little about it – 
does track closely with the point at which AQI began to feel real sustained pressure in Ramadi.  The 
January 28, 2007 chlorine attack – the first really clear-cut chemical weapon attack on Iraqis carried 
out by the insurgency – was aimed squarely at the new ERU units being raised by the Anbar 
Awakening in Ramadi. The triple chlorine bombing in March 16, 2007 was intended to carry a 
message to the sheikhs leading the Anbar Awakening by targeting their home areas just three days 
after they met with Prime Minister Maliki. In late March, AQI made a determined attack on the 
Fallujah government center immediately after the council was reappointed with anti-AQI tribal 
leaders.  
Chlorine attacks were probably utilized by AQI because the movement was desperate to 
overawe and terrorize the tribal leaders and nationalist insurgents who had turned against it. AQI 
leaders in eastern Anbar considered such turncoats to be traitors and apostates, and thus viable 
targets for any form of weapon. If car bombings and assassinations were message sending, the 
chlorine attacks were a way of turning up the volume and regaining some of the shock effect that 
might break the will of the Awakening sheikhs.  
 
Why did the chlorine attacks cease? 
 
One contributing reason for the tailing-off of attacks is that the attacks were decimated in 
eastern Anbar. The fight was lost and many AQI elements abandoned the Ramadi and Fallujah 
operating areas. Another factor may have been improved control of chlorine canisters.46 Yet the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 The US military and Iraq’s Facilities Protection Service sought to tighten security at chlorine plants in the spring and 
summer of 2007. There was also a push to gather as many canisters as possible to a small number of central Baghdad 
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chlorine tactic did not resurface in other areas of Iraq, no matter how desperate AQI cells became. 
In the end, the attacks in Diyala were the only real horizontal proliferation of the chlorine bomb 
tactic from one area to another, and the tactic was not used for long. In one of the two Diyala 
attacks a US military target was hit in a “clean” attack that did not endanger civilians. The other was 
a sectarian strike on Shia civilians specifically, underlining the way that chlorine attacks were 
employed in different ways to fit the local operational aspirations of cells.  Between July 2007 and 
October 2008, three more weapons caches were found containing chlorine tanks in Diyala, Babil 
and Hawijah (near Kirkuk). Despite hundreds of car bombings since July 2007, only one other 
chlorine bombing has been recorded since (a foiled attack in Husaybah, on the Syrian-Iraqi border, 
on 22 November 2009).47 As availability of chlorine tanks was not the restraining factor, chlorine 
attacks must have either been considered too ineffective or too controversial (or both) to employ 
more widely.   
 
Perceived ineffectiveness of the tactic 
 
Was the apparent ineffectiveness or counter-productiveness of the chlorine attacks the 
decisive factor? By the time chlorine bombs were used, the tide had already decisively turned against 
AQI. As an innovation, they came too late to reverse the situation in eastern Anbar.  Furthermore, 
the attacks were correctly interpreted by anti-AQI sheikhs as a sign of AQI’s desperation and were 
even disavowed by the national leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq. The attacks were horrific 
enough to enrage their intended targets but were not effective enough to truly intimidate them. As 
Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi, the target of one of the three March 16, 2007 chlorine bombs told 
interviewers, “Al-Qaeda sent a tanker of chlorine against me. They blew it up in the first checkpoint, 
which is very close to my house. My mother was killed — her name was Turkiyah — and five 
children were killed, and one of my guards. This gave me another great push to fight them.”48 
Was this dynamic obvious to AQI? Probably not straight away: the effectiveness of the 
attacks (i.e., their intimidation effect) would not have been entirely apparent to AQI as they 
undertook the campaign and would have been given time to work. In February and March 2007, 
AQI enthusiastically embraced chlorine attacks in eastern Anbar, with these attacks comprising over 
half of the VBIED attacks in Ramadi and Fallujah districts in these months. There was no cessation 
or reduction of attacks after the Islamic State of Iraq publicly disavowed the tactic on March 22, 
2007. In contrast, more chlorine attacks might have been launched during this period if it were not 
for the major arms caches and car bomb-making workshops disrupted in late February and March. 
The tailing off of attacks only occurred from the end of March, though deliberate chlorine attacks 
continued into late June at least.  
 
Targeting concerns and broader strategy 
 
It is possible that the lack of support from other parts of AQI / ISI were a factor in limiting 
that spread of chlorine bomb tactics. In other cases, AQI / ISI proved to be gimmicky about new 
tactics, promoting their adoption by different cells operating across the country. One example would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
water treatment plants as a part of emergency program of providing clean water to Baghdad during the summer. Michael 
Knights, interview with Joel Rayburn, October 25, 2011, Washington DC. 
47 "Police find 2 chlorine caches in Kirkuk," Voices of Iraq, October 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/37757. 
48 Interview with Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi, Fallujah Representative Iraqi Awakening Political Party, in  
Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams (eds), Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives from Insurgency 
to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009).  
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be the promotion of RKG-3 anti-tank grenades in May 2007, which AQI / ISI glamorized through 
their propaganda about the so-called “Thermal Brigades” of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.49 This did not happen 
with the chlorine-laced car bombs.  
Instead AQI chose not to promote such attacks and they were not emulated in almost any 
other parts of Iraq. As noted, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) did not claim the chlorine attacks using 
their traditional means of communication such as the Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production, the 
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), the Al-Fajr Media Center, the Al-Boraq Media Center, or the 
Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production. The only ISI communication on the chlorine attacks was 
the March 22, 2007 communiqué that denied targeting “the general people with poison gas.”50  
This formulation is probably significant: it is the target of the attack that is proscribed, not the 
weapon itself. AQI does not seem to have been opposed to chemical warfare in principle: quite the 
opposite. On September 28, 2006, Abu Ayyub al-Masri (also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), the 
emir of ISI, recorded an audio message that called for persons with expertise in chemistry to help 
with the development of non-conventional weapons for employment in Iraq.51 Likewise even after 
the chlorine attacks, ISI claimed to possess long-range missiles capable of striking Tel Aviv with 
chemical warheads.52 By the middle of 2007, ISI/AQI was engaged in a desperate effort to portray 
itself as an Iraqi-led organization that stood with the people against the occupation. Use of chemical 
weapons against Iraqi civilians ran counter to this message and the propaganda core of the 
movement chose not to back the tactic’s adoption by local cells.  
 
Lessons learned regarding innovation by terrorist groups 
 
AQI’s adoption of chlorine-based chemical weapons is an interesting phenomenon but is 
nonetheless just a single case study. As the historical circumstances of each terrorist group are 
unique, it is very hard to justify the extraction of transferable conclusions from a single case. 
Nevertheless, it is only by creating in-depth accounts of individual cases that the academic 
community can create well-constructed building blocks to use in comparative case study-based 
analyses. Hopefully this work is useful for this reason alone.  
The chlorine bombs case study suggests a number of avenues of enquiry and generates 
observations that might be further investigated in other cases and through comparative case study 
methodology. In brief: 
 
• Internal causes / drivers can be necessary but not  suf f i c i ent  to prompt innovation. 
There were plenty of internal drivers that might have resulted in AQI adopting chlorine 
attacks at any stage since 2003, or continuing such attacks to this very day. These factors 
were all vital – and they each prompted many preparatory behaviors that might have given 
indicators and warnings of the chlorine attacks. However it took an external factor – the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, “Iraq’s RKG armour threat,” May 22, 2009, available at 
http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Terrorism-And-Security-Monitor-2009/Iraq-s-RKG-armour-threat.html . 
50 "Islamic State of Iraq Issues Statement Regarding Chlorine Attacks, Operations in Amiriyat al-Fallujah," SITE 
Intelligence Group, March 22, 2007, available at 
http://siteinstitute.wsone.com/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications264807&Category=publications&Subcategory=0. 
51 Sammy Salama and Gina Cabrera-Farraj, “New leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq calls for use of unconventional weapons 
against U.S. forces: Possible poisoning of Iraqi security forces at central Iraq base,” WMD Insights, No. 10, November 
2006, pp, 2-3.  
52 CBS News, “Islamic State Of Iraq Claims It Has Chemical Warhead Missiles Capable Of Reaching Israel,” September 
22, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-502684_162-4468382-502684.html . 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix IV  !82!
desperation of the movement in eastern Anbar in late 2006 and early 2007 – to push AQI 
into local adoption of chemical warfare.  
• Intent may be as important as capability. In a world full of off-the-shelf chemicals, 
assessing the intent of a group to use chemical warfare may be as significant as assessing the 
capability to field such weapons. This is particularly true in post-conflict environments where 
chemical weapons or hazardous materials are not strictly controlled. Considering the 
operational space available to AQI between 2003 and 2008, or even now, the movement 
could have mounted chemical weapon attacks every month for years on end had it wished to 
do so. The group had the basic capability to mount chlorine bombings – or better yet cause 
major chlorine leaks – throughout the post-2003 era. For some types of attack – killing 
masses of Shiite civilians or fomenting sectarian civil war –chemical attacks might have been 
operationally ideal. Yet the movement chose not to mount such attacks, or at least did not 
consider making such attacks, most of the time. Instead, chlorine bombings were only 
adopted when AQI’s intent changed.  Further in-depth study should be undertaken, 
preferably involving interviews with detainees or former militants and ideologues, to 
ascertain whether AQI had an operational or ethical bias against using chemical weapons, 
and what the basis of these views were.  
• Desperation can be a key driver of innovation. In the case of AQI’s adoption of chlorine 
bombs, the primary driver appears to have been desperation as the organization fought to 
survive in eastern Anbar. In particular, AQI needed to quickly regain the aura of intimidation 
it had maintained in eastern Anbar for years. It also sought urgently – and probably angrily - 
to punish the perceived betrayal by the Sunni sheikhs who had fought alongside AQI or 
passively supported the movement for years. Quite literally, desperate times called for 
desperate measures.  
• Local context can sometimes be more significant than national or international 
drivers. The decision to utilize chlorine bombs very likely originated in eastern Anbar. The 
national leadership of ISI / AQI was, at the time, focused on the national project of an inter-
Salafist umbrella movement, the Islamic State of Iraq, and was not significantly involved in 
tactical or operational planning at the level of the regional and sub-region “emirates.”53 The 
political context in eastern Anbar in late 2006 is probably the most significant factor in 
AQI’s localized adoption of chlorine bombings. No amount of studying ISI’s strategic 
communiqués would have detected indicators of the coming adoption of chlorine bombs: 
the indicators were instead present in district-level politics.  
• Organizations are idiosyncratic and can be conservative in their adoption of new 
technologies and processes. The dispersal of chlorine gas by explosive detonation was not 
the optimal means of causing a toxic-by-inhalation hazard. Indeed, the optimal means of 
dispersing chlorine gas might have actually been simpler to engineer than the bombings that 
were undertaken. Chlorine was integrated into the existing preferred “heavy weaponry” of 
AQI – the suicide car bomb – with little or no amendment of the basic tactics. The explosive 
force of the car bomb or truck bomb package was the focus of each operation and the 
chlorine seemed to have been of strictly secondary importance: in almost every case, the 
explosive yield of the car bomb was large enough to dwarf any casualties that might have 
been caused by the chlorine payload.  This tentative incorporation of chlorine into car !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Michael Knights, telephone interview with Nibras Kazimi, September 14, 2011. 
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bombing techniques is suggestive of only limited organizational acceptance of the utility of 
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Unknown, possibly a 
police compound or 
sheikh’s house.  
Car bomb.  
Main charge = 12x 120mm 
mortar rounds 
Chemicals = 2x 150lb chlorine 
tanks 
Intercepted at checkpoint. 
Caused 3x wounded (two 
police, one civilian) 
 
28 Jan 2007 
0944hrs 
Jazeera area, 
Ramadi  (north 









Garbage / dump truck  
Main charge = 1 ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = single 1-ton 
chlorine tank 
Rammed perimeter fence. 
Sixteen ERU personnel 
killed by main charge. Fifty-
five wounded, including 
chemical burns and 
breathing difficulties. Clean 





Ramadi  (north 




checkpoint – near 
OP5 (2.7km from 
previous incident). 
Suicide-initiated 
Small truck  
Main charge = ½  ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = single 1-ton 
chlorine tank 
Intercepted at checkpoint. 
Killed two policemen and 













Detonated at rest 
stop / restaurant on 
Expressway 1.  
 
 
Large tanker truck 
Main charge = 100lb bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = two 1-ton 
chlorine tanks 
Possible accidental pre-
detonation. Killed nine 
people and caused 148 
injuries, mostly breathing 












Detonated at a diesel 
fuel station.  
Small pickup truck (Kia)  
Main charge = ½  ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = multiple 150lb 
chlorine tanks  
Concealed under 
commercial cargo of liquid 
detergent. Killed 5-7 









Main charge = 32x 57mm 
rockets, 4x anti-tank mines!
Chemicals = 2x 150lb chlorine 
tanks. 
Device intercepted – 







Tribal leader’s home 
in Ramadi city 
Suicide initiated  
Small pickup truck 
Main charge = small amount 
bulk explosives 
Chemicals = multiple 150lb 
chlorine tanks 
Stopped at US/Iraqi 
checkpoint, wounded one 
US soldier and one Iraqi 
civilian.  











Tribal leader’s home 
in Amiriyah 
 
The target in 
Amiriyah was a 




Garbage / dump truck  
Main charge = 1 ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = two 1-ton 
chlorine tanks 
Intercepted at checkpoint. 
Killed six security forces 




Second of triple attack. ! !
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Tribal leader’s home 
in Albu Jumayl  
 
The target in 
Amiriyah was a 




Garbage / dump truck  
Main charge = ½ ton bulk 
explosives 




Intercepted at checkpoint 
very close to target building. 
Injured 150 persons (mainly 
breathing difficulties).  
 






Ramadi  (north 
of Hwy 11) 
 
38S LC 402038 
Unknown target. Articulated (Mercedes) truck 
rig 
Main charge = two tons of 
bulk explosives in 55x two-
gallon jugs and 2x 55-gallon 
barrels 
Chemicals = four 1-ton 
chlorine tanks 
  







Ramadi  (north 
of Hwy 11) 
 
38S LC 394031 
Al Jazeera police 
station. 
Initiation method unknown 
Garbage / dump truck  
Main charge = one ton of bulk 
explosives hidden under boxes 
filled with candy. 
Chemicals = twelve 150lb 
chlorine tanks 
Found and defused at site of 










day after the 
appointment by the 
Fallujah City Council 
of a new anti-AQI 
mayor, Saad Awad 
Rahid Al-Dulaimi.  
 
 
Two suicide-initiated devices 
Both garbage / dump trucks 
Main charge = each 1 ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown 
Intercepted during complex 
attack (small arms fire and 
mortars) on Fallujah 
Government Center. Both 
trucks immobilized by small 
arms fire and self-detonated. 
Wounded 57 US troops and 






Fallujah Unknown housing 
compound 
Articulated truck rig 
Main charge = unknown, large 
secondary explosions on gun 
camera footage.  
Chemicals = unknown 
US Marine F/A-18 destroys 














Main charge = 1 ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown 
 
Intercepted at checkpoint. 
Killed 27 Iraqis and 
wounded at least thirty 
others. Injured civilians 
reported breathing 







Unknown.  Suicide initiated 
Truck 
Main charge = ½ ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown 
Killed one Iraqi soldier and 
wounded two others. US 












meeting at restaurant 
Large tanker truck 
Main charge = 250lb bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = one 1-ton 
chlorine tank 
Detonated in parking area 
of restaurant. Killed one 
person and wounded eleven.  
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Abu Sayda in 
Diyala province 
38S MC784544 
Market in Shiite area Suicide initiated 
Truck 
Main charge = one ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown 














Main charge = one ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown 
Killed 2 police officers on 
checkpoint and injured 
eleven nearby.  
 








US military base Suicide initiated 
Taxi cab 
Main charge = ½ ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = two 1-ton 
chlorine tanks 
Intercepted at outer 
checkpoint. No explosion-
related casualties but 62 US 
soldiers affected sought 
treatment for dizziness and 
nausea.  








Bridge (the last of 
five suicide VBIED 
attacks on the bridge 
in the first half of 
2007) 
Suicide initiated  
Truck 
Main charge = ½ ton bulk 
explosives 
Chemicals = unknown, 
probably multiple 150lb 
chlorine tanks  
Attacker decided not to 
detonate. Chlorine bomb 
defused. Other vehicle 
detonated, destroying two 
of four lanes of bridge.  
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Annex 2: Chlorine bombs as a proportion of total VBIEDs in eastern Anbar between 
January 28, 2007 and July 1, 2007.  
 
 
Figure 11: All VBIEDs in eastern Anbar in the date range. 
 
 
Figure 12: Chlorine VBIEDs in eastern Anbar in the date range. 
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Annex 3: Indicative image of decline in incidents in Ramadi city during 2007 (from 
Olive datasets).   
 
 
Figure 13: Ramadi city, January 2007. 
 
 
Figure 14: Ramadi city, April 2007. 
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Annex 4: Indicative image of decline in incidents in Fallujah city during 2007 (from 
Olive datasets).   
 
 
Figure 15: Fallujah city, March 2007.  The Awakening movement started later in Ramadi.  
 
 
Figure 16: Fallujah city, August 2007.  By August, AQI had scattered and municipal leadership was back in the 
hands of the local tribes and families.  
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APPENDIX V: J. TONGE, THE LACK OF LOYALIST INNOVATION 




Loyalist paramilitaries engaged in “pro-state terrorism” throughout the Northern Ireland 
conflict, acting, in their view, to preserve Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom and to 
deter the Catholic community from joining the IRA. Loyalist violence was thus aimed physically at 
the Catholic-nationalist community and was designed to send messages to the British and Irish 
governments to demonstrate that a civil war might ensue should a united independent Ireland be 
forced upon the British population in Northern Ireland. 
Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 1,028 deaths during the Northern Ireland conflict 
from 1969 until 2002. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) killed 483 people; the Ulster Freedom 
Fighters (UFF) killed 265 and a variety of other loyalist groups, such as the Red Hand Commando 
(RHC) and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) killed 280.1 This paper concentrates upon the 
campaign and lack of innovation of the main two groups: the UVF and UFF. It should be noted at 
the outset that the UFF was effectively the ‘killing wing’ of the UDA, a flag of convenience used to 
ensure that the UDA remained a legal organization, until it was finally outlawed in 1992. 
The UFF and UVF, under the umbrella of the Combined Loyalist Military Command 
(CLMC), called ceasefires in October 1994, six weeks after the IRA called its ceasefire and following 
a spate of loyalist attacks immediately following the republican cessation. The CLMC declared 
“abject and true remorse” for all victims. The Loyalist ceasefire was often fragile and was opposed 
by the LVF and by sections of the UFF. In the run-up to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, was forced to plead with UFF prisoners that 
their organization maintain their cessation. Whilst this move was successful, the UFF ceasefire was 
briefly declared ‘invalid’ by one of Mowlam’s successors, John Reid, in 2001.2 An UVF-UFF feud 
resulted in a series of deaths in the early 2000s, despite their ‘on ceasefire’ status. 
Four years after the Provisional IRA completed the decommissioning of its weapons in 
2005, the UVF announced that it had “completed the process of rendering ordnance totally and 
irreversibly beyond use.” At the start of 2010, the UDA also declared that it had begun the process 
of decommissioning of weapons. Both organizations initially justified not decommissioning by 
claiming they would not “dance to the IRA’s tune” – an odd claim given that loyalist paramilitaries 
had long claimed they only existed in response to IRA activity.  
Loyalists later claimed that the activities of armed republican dissidents had delayed the 
decommissioning process. The UVF and UDA ostensibly now exist as commemorative and 
community organizations. However, there have been difficulties in interesting younger, more 
militant members in community activity and this, allied to internal power struggles, has led to 
tension.3 The Independent Monitoring Commission claimed as late as 2009 that loyalist paramilitary 
organizations continue to recruit on an ad hoc basis.4 In 2011, the UVF was accused by the Police !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 John Coakley, ‘The legacy of political violence in Ireland’, in M. Bric and J. Coakley (eds) (2003) From Political Violence to 
Negotiated Settlement: The Winding Path to Peace in Twentieth-Century Ireland, Dublin: UCD, 192. 
2 See Peter Taylor, (2001) Brits: the war against the IRA, London: Bloomsbury.  
3 Lyndsey Harris, ‘Quis Separabit? Loyalist Transformation and the Strategic Environment’, in J. McAuley and G. Spencer 
(eds) (2011) Ulster Loyalism after the Good Friday Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 87-103. 
4 John Grieve ‘Monitoring the Loyalist Paramilitaries: The Role of the Independent Monitoring Commission in the 
Northern Ireland Peace Process, 2003-09’, in McAuley and Spencer op cit., 176-98. 
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Service of Northern Ireland of orchestrating attacks upon the Catholic-nationalist enclave of Short 
Strand in Belfast. 
 
Factors Diminishing the Capacity for Innovation 
 
Structure and lineage 
 
The UVF did not claim to be a new organization, but, somewhat spuriously, claimed lineage 
from the organization of the same name which pledged to defend Ulster’s place in the United 
Kingdom “by all means necessary” from 1912-14. Indeed the “cult of 1912-14” remained within the 
Unionist psyche as an example of how armed militancy could be successful.5   
Unquestionably, the UVF had contributed to the retention of the bulk of Protestant 
Unionists within the United Kingdom at the time of the partition of Ireland. The UVF reborn in 
1966 via the killing of three Catholics bore little resemblance to the mass movement of the early 
twentieth century, when the Union was under threat. As English notes though of the disorganized 
1960s UVF model: 
 
Loyalist fears...during the 1960s were certainly exaggerated: there was no IRA uprising in 1966, 
or, for that matter, in the crucial year of 1969...These three UVF killings, occurring as they did 
several years before the founding of the Provisionals, clearly show as false any suggestion that it 
was the Provisional IRA that started the troubles.6 
 
Igniting a conflict in response to a non-existent threat of rebellion might indeed be seen as 
innovative. Moreover, reliance upon dubious antecedents does not preclude innovation; the IRA 
offered several novel developments in its campaign from 1970, whilst repeatedly claiming to be a 
direct descendant of the 1916 rebellion against British rule in Ireland. However, the difficulty for the 
UVF, a small, secretive organization with little public backing, lay in claiming that its rebirth and 
modus operandi would somehow secure the Union. Few people welcomed its rebirth and, unlike the 
pre-partition version of the organization, the UVF enjoyed scant legitimacy. Its killing of Catholics 
seemed unlikely to bolster the Union. The UVF nonetheless developed the capacity to exercise 
regular sectarian killings. Its closed, hierarchical structure and leadership dominance meant that it 
had no accountability and the orders of a few ruthless ultras at the organization’s head had to be 
implemented by the few joiners. 
In contrast, the UDA’s origins lay in an amalgam of local community defense associations. 
Whilst this was novel and offered scope for local innovation, it created an “amateurish,” chaotic 
federal structure with a lack of central discipline or remit. Moreover, although its membership 
soared into tens of thousands during the early 1970s, “most were passive supporters rather than 
active combatants” whose membership soon lapsed amid a lack of commitment.7 There was 
nonetheless scope initially for innovation, given the breadth of the organization and potential 
infusion of ideas. In an attempt to become the authentic voice of the Protestant working-class, the 
UDA was instrumental in setting up the Loyalist Association of Workers, a trade union operating on 
sectarian lines. The UDA also recruited via its youth movement, the Ulster Young Militants, as did 
the UVF, via the Young Citizen Volunteers. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Alvin Jackson, ‘Modern Unionism and the cult of 1912-14’, in M. Bric and J. Coakley (eds) (2003) From Political Violence 
to Negotiated Settlement: The Winding Path to Peace in Twentieth-Century Ireland, Dublin: UCD, 99-114. 
6 Richard English, (2003) Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA, London: Macmillan, 99-100. 
7 William Beattie Smith (2011) The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1969-1973: From violence to power-sharing, 
Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 257. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix V  !92 
Differences in formation and organization at times reduced the unity of purpose of loyalist 
paramilitarism. The UVF’s historical approach stressed the defense of the principles of the Ulster 
Covenant and the defense of the Crown.8 The UDA stressed the defense of local communities as its 
raison d’etre. Despite these differences, both organizations saw the defeat of the IRA as essential to 
their roles and engaged in sectarian attacks upon Catholics to deter them from supporting the IRA 
(even though most Catholics didn’t offer such support) – defense as a form of attack – to achieve 




The prevailing ideology of loyalism was one of defense of the constitutional status quo, a 
rearguard, defensive stance not attuned to innovative thought.  Loyalist paramilitaries existed mainly 
to emphasize the potential cost to the British government – probable civil war should that 
government decide to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The British government was not to be 
trusted according to loyalists, a perception that persisted throughout the Troubles. As late as 1994, 
in the run-up to the republican and loyalist ceasefires of 1994, the defense of the Union was not 
seen as something that could be left to Her Majesty’s government. The UVF magazine, Combat, 
asserted, “there are those in the British government whom, had it not been for the resilience of the 
Ulster people would have had our identity engulfed by Eire [the Irish Republic] long before now.”9 
The early years of the conflict saw the UDA and UVF also exercise their militarism in an 
attempt to preserve Unionist domination in the devolved Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont.  
The British government amid growing republican insurrection and amid ungovernability in 1972 
suspended this parliament. From 1972 until 1998, direct British rule over Northern Ireland was the 
norm, only once interrupted when the ill-fated Sunningdale power-sharing deal was attempted.  
Although critical of the middle-class orientation of the Ulster Unionist Party, the dominant force in 
Unionist politics until 1998, the loyalist paramilitaries did not offer a credible alternative and failed 
to capture mass Unionist backing.  Much harder-line Loyalist sentiment went towards the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by the Reverend Ian Paisley until 2008, which emerged in 
1971 as a robust but constitutional loyalist force, much more religiously-influenced than the 
paramilitaries, further undermining the efforts of paramilitaries to become the “people’s army.” 
Although the leader of the DUP had flirted with paramilitarism via the Ulster Protestant Volunteers 
of the 1960s and again did so in the 1980s with the Ulster Resistance “Third Force,” his role was 
never more than midwife to the armed groups that did emerge.10 
Loyalist paramilitaries were members of that community identified as “Ulster’s Uncertain 
Defenders”11 and “Queen’s Rebels.”12 At one level they pledged loyalty to the state, yet such loyalty 
was conditional upon the particular actions of the government and unconditional fidelity was 
extended only to the British Monarch. Defensive ideology and insecurity combined to preclude 
innovative thinking, with disorientation exacerbated when loyalists found themselves imprisoned by 
the state they purported to serve. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Lyndsey Harris, ‘Duck or rabbit? The value systems of loyalist paramilitaries’, in M.Busteed, F. Neal and J. Tonge (eds) 
(2008) Irish Protestant Identities, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
9 Combat, January 1994: 1; Alan Finlayson, ‘Discourse and Contemporary Loyalist Identity’, in P. Shirlow and 
M.McGovern (eds) (1997) Who are ‘The People’? Unionism, Loyalism and Protestantism in Northern Ireland, London: Pluto, 81.   
10 For an extended discussion, see Ed Moloney (2008) Paisley: From Demagogue to Democrat, Dublin: Poolbeg. 
11 Sarah Nelson, Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders: Loyalist Political Paramilitary and Community Groups and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict, Belfast: Appletree. 
12 David Miller and John Bew, Queen’s Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective, Dublin: UCD.  
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Internal Causes of Loyalist Paramilitaries’ Lack of Innovation 
 
Leaks and infiltration 
 
Loyalist paramilitaries were hindered in their freedom to operate through considerable 
infiltration by the security services, which penetrated the UVF and UFF to the extent that they were 
able to run a large number of agents in both organizations. Elements within the UVF and UFF 
colluded with handlers to target republicans (see below). Yet the successful targeting of IRA and 
Sinn Fein personnel merely boosted the credibility of loyalist terrorists at the expense, amid growing 
revelations, of the regular pro-state forces. The earlier staging of “supergrass” trials had damaged 
loyalists. Paramilitaries were prepared to divulge the names of their colleagues in return for 
immunity from prosecution and, in some cases, payment by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 
In a highly dubious legal process, this led to mass trials and convictions of alleged paramilitaries. 
Supergrass trials greatly affected the IRA also during the 1980s, although its pool of active 
volunteers was larger and those operating mainly from the Irish Republic were largely unaffected. 
The UVF was particularly badly hit by the evidence provided by Joseph Bennett in his 1983 trial. 
However, the convictions were overturned at the end of 1984 and loyalist paramilitaries revived, a 
process abetted by anger over the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The permanent damage done by 
supergrass trials lay in providing a clearer picture of the hitherto secure (relative to the UDA/UFF) 
UVF membership in particular. Although apparently discredited, supergrass trials were revived after 
a twenty-five year hiatus this year when fourteen UVF members faced 97 charges, including that of 
the murder of a leading member of the UDA, amid testimony from two former UVF members. 
 
UDA versus UVF tensions 
 
Intra-loyalist feuds were common throughout the conflict and erupted during the 2000s, 
even when the UFF and UVF were on ceasefire. During the conflict, racketeering in particular 
plagued the UDA, whilst some of its leaders also colluded with the IRA.  Jim Craig, a UDA leader 
during the 1980s, was assassinated for these reasons. The shift of the UDA’s role from community 
defense to control and a more parasitical role partly explained its loss of the membership during the 
1970s, although diminished IRA activity was also important. Within the UVF, loyalist colleagues of 
Lenny Murphy, the leader of the UVF’s Shankill Butchers, the most brutal of all the loyalist 
paramilitary gangs, set him up for IRA assassination because they recognized he was out of control. 
The move towards the loyalist ceasefire of the 1990s was challenged internally, “dissidents” 
emerging within both the UVF and UFF. Within the UVF, Billy Wright led the dissident core into 
the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). A movement designed to revive sectarian killings rather than 
offer any innovative military or political thinking, the LVF had sufficient support in its mid-Ulster 
base to briefly threaten to destabilize the peace process, until Wright was assassinated by the 
republican Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in the supposedly secure Maze Prison in 1996. 
The UFF divided over the ceasefire between the militarist renegades of “C” Company, led 
by Johnny Adair, later “exiled” to England, then Scotland, after a killing spree and those supportive 
of the peace. The Adair section of the UFF took the same skeptical view as the LVF of the ceasefire, 
arguing that loyalists were winning the war and there was thus no need to stop. Even those 
ostensibly committed to peace were reactive rather than proactive in respect of the decommissioning 
process, reluctantly undertaking “acts of completion” for the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) after a long hiatus during the 2000s, whilst loyalists 
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monitored the IRA’s progress towards the removal of its guns.13 As late as 2009, one UDA leader, 
Jackie McDonald, was arguing that the weapons held were “the people’s guns” and thus could not 
be removed from the equation, but with pressure upon the UDA mounting, it agreed to 
decommission weapons. 
From different perspectives gleaned from separate studies, Bruce,14 Harris15 and Gallagher 
and Shirlow16 concur that UDA versus UVF tensions inhibited innovative capacity for loyalist 
paramilitarism. Bruce depoliticizes the context, arguing that ego and personal desire for control are 
explanatory variables, with personal aggrandizement displacing loyalist capacity for adaptation. A 
loyalist paramilitary tendency towards criminality, especially racketeering and drug dealing was also 
evident, leading to internal conflicts. Gallagher and Shirlow suggest that intra-and inter-loyalist 
feuding often developed around battles for territorial control. Harris offers the most political 
explanation, arguing that the lack of loyalist innovation was a derivative of the pantomime horse 
federal structure of the UDA, which allowed different areas and different leaders to take contrary 
directions. Whilst this explanation is cogent, the UVF’s lack of innovation is less explainable. 
 
Lack of talent, leadership and definition 
 
A further reason for the lack of loyalist innovation has been the inadequacies of leadership 
and membership. Early leaders of the UDA were seen as gangsters and/or drunks with little talent 
other than to coerce.17 “Strategy,” especially that for the UDA/UFF, was more likely to be 
determined in a bar than via a detailed analysis of the political situation. A capacity to engage in 
random sectarian assassinations of Catholics, regardless of the status of victims or the consequences 
for the loyalist community, yielded status. Innovation, insofar as it existed, lay merely in the regular 
capacity to utilize means of escape after killings.  Moreover, largely unlike their republican 
counterparts, drug use and trafficking was common amongst some of the loyalist paramilitary units. 
One passage from McDonald and Cusack, describing the activities of a highly regarded UDA 
operator, Stephen “Top Gun” McKeag, illustrates these points: 
 
Every year during the last decade of Northern Ireland’s Troubles the Ulster Defense Association 
held its very own ghoulish version of the Oscars. ‘Volunteer of the Year’ was an award for top 
assassins, usually staged in bars and drinking dens in the loyalist stronghold of Belfast’s Lower 
Shankill ... Hundreds of men and women would gather to hear speakers, usually members of the 
UDA’s leadership, announce who had won the year’s big award. Inevitably Top Gun’s name 
would be called out over the PA and the crowd, worse for wear from drink and drugs, would 
cheer wildly...On 28 April 1992, McKeag shot dead Philomena Hanna, a young Catholic shop 
assistant ... He fired ... as she worked on a window display and when she fell to the ground he 
fired several more shots into her body. Then he strolled out of the shop and mounted the back 
of a stolen motorcycle that did a U-turn and sped off towards Lanark Way, the favoured route of 
loyalist killers returning from West Belfast to the Shankill. Eyewitnesses...reported that as they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 John de Chastelain, ‘The Northern Ireland peace process and the impact of decommissioning’, in M. Bric and J. 
Coakley (eds) (2004) From Political Violence to Negotiated Settlement: The Winding Path to Peace in Twentieth Century Ireland, 
Dublin: UCD Press, 154-78. 
14 Steve Bruce, (2004) ‘Turf War and Peace: Loyalist paramilitaries since 1994’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16.3, 1-21. 
15 Harris, Quis Separabit, op cit.  
16Carolyn Gallagher and Peter Shirlow, ‘The geography of loyalist paramilitary feuding in Belfast’, Space and Polity, 2006, 
10.2, 149-69. 
17 Steve Bruce, (1992) The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Henry 
McDonald and Jim Cusack, (2004) UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror, London: Penguin.  
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left the killers were signing ‘Follow the Yellow Brick Road’...assassins regarded Lanark Way and 
other arterial routes...as their ‘yellow brick roads’ to safety.18 
 
Episodically, the sectarian assassinations would be reined in, perhaps most notably during 
the late 1970s, when Andy Tyrie was the Supreme Commander of the UDA. However, the fall in 
killings by loyalists (to single figures per year during 1976-8) also owed much to a slackening in IRA 
activity. The 1970s saw the regular torturing of randomly selected Catholic victims, a feature which 
distinguished loyalists from the IRA, which tended to torture only those suspected of being 
informers. As McIntyre argues: 
 
[T]he UDA throughout its history has had the appearance of being an organisation in which 
muscle rather than strategic acumen was the driving force ... Sammy Smyth was said to be a rarity 
amongst the UDA leadership in that he had an interest in broader ideological issues. Charles 
Harding Smith, the organization’s first leader, is reported to have said: ‘I’m the boss, I take 
orders from no-one. Jim Craig, a one-time military commander was a brutal boss who imposed 
discipline through violence ... John Gregg, the would-be assassin of Sinn Fein leader Gerry 
Adams, was ruthless with his local units and renowned for kneecapping anyone who transgressed 
him.19 
 
The ideological development of loyalism lay largely elsewhere, undertaken by the rural 
Protestant evangelicalism-meets-urban working-class-insecure-unionism fusion offered by the DUP. 
Steve Bruce’s analysis of loyalism argued that religious evangelicals provided the ideological 
framework and backbone and that the paramilitaries were mere foot-soldiers of evangelicalism.20 
Loyalist paramilitaries mobilized under the “For God and Ulster” slogan of the UVF, but, unlike the 
evangelical ideologues (and demagogues) that did not do the fighting, the paramilitaries rarely 
darkened church doorsteps. 
Lack of talent thus contributed to lack of innovation within the UDA, but the UVF 
leadership was, firstly, more constant and secondly generally of higher caliber. The interlocutor 
between the Irish government and the UVF during the peace process, the Unitarian Minister, Chris 
Hudson, rejected the idea that such loyalists were Neanderthals and argued that many of the UVF 
leadership during the peace process began to show sophisticated thinking belying its “comical 
stereotyping.”21 
Loyalists utilized only one-half of its potential pool of recruits. Within the IRA, women had 
a significant presence via the activities of Cumann na mBan, but the attempt to replicate this within 
the UDA was an abject failure. The Women’s UDA was disbanded in 1974 after one of its members 





18 McDonald and Cusack op cit, p.1-2.  
19 Anthony McIntyre, ‘Of Myths and Men: Dissent with Republicanism and Loyalism’, in A. Edwards and S. Bloomer 
(eds) (2008) Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 124.  
20 Steve Bruce (1994) The Edge of the Union. The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Claire 
Mitchell, ‘For God and ... Conflict Transformation? The Churches’ Dis/engagement with Contemporary Loyalism’, in 
Edwards and Bloomer op cit., 148-62. 
21 Christopher Hudson, ‘The UVF and the Path to Decommissioning’, in James McAuley and Graham Spencer (2011) 
Ulster Loyalism after the Good Friday Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 77. 
22 Rosemary Sales, ‘Gender and Protestantism’, in P. Shirlow and M. McGovern, M. (eds) (1997) Who are ‘The People?’ 
Unionism, Loyalism and Protestantism in Northern Ireland, London: Pluto, 140-57. 
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“Community policing” 
 
Much of the authority of the loyalist paramilitary leaders was derived not merely via their 
supposed capacity to take on the IRA, but also from their overseeing of local policing. There was a 
policing void in loyalist as well as republican areas. Loyalists had imitated republicans in setting up 
no-go areas during the early 1970s and continued to unofficially police local areas for decades 
afterwards. Indeed, given the lack of a definitive republican enemy after 1994, paramilitary 
punishment attacks in loyalist areas increased (to almost 100 in 2003) as loyalists struggled to 
maintain control and demonstrate a rationale for their continuing existence.  Loyalist paramilitaries 
engaged in punishment attacks (usually kneecappings) and, in more serious cases, the exiling of 
individuals, when offenders committed crimes such as theft, joyriding or drug-dealing, the latter only 
permitted in certain circumstances of profit to paramilitaries. Whilst the number of punishment 
attacks declined after 2003, the UVF and UDA both continued to assert their right to exercise 
control in loyalist areas. 
Unquestionably some of the demand for community policing came from civil society, 
although the extent of support for punishment beatings and shootings within loyalist communities is 
difficult to quantify, as is the effectiveness of such methods.  It is stretching a point to claim that 
demands for community policing placed upon loyalist paramilitaries diminished the capacity to 
innovate in the war against the IRA, although it further strained resources and time, whilst also 
providing further security risks in terms of information gleaned by the regular police force. A 1992 
Community Relations Council report acknowledged the extent to which paramilitaries were filling 
the policing void: 
 
The police are not fulfilling their role of crime prevention and are more interested in anti-
terrorist work. This has left a vacuum for the paramilitaries. They may be used by people in the 
community to get things done- for example for house break-ins in which the police have failed to 
catch the culprits. It was stated that the police have recommended the use of paramilitaries for 
‘quick action’ in cases like this. 23 
 
By the late 1990s, Loyalists and Republicans had begun to imitate the innovative republican 
community restorative justice initiatives. These schemes brought together offenders and victims in 
an informal setting, excluding the police, and required offenders to engage in good works for the 
benefit of the community as a form of reparation. The UVF and PUP developed the Alternatives 
program to deal with young offenders in a non-violent way. It acquired sufficient legitimacy for 
referrals to be made to the program not merely from the UVF/PUP but also from community 
groups and social services. 
 
The Failure of Politics 
 
The failure of Loyalist paramilitaries to develop political outlets also ensured the domination 
of a largely unchanging, non-innovative and sectarian military campaign. The Ulster Democratic 
Party (UDP) operated as the political wing of the UDA from the 1980s onwards and the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) operated as the equivalent for the UVF. Yet neither the UDP nor the PUP 
operated at anywhere close to the level of Sinn Fein as the IRA’s political outlet. Firstly, paramilitary 
conspiratorialism and disdain for politics ensured that the UVF and UFF remained much more 
important. The UDP and PUP operated at the level of political consultants rather than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Community Relations Council (1992) Community Development in Protestant Areas, Belfast: CRC: 30.  
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representatives, although this problem was greater amongst the UDP, which was dissolved amid 
abject electoral and political failure by 2001.24 The leader of the Ulster Political Research Group, 
which replaced the UDP, later claimed that part of the problem was that the UDA was never really 
in favor of the Good Friday Agreement. 25 In 2002, the UVF openly questioned the political 
direction of the PUP and the leader of the PUP, Dawn Purvis, quit the organization after the UVF 
killed Bobby Moffatt in 2010.26 Moffatt’s crime was to have antagonized a paramilitary leader. 
Secondly, neither of the political wings of loyalist paramilitarism could ever achieve a 
sizeable foothold amongst the loyalist working-class electorate, reinforcing the perception that 
politics did not work. Rather than political development and transition to what has been termed new 
loyalism, loyalist paramilitarism was more successful in developing localized initiatives for former 
prisoners and local communities, albeit modeled on those begun in republican areas. Groups such as 
the Ex-Prisoners Interpretive Centre (EPIC) and Local Initiatives for Needy Communities (LINC) 
emerged to offer voice to local communities struggling to recover from the conflict. 
This is not, however, to dismiss the political thinking of loyalism’s two small outlets, which 
did produce innovative ideas (see preparatory behaviors below). 
 
External Causes of Loyalist paramilitaries’ Lack of Innovation 
 
The difficulty of defining an enemy 
 
The problem of defining a clear enemy meant that even those commentators with a nuanced 
understanding of loyalist paramilitaries and who rejected the thesis that they were unreconstructed 
paramilitaries, acknowledged that loyalist violence was often “nakedly sectarian, targeting ordinary 
Catholics.”27 From the first killings in 1966 until the end of the loyalist campaigns, there was little 
attempt to refine targeting to ensure that only those active in the IRA or INLA would be 
assassinated. There were only two major innovations: collusion with elements of the state’s security 
services and, in isolation, attacks upon the Irish Republic (see below). Even under the supposed 
targeting of the IRA derived from collusion, the majority of loyalist victims remained civilian 
Catholics. 
Of course, prior to collusion (and even during its operation) it was difficult to identify the 
republican enemy, given the secrecy under which the IRA operated. Nonetheless, there was a regular 
tendency to assume that the wider nationalist population, the majority of which voted for the 
constitutional nationalism of the SDLP, (albeit not in the working-class areas targeted by loyalists) 
sympathized with militant republicanism, a view hardened after the election of the IRA hunger 
striker, Bobby Sands, in 1981.  A UDA leader argued, “The Catholic community as a whole had a 
major responsibility for the actions of the IRA. The IRA themselves said ‘the day the wee woman on 
the Falls Road comes out and throws the rifle she has been minding on the street we will know we 
are in trouble’.”28 
Much loyalist violence was reactive in nature, although disentangling who-provoked-whom 
in the regular cycle of sectarian killings was often difficult. Moreover, early loyalist bombings, such 
as that of McGurk’s bar in 1971, in which 15 Catholics died, could not simply be seen as reaction, as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 For a detailed discussion see Ian Wood (2006) Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press.  
25 James McAuley ‘Constructing Contemporary Loyalism’, in Edwards and Bloomer op cit., 15-27. 
26 McAuley (2010) op cit. 
27 James McAuley. ‘”Flying the One-Winged Bird”. Ulster Unionism and the Peace Process’, in P. Shirlow and M.  
McGovern (eds) (1997) Who are ‘The People’? Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland, London: Pluto, 158-75.  
28 Ibid, p.163; Irish News, 15 October 1995. 
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they occurred just before the IRA began to engage in mass slaughter. Loyalist violence also 
provoked IRA violence in response. Thus the South Armagh Republican Action Force, a thin 
veneer for the local unit of the IRA, claimed that the January 1976 Kingsmills massacre of ten 
Protestants (the Catholic passenger was allowed to go free) was in response to the killing of six 
Catholic civilians the previous evening. In October 1993, the IRA’s bombing of a fish shop on the 
Shankill Road killed nine Protestants, in a failed attempt to kill the loyalist paramilitary leadership, 
which had met earlier in the flat above. In response, Loyalists killed thirteen Catholics during the 
following month. The killings included those of six Catholics (and one Protestant) at the Rising Sun 
bar awaiting a Halloween celebration, when one of the UFF gunmen asked “Trick or Treat?” on 
entering the premises. 29 
When, in 1988, John Hume, the leader of the moderate constitutional nationalist party, the 
SDLP, entered talks with Sinn Fein’s President, Gerry Adams, in an attempt to secure peace, loyalist 
paramilitaries responded by declaring that all members of what was termed the “pan-nationalist” 
front would be legitimate targets, a move which caused unease within the UDA. Yet the threat made 
little difference to the existing reality, given that randomly chosen Catholics were by far the most 
common type of victim of loyalist paramilitaries. 
 
The Inability to attract external support and weapons 
 
With the arguable exception of their working-class heartlands, there were no safe havens 
from which the loyalist paramilitaries could operate. In the early years of the Troubles, the IRA 
attracted sufficient sympathy in the Irish Republic for it to operate there without undue interference 
(this changed rapidly) whilst republicans could count upon an eclectic range of external sources of 
finance and weaponry, ranging from the Irish-American diaspora to Moammar Gaddafi’s regime in 
Libya. 
For loyalists, the range of support and supplies was very restricted, confined mainly to South 
Africa (weapons) and Scotland (backing). Although there were large number of Ulster-Scots in 
Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand, “what-we-have, we hold” was not an attractive 
rallying cry for those diaspora and the Northern Ireland situation tended to attract only passing 
interest from most. The pockets of support that did emerge were closer to home, such as on 
Merseyside in England and more notably, via the formation of the Scottish UDA. However, the 
Scottish contingent, often as much, if not more, sectarian in attitude, was largely useless in terms of 
substantial tangible support, with most of the network arrested and jailed in 1979.  
The acquisition of weapons was piecemeal, far from insignificant but bereft of a regular 
supply. In the early 1970s, the UVF carried out a number of sectarian attacks using a homemade 
machine gun known as the “Whiteabbey Widowmaker.” It is understood that loyalists working in 
some of the north’s major engineering factories made the weapons. Throughout the 1980s the UDA 
carried out a number of raids on British army bases across the north stealing hundreds of weapons. 
Between 1979 and 1986 the UVF received around 100 colt commando rifles, 100 Ingram 
and MAC-10 sub machine-guns and 100 magnum handguns from loyalist supporters in Canada. The 
UVF also acquired up to two tons of Powergel plastic explosives, stolen from quarries in Britain 
over the years.  In November 1993 a major UVF arms shipment from Poland was uncovered in 
Teesport in northern England. The shipment included 320 AK47s with 60,000 rounds of 
ammunition, 500 hand grenades, 53 pistols with 14,000 rounds of ammunition, two tons of plastic 
explosives (thought to have been Semtex) and several thousand detonators. The arms shipment had 
been part of an MI6 sting operation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Richard English (2003) Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA, London: Macmillan, 282-3. 
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Loyalist paramilitaries capitalized on sympathy and assistance from sections of the Ulster 
Defense Regiment (UDR), the local unit used to support the British Army and Royal Ulster 
Constabulary. Twelve weapons were stolen from the British Army’s Palace barracks in August 1987. 
UDR soldier Steven Fletcher was later arrested in the Republic and found to be in possession of 
another handgun stolen from the Palace Barracks armory. Fletcher was jailed for five years in April 
1988. During the trial, he claimed he had sold the guns to members of the UDA at a drinking club 
on the Shankill Road. In 1990 former UDR soldier Samuel McCoubry was jailed for 14 years for 
operating the largest weapons factory found in Northern Ireland. More than 30 Sten guns and parts 
for over 1,000 Uzi-type rapid-fire machine guns were found during a search of McCoubry’s farm 
outside Ballynahinch. Up to 800 machineguns were being assembled on McCoubry’s premises at the 
time of his arrest and McCoubry is thought to have manufactured guns for loyalist paramilitaries for 
nearly 20 years. It later emerged he had been subsidized through finance awarded from the Local 
Enterprise Development Unit to his saw-making business. 
The main cache of imported weapons were Palestine Liberation Organization arms captured 
by the Israelis, sold to Armscor, the South African state-owned company which, in defiance of the 
1977 United Nations arms embargo, set about making South Africa self-sufficient. 
Some of these imports were soon rounded up, partly due to the ineptness of the UDA, 
which weighed down vehicles carrying the guns, resulting in rapid police interceptions. The UVF, 
better organized, more secretive and with fewer volunteers to service, was more successful in 
retaining its share of the cargo until a large portion of the cache was recovered in Ligoniel in north 
Belfast. Some weapons also went to Ulster Resistance, the loyalist “third force,” which flirted 
between constitutionalism and paramilitarism, initially attracting support from the DUP leader 
Paisley. These weapons were never recovered and the dissident UFF C Company, led by Jonny 
Adair, later acquired them. The consignment included 200 AK-47 rifles, Uzi machineguns, and 
machine pistols (also home-made submachine guns); 90 Browning pistols, revolvers, 500 grenades 
and 200 Czech assault rifles. In addition, 12 RPG-7 rocket launchers and a small amount of 
Powergel (commercial plastic explosive) and 30,000 rounds of ammunition entered loyalist hands.  
Storage was a continual problem for loyalist paramilitaries. 
 
External Causes of Innovation 
 
Whilst the vast bulk of their bombings were routine random killings of Catholics in 
Northern Ireland, Loyalists did innovate significantly in May 1974 in taking the war south. The UVF 
bombed Dublin and Monaghan, killing 33 (26 in Dublin and 7 in Monaghan) at a time when loyalists 
and many unionists were attempting to defeat the Sunningdale Agreement, introduced at the start of 
that year.  The Sunningdale Agreement introduced power-sharing between moderate unionists and 
nationalists in Northern Ireland and established the Council of Ireland, giving the Irish government 
some say (the extent of which was greatly disputed) in the affairs of Northern Ireland.30 
Sunningdale was abandoned at the end of May 1974. Given this, it remains curious that 
loyalist paramilitaries did not repeat the bombing of the Irish Republic when the equally hated 
Anglo-Irish Agreement was introduced eleven years later. The scale of loss of life in the Dublin-
Monaghan bombings may have embarrassed the UVF, which did not admit responsibility for the 
bombings until 1993. There have also been persistent, if unproven allegations of collusion between 
the UVF and elements of the British security services.  The type of bombing – car bombings in both 
locations – was most unusual for loyalists. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Gordon Gillespie (1998) ‘The Sunningdale Agreement: Lost Opportunity or an Agreement too far?’ Irish Political 
Studies, 13.1, 100-14. 
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Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald and the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, one year after she 
and her Cabinet were nearly killed in the IRA’s bombing of the Conservative Party conference hotel. 
The Agreement formalized a consultative role for the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland issues and 
was opposed with equal, if not greater, fervor, by Unionists, amid the continuation of the Irish 
Republic’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. The deal was intergovernmental and impervious 
to boycott, as there was no attendant power-sharing Assembly in Northern Ireland to derail.  A 
bombing campaign would thus have achieved little, but this is a necessary but insufficient 
explanation of why loyalists stayed their hand. 
Aaron Edwards argues that: 
 
[T]he military threat posed to the neighboring state of the Republic of Ireland by loyalist 
paramilitaries – although limited in comparison to the IRA’s bombing campaign in mainland 
Britain – did none the less provide the necessary impetus for the Irish government to make 
conciliatory overtures to the Protestant working-class community.31 
 
This perception was shared by the UVF and by the go-between for the Irish government 
and UVF. From the paramilitary point of view, Billy Hutchinson, a former life-sentence UVF 
prisoner, now leader of the PUP, claimed that the “Irish Government was quite happy for us to be 
involved [in the peace process dialogue] because what they didn’t need was some sort of loyalist 
activity around the Irish Republic.”32 A crucial role for loyalists was to ensure that the Irish Republic 
abandoned the claim to Northern Ireland in articles two and three of its constitution, something 
attained in 1998. The paramilitary-Irish government interlocutor, Chris Hudson, was made fully 
aware that the loyalist threat to the Irish Republic was real: 
 
The Belfast ‘face to face’ was not a meeting of minds and there were harsh words and some 
issuing of threats to the people of the South (Irish Republic). In that discussion one of the 
participants (later given the code name ‘Craftsman’) even suggested to me that there was no 
reason why loyalists should not carry out a bombing campaign in Dublin. His contention was 
that this strategy had delivered for the Provisional IRA in London.33 
 
That Loyalists stayed their hand after 1974 in terms of the Irish Republic and during the 
peace process can be partly explained by the difficulty of operating in that jurisdiction, but clearly 
the mere threat of a renewal of the 1974 violence was felt sufficient to exercise influence. The 
novelty and surprise of the 1974 operation had an enduring effect upon the outlook of the Irish 
government, which was conscious not to overplay its hand, notwithstanding the furor over the 
influence it was afforded in Northern Ireland by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government 
during the 1980s. 
Collusion and the passing of information from elements of the British security services 
provided the preparatory ground for the limited amount of loyalist targeting of IRA personnel, as 
distinct from ordinary Catholics, which occurred, mainly from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. 
The extent of collusion was considerable, investigated in a series of inquiries undertaken by John 
Stevens (later Lord Stevens), who became Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police during his 
examination of the trading of intelligence material. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Aaron Edwards, ‘Talking to Terrorists: Political Violence and Peace Processes in the Contemporary World’, in 
Edwards and Bloomer op cit.,, 205. 
32 Cited in Graham Spencer, ‘From Politics to Community Development: In Discussion with Billy Hutchinson’, in 
J.McAuley and G.Spencer (eds) (2011) Ulster Loyalism after the Good Friday Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
33 Chris Hudson, ‘The Ulster Volunteer Force and the Path to Decommissioning’, in J. McAuley and G. Spencer, op cit., 
75. 
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The main group colluding with loyalist paramilitaries was the British Army’s specialist 
intelligence unit, the Force Research Unit (FRU) established in 1979. The FRU’s modus operandi 
was to run agents within the UDA/UFF. Brian Nelson, the UFF’s Senior Intelligence Officer, was 
recruited by the FRU ‘to encourage the UFF to redirect its “death squads” from innocent Catholics 
to suspected republican terrorists’, a position palpably contrary to normal processes but which the 
FRU handlers claimed ultimately saved lives.34 The Stevens inquiries into collusion concluded, 
amongst other findings, that collusion between the FRU and Nelson, as a loyalist paramilitary, 
contributed to the death of a Catholic solicitor, Patrick Finucane, in 1989 (the UDA used a British 
army handgun) and similar collusion contributed to the death of a Protestant, Brian Lamb, shot in 
the mistaken belief that he was a Catholic, as a reprisal for the IRA’s killing of twelve Protestants at 
a Remembrance Day service at Enniskillen in 1987.35 
Collusion did not allow loyalists to innovate in terms of the rationale or nature of their 
killings, but it did ostensibly facilitate “refinement” of their activity. At the same time as collusion 
was allowing Loyalists to innovate somewhat beyond crude sectarian slaughter towards targeting the 
enemy, surprisingly innovative political thinking emerged. The political associates of the UDA 
offered Catholic nationalists power-sharing government and proportionality in political institutions 
in their Common Sense document. Sinn Fein would be allowed to take positions in government amid 
an IRA ceasefire, a radical offer at the time. Common Sense was a new approach to how to end 
political violence and many of its ideas were adopted in the Good Friday Agreement eleven years 
later. Loyalist innovatory thinking was based upon an early assessment that the conflict could enter 
an endgame, amid growing realization of military stalemate. Such innovation was inconsistent; the 
UDA’s alternative was a doomsday plan involving ethnic cleansing and repartition to create an 




Loyalist paramilitaries were less innovative than the IRA in terms of the nature of their 
violence, which was mainly reactive and sectarian, with the vast bulk of victims being innocent 
Catholics with no paramilitary connections (approximately 50 per cent of IRA killings were of 
civilians, compared to over 80 per cent of Loyalist killings). Loyalists were also less ready to use 
brinkmanship tactics to improve the conditions of prisoners, compared to the no-wash protest and 
hunger strikes of republicans. 
Much of the lack of loyalist innovation is explained by ideology and isolation, the two key 
variables that did not also pertain to the IRA. Pro-state terrorism has its own heroic narratives, as 
the UVF’s historical connection to 1912-14 tried to emphasize, but its exercise was unlikely to 
engender much support beyond Northern Ireland. As such, loyalists had few safe havens and 
struggled to import weapons. Loyalists had to be self-reliant and use their own existing meager 
resources in contributing to the British government remaining in the region, whilst most loyalists 
and unionists were content to support the regular state forces of the British Army, RUC and UDR, 
not irregulars bereft of a mandate or legitimacy. 
Thus the containment of the IRA owed far more to the regular security forces, which 
consistently penetrated the IRA, a task loyalists never attempted.  Poor leadership, which was often 
uneducated and largely unthinking within the paramilitary core, if not beyond, also contributed to 
the loyalist lack of innovation.  Prison was a more debilitating experience for loyalist terrorists, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Peter Taylor (2001) Brits: The War against the IRA, London: Bloomsbury, 289-93.  
35 Stevens Enquiry (2003) Overview and Recommendations, London.  
36 McDonald and Cusack op cit., 264-6. 
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imposed by their own state. Loyalist prisoners also emerged from jails to a less supportive 
community (other than in the most hardline areas). Another key variable was the very different 
origins and structures of the UVF and UDA, which competed for dominance, whereas the 
Provisional IRA soon established itself as the main force within republican areas. 
Some original political thinking did emerge from associates of loyalist paramilitaries, notably via the 
UDA/UDP Common Sense document of 1987, which advocated power sharing and proportionality in 
government between Unionists and Nationalists. Moreover, the Loyalist leadership has been 
sufficiently secure to ward off any grassroots hankering of a return to war, amid the dissident 
republican activity of recent years. Dialogue with mainstream republicans, similar prisoner 
experiences and a willingness to consider together issues affecting the Catholic Nationalist and 
Protestant Unionist working classes have assisted in the transition from violence. 
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APPENDIX VI: P. WALDMANN, POWERFUL BUT LACKING 




Before we analyze the reasons why the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas) 
have not developed any weapons of mass effect (WMEs), some preliminary notes are necessary. 
They pertain to a) the counterfactual approach which is needed when dealing with this question; b) 
the (not unimportant) self-assessment of the FARC as guerillas, not as terrorists; and c) the fact that 
there is not much literature regarding the FARC, the oldest insurgent organization in Latin America. 
 
The Counterfactual approach 
 
 It is assumed that there are far more factors that have to be considered as possible reasons 
for an event or a certain development to not have taken place, than there are factors that can be 
involved for a development or event that has taken place.1 Methodologically, two consequences can 
be assumed from this: In light of the unlimited number of potentially causal factors it does not seem 
very sensible to examine specific circumstances and conditions but rather to focus on general 
structures and processes which have not been favorable to, or have prevented the production of, 
WMEs. Secondly, in order to narrow down the field of possible causes, it stands to reason that we 
should look at a comparable case in which WMEs were used. For Colombia that could be the M-19, 
a guerilla organization founded in 1972, but disbanded after negotiating with the government 
eighteen years later. The M-19 carried out two high-profile attacks that could be classified as WMEs. 
The first was the occupation of the embassy of the Dominican Republic in 1980. All ambassadors 
(including the American Ambassador) who had gathered for a dinner were taken hostage. The 
hostage drama, which came to a bloodless end only after several days, forced the former 
government under President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-82) to enter negotiations. This 
decisively undermined the government's claim to a hardline stance against violence. The second 
high-profile attack occurred five years later. This was the occupation of the Palace of Justice in the 
center of Bogotá, which ended in bloodshed after the intervention of the armed forces.2 Thus a 
comparative look at the “innovative” M-10 will help to better understand the “conservative” FARC.  
 
How the FARC views itself 
  
Both the US State Department and the European Union (EU) label the FARC as 
“terrorists.” However, experts dispute this classification. While the FARC have executed and are still 
executing terrorist attacks in major cities, the goal of spreading fear and terror is being subordinated 
to considerations of a territorial sort and to strategic planning in terms of space. This involves the 
FARC's direct or indirect exercise of power over certain areas, the creation of strategic corridors, the 
surrounding of cities, and movements of retreat or encroachment into certain urban areas. The 
FARC troops rarely enjoy much popularity with the local population. Instead they are seen as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 One reason for this is that the explanation of an event or development that has actually happened only needs to take 
into account structures or events that have taken place before, while what has not happened yet theoretically still can 
happen could be due to a broader set of variables. 
2 On the history of the M-19 see Villamizar 1995 and Zuluaga 1999. 
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necessary evil or, in the absence of governmental authority, accepted as the only available regulatory 
power, albeit one that often uses violent methods. Nevertheless, the majority of Latin American 
specialists on violence refer to them as “guerillas” and not as terrorists.3 
 Of course, more important than this “external” definition is the fact that the leaders of the 
FARC themselves view their organization as a guerilla group which is supposed to form the 
vanguard of a future revolutionary army of the people and of a mass uprising. As we will see, it is 
this self-assessment that most significantly shapes the FARC's idea of the nature of the fight they are 
leading, of its main focus and its possible end.4 
 
The absence of a body of literature 
  
While other Latin American guerilla organizations such as the Tupamaros (Uruguay), the 
Montoneros (Argentina) and the abovementioned M-19 have been analyzed in detail, corresponding 
works about the oldest guerilla organization on the subcontinent are still to be written.5 All we know 
about the “inner development” of the FARC, and in particular about internal discussions on 
targeting and innovation, derives from occasional memoranda, decisions of the group's general 
assemblies or interviews given by the leaders. The discussion and assumptions that follow are for the 
most part based on the secondary literature. Original sources were only occasionally consulted, 
because these are largely unavailable to the researcher.  
 The text is organized as follows: first, there is a short overview of the beginning and the 
history of the development of the FARC, as well as an outline of some characteristics of the 
organization. The paper's main section addresses the concerns and questions raised by the workshop 
organizers. It deals with the absence of prerequisites for innovation within FARC, and the 
continuing absence of “causes” for WME. Finally, the paper discusses the question: at which point 
in the development of the FARC as an organization has the use of WMEs been most likely? 
 
A Brief History of the Development and Structure of the FARC 
 
The FARC are among the veterans of guerilla organizations in Latin America. They were 
founded in the early 1960s after the so-called Violencia, the period of civil war in Colombia (1948-
58). Following the Violencia, the two traditional parties, the Conservatives and the Liberal Party, 
agreed to form a permanent coalition, the Frente Nacional (National Front), in order to avoid a 
recurrence of the excesses of the civil war period. It is no accident that other guerilla organizations 
in addition to the FARC emerged in Colombia during the 1960s. The example of the recently 
successful revolution under Castro in Cuba (1959) set a precedent and inspired a spirit of resistance 
by the liberal guerillas rebelling against the utterly repressive regime of the Conservatives in 
Colombia. The guerrillas also felt provoked by the cartel of power formed by the Conservative and 
Liberal parties, the Frente Nacional, which monopolized political power at gunpoint.6 
 In the case of the FARC, the impetus for rebellion originated in rural, peasant self-help 
communities which, supported by the Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista 
Colombiano, or PCC), had formed during the turmoil of the Violencia period. Two elements, the 
peasant’s shrewdness and tenacity as well as the submission to the dogmatic guidelines for a Marxist 
revolution provided by Moscow, would shape the political and military course of the FARC for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Pizarro 2004, p. 73ff; Rangel 1998, p.6; Zinecker 2007, p. 305ff. 
4 Compare the interviews with guerilla leaders in Arango 1984, p. 23ff, 84ff. 
5 According to Fischer 2005, p. 85 n. 23,  “A convincing history of the FARC has not been written yet.” 
6 Palacios 2006, p. 190ff.; Waldmann 2007, p. 225ff. 
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decades. The concrete cause for the FARC's creation was the government’s attempt to end, at 
gunpoint, the “Independent Communist Republics” left over from the Violencia period. The FARC 
later glorified this incident, known as the Marquetalia episode after an area in the southern part of 
the Tolima province where these events took place. Thousands of soldiers, highly trained and 
equipped with the latest weaponry from the U.S., were mobilized to drive 46 peasant families from 
land that they had occupied. Even though the soldiers successfully recaptured the land the peasants 
had occupied, the troops were unable to capture the peasants who became a mobile guerilla group 
and took on the name FARC two years later, in 1966.7 
 The development of the FARC can be roughly divided into three periods: 1966-1982, 1983-
2000, and 2000 until today. During the first fifteen years (1966-82) the FARC remained a group of 
rebels, barely noticed by the Colombian public. The group settled into some remote and rather 
inaccessible regions in the vast Colombian hinterland and was primarily preoccupied with standing 
their ground against persecution by the military and police, while they consolidated their own 
structures. The number of fighters was still relatively small (several hundred) and was only growing 
slowly. The same could be said of the “fronts” (frentes) at which the combatants were dispersed. 
Their weaponry was insufficient, mostly stemming from raids on police stations and military 
patrols.8 
 The second phase (1983-2000) was initiated by the so-called VIIth Conference, in which the 
organization decided to expand. The overall number of combatants was to be increased significantly 
and the number of regionally dispersed “fronts” to be doubled in order to weaken the Colombian 
army by forcing it to divide its forces. In addition to the territorial diversification of the troops, the 
leadership skills of FARC's inner circle were strengthened and new institutions, including a military 
training academy, were formed. There were international and national determinants of this dynamic. 
On an international level, the successful Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua (1979) should be 
mentioned. It reinvigorated the stalled revolutionary movement in Latin America and initiated a 
second wave of formation of guerilla organizations. Overall these guerrilla groups operated more 
successfully than the groups of the first wave, and posed a bigger challenge for their respective 
governments.  
The FARC also benefited from the country’s economic upturn due to the development of 
new agricultural products fit for export. A special, intensive symbiosis developed rapidly in the 
1980s with the drug industry (in the widest sense). FARC specialized in defending farmers who grew 
illegal coca plants in the country’s southern and southeastern periphery. The farmers paid FARC a 
kind of tax in return for protection from the governmental security forces as well as from the 
exploitation by intermediaries and powerful drug bosses. Finally, the rebels stood in good stead 
because of a perennial armistice for all guerilla groups negotiated with the government under 
Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). FARC used this pause in the fighting in order to effectually increase 
their force structure and their material resources, so that they were optimally prepared for the 







7 Pizarro 2004, p. 85ff; Allemann 1974, p. 255ff; Fischer 2005, p. 80ff. 
8 Pizarro 1992, p. 180ff.; Fischer 2005, p. 85f. 
9 Pizarro 2004, p. 87ff. 
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Table 1: Development of the military force of the FARC 1966-2009 
 
Year 1966 1970 1978 1982 1986 1991 1996 1998 2001 2009 
Number 
of Fronts 6 N/A N/A 15 32 49 66 N/A 70 N/A 
Force 
Structure 350 750 1000 N/A 3500 5600 7500 12000 15000 8000 
 
The numbers are not complete as the information stems from different sources.10 A good 
many things suggest that the FARC reached their maximal force level and military strike power 
(estimated around 18,000 men and up to 90 fronts) around 1997/98 and therefore their peak had 
already been passed in 2001. Also, it is unclear where the boundary between actual members of the 
organization (“fighters”) and helpers or supporters is to be drawn, and this affects force structure 
estimates. Into which category, for example, should the numerous employees in the municipal areas, 
who provided the organization with information about the banking and insurance sectors, be 
included? The overall picture presented by the numbers is, nevertheless, conclusive. We can assume 
that the FARC transformed itself into a powerful economic and military organization within fifteen 
years. In the late 1990s the income of the FARC, stemming mostly from kidnappings and drug 
trafficking, was estimated to be around US$600 million per year.11 This enabled them to buy modern 
weapons on the international black market, to pay generous bribes to spies and informants – 
without whose help the large-scale kidnapping business would not have been possible – but also to 
local civil servants, and to secure an adequate standard of living for the “troops” and their families. 
Last but not least, the fact that the Colombian army suffered some severe defeats at the hands of the 
FARC demonstrates how seriously the guerilla organization had to be taken as a powerful military 
force.12  
 The advance and expansion process of the FARC did not proceed uninterrupted. For 
instance, the attempt to increase the FARC's power and assertiveness through amalgamation with 
other guerilla organizations, worked only temporarily. The guerrilla coordination committee that 
resulted (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar) proved a failure and was subsequently disbanded. The 
formation of a political party by the FARC, the Unión Patriótica, with which it wanted to distinguish 
itself from the Communist Party, proved to be a failure as well. Though the party candidates were 
successful in a number of elections, in the aftermath rightwing extremist death squads killed its 
followers. After this failure to gain political influence by legal means, the FARC exclusively 
concentrated on exercising pressure, and the use of violence, in order to come closer to their goal of 
acquiring power.13 They were so successful in this that the guerilla expert Alfredo Rangel predicted a 
threatening vision for Colombia’s future. He suggested that the country might soon be divided by a 
corridor occupied by the rebels and that the big cities would be surrounded by them. His colleague 
Eduardo Pizarro added that while one could not speak of a counter state or a “state within the state” 
yet, the FARC had reached the status of a proto-state, which posed a tremendous challenge for the 
Colombian government.14 
 Soon after, however, the decline of the FARC began. This third phase of its development 
began under the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), who was, on the one hand, open to 
serious peace talks with the FARC while making sure, on the other, that he had the growing military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Pizarro 2004, pp. 65, 86, 97; Lair 1999, p. 68f.; Richani 1997, p.41ff.; Rangel 1998, p. 29. 
11 Richani 1997, p. 45ff.; Rangel 1998, ch. 1 and 2. 
12 Rangel 1998, p. 81ff. 
13 Zinecker 2007, p. 380ff.; Pizarro 2004, p. 92ff. 
14 Rangel 1998, pp. 33, 80; Pizarro 2004, p. 62. 
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support of the United States. President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) continued the equipment and 
modernization of the army with the help of the United States under the “Plan Colombia” with 
determination. For a few years he succeeded in pacifying the right-wing extremist militia, which had 
consolidated under the umbrella organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, the Colombian 
United Self-Defense Forces), so that he was able to use the army exclusively in fighting the main 
enemy, the guerillas. For the first time in many years the military kept the upper hand in its armed 
encounters with the FARC units. Most importantly the government succeeded, in the course of the 
military offensive, in driving the FARC out of strategically important areas and in breaking up the 
corridors that had secured the connection between the different “fronts” and blocks of rebels. All 
this led to a considerable weakening of the FARC, who are said to have lost around 6,000 men 
through desertions between 2002 and 2007.15 This weakened position resulted in an increased 
willingness to enter into negotiations with the government. Furthermore FARC returned to the 
concept of a mobile guerilla force on which it had based its actions decades earlier, mixed with an 
increasing number of terrorist attacks in the cities.16 
 Not much remains of the original goal of radical, revolutionary change, a goal that had 
characterized the FARC’s internal discourse for a long time. Since the 1990s, apart from a 
continuing call for land reform, declarations of a more social democratic nature have predominated. 
These include the growing support for cooperatives and small-scale entrepreneurs, a stronger 
protection of national markets and industries, the elimination of corruption, the reorganization of 
the judicial system, the protection of human rights and the elimination of immunity from 
prosecution. The disassociation from the official government politics basically amounts to nothing 
more than asking the state to stand up more for national interests and to a stronger commitment to 
the needs of the lower class and minority groups.17 The legitimacy of the democratic form of 
government, however, is not being questioned; on the contrary, the proposed reforms are supposed 
to help “true” democracy to assert itself.18 
 The FARC is far from democratic. In fact, in the zones in which FARC rules, it practices an 
authoritarian style of government that amounts to a strict hierarchy: the headquarters, the general 
staff and the “secretariat” dictate the directives on which the different divisions, the “fronts” and 
“blocks,” operate. In contrast to most of the other Latin American guerilla groups, the FARC are 
said to be particularly disciplined, a fact that, together with the long-propagated Marxist ideology, 
explains the cohesion and strike power of their extensive weaponry. Of course the question remains: 
As the ideology becomes increasingly diluted and the disruption of the corridors connecting the 
different “fronts” heightens their inherent tendency to become more independent, can FARC 
maintain its organizational unity? 
 This will depend, not least, on the FARC leaders. Apart from the firm organizational 
structure and a common ideology, the prestige and charisma of some of the leaders, especially of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Latin American Regional Report: Andean Group, April 2007, p. 12. See also Pizarro 2004, p. 316ff. 
16 This can clearly be seen in the monthly reports from Colombia in the magazine Latin American Regional Report: Andean 
Group. 
17 See for example the demands listed in Fischer 2005, p. 92, which the CGSB raised in an open letter to Congress in 
1992. Compare these demands to the memorandum sent by the FARC about 18 years later (on February 22, 2010), 
available at: http://www.resistencia-colombia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i (accessed July 13, 
2011). 
18 See the interview with Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias “Tiro Fijo,” in Arango 1984, p. 110, 112ff. Zinecker 2007, p.344 
sees one of the insurgents’ main weaknesses in the fact that they are fighting a democratically elected regime. It is 
remarkable, however, that following Uribe’s U.S.-centered strategy the guerillas hardly pushed or profited from the 
argument that the government is handing the country over to the imperialist superpower and that concerted resistance is 
necessary. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VI  !108 
legendary “Tiro Fijo” (Sure Shot) who died a couple of years ago, was the main tie that held the 
FARC together. Having grown up in a peasant setting, the FARC leadership mirrored the abilities, 
persistence, shrewdness, tactical sense and long term strategizing of the majority of the members 
who, in contrast to most other Latin American guerilla groups, also came from the rural lower 
classes. Even if they can be blamed for having been too closely attached to their rural worldview and 
to have missed Colombia’s rapid process of urbanization, it has to be acknowledged that the leaders 
barely revealed their ignorance and made few serious mistakes in the leadership of the rebel 
organization.19 Most of them are now dead, many because of targeted actions by the military, which 
tracked down their hiding places. Only time will tell if the successors to the historic FARC 
leadership will hold the old “conservative” course or if they will choose new, more spectacular 
forms and techniques of violence. 
 
The Absence of Preconditions for Innovation 
 
From the author’s point of view, there are five conditions that hinder the FARC’s potential 
for developing WMEs. Two of these conditions are connected to the country’s political culture, two 
can be derived from the FARC’s self-conception as a guerilla group and one is a result of the social 
affiliation of most of its members. 
 It is known that in many, if not most, Latin American countries the state has not been able 
to enforce an effective monopoly in exercising legitimate political power. Once again Colombia 
poses a special case within Latin America, as its political elites, especially the leaders of the two 
traditional parties, have never seriously tried to limit the exercise of political power to the organs of 
the state. Rather, they have regularly asked the citizenry to take sides for one party or the other in 
their conflicts. This is the background for the countless bloody civil wars of the nineteenth century.20 
The idea still exists that it is quite legitimate to take the law into one’s own hands if the judicial 
organs do not punish the “culprit”, or to take up arms in order to enforce one's own interests or 
draw attention to political causes one champions.21   
 This is one side of Colombia’s political culture: power holders, private citizens and political 
activists do not feel that their actions are or should be restricted by the rule of law, as it is standard 
practice in Western states. From a humanitarian point of view, this release has led to scandalously 
violent assaults against individuals and to excesses against groups (massacres in the Colombian 
hinterland are not uncommon). But there are boundaries to the violence. The public does not 
tolerate every form and every degree of unauthorized acts. The FARC’s rival guerilla organization, 
the M-19, felt the full force of this in 1985 when they tried to send the public a signal by occupying 
the Palace of Justice to force a verdict against the republic’s president, Belisario Betancur (1982-86). 
The armed forces did not acquiesce in this open provocation of the government, employed tanks 
against the rebels and destroyed the Palace of Justice thus killing not only the attacking rebels but 
also many judicial employees and some high court judges. The public made the M-19 responsible for 
this bloody disaster that cost more than a hundred lives. The guerilla organization suffered a loss of 
face from which it never recovered. This was one of the reasons for their eventual agreement to the 
government’s offer of negotiations and amnesty, resulting in them laying down their weapons.22 It 
could be speculated that had the tragedy of the Palace of Justice ended without bloodshed, M-19’s 
reputation and stature might have been enhanced in the public eye. Nonetheless this much seems !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Waldmann 2007, p. 245ff. 
20 Krumwiede 1980, p. 79ff.; Palacios 2006, p. 190ff. 
21 Waldmann 1997; Waldmann 2007, p. 593ff. 
22 Zinecker 2007, p. 846ff. 
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certain: political rebels are not interested in using WMEs that can be highly destructive because they 
would exceed an unwritten limit on violence deemed acceptable by the Colombian people. 
 This again is connected to a second characteristic of the country’s political culture: the goal 
of any politically inspired use of military power is rarely the annihilation of the enemy or a 
fundamental change of the existing structures; rather the ultimate goal is to negotiate with a view 
toward a reorganization of conditions. On this point, the protagonists in power and the pundits – in 
Spanish, “violentólogos,” which means specialists on violence – agree: under no circumstances should 
one's bridges be burned or the enemy fought until the bitter end. Rather, a door should be left open 
in order to find a way to come to a peaceful agreement.23 No Colombian president in the past 
decades has ruled out from the start the possibility of a compromise with the guerilla groups. This is 
true even for the outspoken “hawks” irrespective of the menacing rhetoric they used initially.24 The 
best evidence for the ongoing willingness to end conflicts without victory or defeat is delivered by 
the country’s recent political history itself. A number of amnesty offers to the rebels have been 
made, some of which have been accepted, others have not: in 1953, a declaration of amnesty at the 
beginning of the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla; in 1958 another amnesty for all rebels who 
agreed to hand over their weapons at the beginning of the Frente Nacional; in 1984 a general armistice 
under Belisario Betancur; in 1990/91 the reintegration of the M-19 into the political process under 
presidents Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria; in 1999/2000 failed negotiations between President 
Andrés Pastrana and the FARC. 
 When the ultimate goal of militant or warlike conflict is compromise, a mutually agreed-
upon pact, then the use of violence beyond a certain level of intensity is out of the question. The 
purpose of violence is that of backing up the opponent’s claim to power and securing them a 
starting position as favorable as possible for the negotiations that will take place sooner or later. To 
completely render the opponent innocuous or to provoke him in such a way that a compromise 
becomes impossible would meet with massive disapproval from the public, if not an eruption of 
public outrage. It is obvious that this informal consensus about violence’s acceptable ultimate goals 
greatly reduces the opportunities for the use of WMEs. 
 Now it is conceivable that the FARC could defy these rules that have arisen out of the 
country’s political culture, as the M-19 has rudimentarily done. However, the M-19 saw itself as a 
new form of urban guerilla. In contrast, the FARC are, and define themselves as, a rural guerilla 
group – one could even say that within Latin America they are the prototype of a rural guerilla 
organization. As such they possess an understanding of time and space that hardly lends itself to the 
use of WMEs.25 
 However one assesses the effects of WMEs, their use would result in an intensification and 
escalation of conflict. The resort to WMEs would elicit a rapid reaction from the opponent and spur 
on the struggle. Rural guerilla groups, on the other hand, are not in a hurry. Having a lot of time at 
their disposal is an important resource for them. In their eyes, to not be pressed for time is a 
strategic advantage over the democratically elected government, which has to present tangible results 
within a few years if it wants to be re-elected.26 The rebels’ confidence that time is working for them 
is even greater if they are in a long-term process of expansion, growing in numbers and power, as 
has been true of the FARC for decades. In interviews, leaders of the FARC have repeatedly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Rangel 1998, pp. 11ff., 16; Pizarro 2004, p. 324; see also Gonzales Sanchez 2003, p. 37: “… everything is negotiable, at 
every point. This mania for pacts pervades all areas of social life” (my translation). 
24 On Uribe’s readiness to negotiate see Pizarro 2004, pp. 303 and 307; on the rebels’ readiness see especially Rangel 
1998, pp. 10, 17. 
25 See Zinecker 2007, pp. 399, 401ff. 
26 Waldmann 2005, p. 139ff. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VI  !110 
emphasized the time factor as part of their strategic calculations (“Sooner or later, the time will be 
ripe for a revolutionary change”). Their philosophy also stands the test in phases of stagnation or of 
partial regression. Their motto seems to be: As our fight has already lasted more than four decades, 
with many ups and downs, we will also overcome this setback. Either way, their concept of time 
leaves little room for WMEs, which represent an escalation of the conflict.27 
 The fact that the rural guerilla groups have their own concept of space adds to this fact, 
especially in a country as geographically fragmented, difficult to manage and control as Colombia. 
The FARC’s operational preconditions and the resulting strategies are the exact opposite of the 
conditions under which the Tupamaros in Uruguay commenced battle against the government in the 
1960s. The small southern republic’s relatively flat topography, the absence of large areas covered by 
forests, and the dominant role of the capital, Montevideo, forced the Tupamaros to run the risk of 
becoming urban guerillas and of losing control of the dynamic of escalation. In contrast, Colombia’s 
much larger size and its regional differentiation virtually have a slowing-down effect.28 The 
formation of numerous “fronts” by the FARC from the 1980s onward in order to bring about a 
kind of fragmentation of the armed forces had the downside of also setting free centrifugal 
tendencies on the side of the rebels. Generally it can be assumed that the scattering and relative 
isolation of the separate guerilla battalions was all but conducive to “innovation.” That even applies 
to the FARC’s central command that, installed in the South in a peripheral province (Caqueta), was 
largely cut off from the flow of traffic and communication that could have triggered the 
development of WMEs.29 
 As a last relevant variable, the peasant background of most of the traditional FARC leaders 
and the guerilla organization’s general embedding in a rural lower class milieu, needs to be 
reiterated.30  This basis of social recruitment explains some previously mentioned socio-psychological 
dispositions and characteristics like persistence, consistency in the pursuit of goals, tactical 
shrewdness and the avoidance of mistakes; discipline and organizational unity. Being particularly 
innovative, testing new forms and techniques of violence, surely is not among these characteristics. 
In fact a rather conservative dislike for experiments is typical of the FARC. This clearly contrasts 
with the actions of the mostly urban guerilla groups of Latin America that primarily consist of 
students and middle class intellectuals. The M-19, the Tupamaros and the Montoneros have not only 
been much more impatient and careless than the FARC but also came up with numerous tactical 
maneuvers and tricks to mislead and fool the security forces and to surprise and entertain their 
urban audience. The FARC dismissed these small-scale innovations as “useless gimmicks” or, more 
harshly, as “petit-bourgeois adventurism” (aventurismo pequeño-burgués).  
 
Causes of the Lack of Innovation 
 
Three factors can be identified (although there may be more) that have directly hindered the 
development of WMEs by the FARC: the system of war economy that has developed over the 
course of decades, the lasting influence of Colombia’s Communist Party over the FARC and the 
competitive relationship with the M-19. 
 In Colombia, violence has not only been used for ideological or political purposes, but also 
for personal reasons and material gain. Estimates suggest that only around 20% of the country’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 On the FARC’s rural notion of time as an unlimited resource see Rangel 1998, p. 5ff. This is reflected in Tiro Fijo’s 
interview with Carlos Arango. See Arango 1984, pp. 98, 99, 123f. 
28 On the Tupamaros see Waldmann 2011. 
29 Rangel 1998, p. 81; Zinecker 2007, p. 414ff. 
30 Allemann 1974, p. 256; Palacios 2006, p. 192. 
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high murder rate is related to the political conflict; the rest is of a criminal nature ranging from 
economic reasons to personal revenge.31 In the late 1950s and 1960s, the bandolero groups’ political 
and economic motives for their acts of violence already merged seamlessly.32 In more recent times, 
Colombia has produced the “sicario,” a juvenile assassin who will kill anybody for an appropriate 
reward. 
 The use of WMEs has been rendered unattractive, I believe, by the FARC’s strong 
integration into the illegal war economy that has evolved over the last decades, especially the 
business of kidnapping for profit, and the growth and trafficking of drugs. The FARC's dependence 
on both of these sources of income is the reason for the group's interest in keeping the status quo, 
i.e. the continuation of a low intensity war. This prevents any abrupt process of escalation.33 It has 
repeatedly been emphasized that the FARC employs a bigger share of its resources to collect money 
than it does to fight the security forces. Armed clashes primarily take place in the peripheral zones 
while in economically more profitable areas the FARC bribe civil servants and come to terms with 
their enemies, for example the AUC, in order to secure a share in the region’s economic revenues.34 
The kidnapping industry, which has been developed to perfection by the guerilla organizations 
requires not only tight relations to the urban bank and insurance employees who provide the 
necessary information to the rebels, but most importantly the recognition that one should not, 
metaphorically speaking, kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Effectively this discourages the 
rebels from questioning the existing distribution of income and wealth. A leading FARC expert 
concludes that given the elaborate system of dues and blackmailing, the group is wary of putting the 
traditional economy into serious trouble.35 Such principles of consideration and preservation are 
unlikely to produce an atmosphere of increasing confrontation that would favor the use of WMEs. 
 The Colombian Communist Party's influence over the FARC leadership over an extended 
period of time has had a similarly neutralizing effect.36 Even though they have evaded the PCC’s 
interference since the late 1980s, it still has to be assumed that the ideas propagated by the 
communists loyal to Moscow have continued to have a formative influence on the FARC leadership, 
especially the idea of a future revolution. According to this idea, the chances of revolution do not 
depend upon the guerilla’s eagerness to fight or their readiness to make sacrifices. At best, these 
factors are harbingers or vanguards of the revolution. What the organization can do is heighten the 
general awareness of the injustice and untenable nature of the existing regime through selective 
attacks. In the end, however, the initiative of the people (“el pueblo”)—the rank and file—will be 
crucial. Only if the people revolt and stand up against the oligarchic rule will the moment come to 
effectively get rid of that rule. This development will have to ripen naturally. Attempts to bring it 
about “artificially” are regarded as blind activism, doomed to failure. 
 Needless to say this attitude, which runs contrary to the foco theory that prevailed for a long 
time in Latin America, does not leave much space for the utilization of WMEs. One strong deterrent 
for the FARC was the example of the M-19. A third assumption behind these considerations is that 
the behavior of the M-19 doubly blocked the FARC’s temptation to resort to WMEs. The role of 
urban guerilla, with all the possibilities to shock and enthrall the urban audience that go with it, was 
already taken; moreover the M-19’s development impressively demonstrated how poorly the impact 
of primarily symbolic acts of violence was received. The FARC dismissed the somewhat theatrically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Pizarro 2004, p. 53. 
32 Sanchez/Meertens 1985. 
33 See especially Richani 1998; see also Rangel 1998, p. 94ff.; Fischer 2005, p. 89ff.; Pizarro 2004, p. 91ff. 
34 Richani 1997, p. 47ff. 
35 Rangel 1998, p. 31. 
36 Eduardo Pizarro in particular has emphasized the PCC’s sustained influence on the FARC. Pizarro 1992; Pizarro 2004, 
p. 85ff. 
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staged attacks of the competing urban guerillas as cheap showmanship and generally made the M-19 
out to be a group of “petit-bourgeoisie gone wild.”37 The M-19’s surprising acceptance of an offer of 
amnesty by president Barco that caused, after a short interlude in the constituent assembly, the 
group’s speedy disappearance from Colombia’s political and military stage, confirmed as far as 
FARC were concerned the accuracy of their opinion that the M-19 had been a gang of dubious 
political adventurers.38    
 
Innovation: If at all, when? 
 
Thus far the question of why the FARC have not developed WMEs has been approached 
from its structural side. We have analyzed which preconditions have rendered the utilization of these 
weapons unlikely and which factors have directly blocked it. Considering the FARC’s long history, 
one could pose the question: At which moment in this history would the use of WMEs have been 
likely or at least possible? If one does not share Nicholas Taleb’s point of view that important events 
are generally unforeseeable, it should be possible to discern periods of time in which the use of 
WMEs was more (or less) likely.39 
 In the second part of this article three phases in the FARC’s history, which spans several 
decades, were highlighted. A long initial phase when the group was launched and became 
consolidated between 1964 and 1982 was followed by a phase of expansion and continued gains in 
power from 1983 until about 2000; and after that date by a third phase of relative loss in significance 
which could lead to the organization’s definitive decline. Looking back, it seems unlikely that the 
FARC thought about WMEs or considered their use during the first phase. After the Marquetalia 
episode, a number of factors militated against the likelihood of WME use: the transition to mobile 
guerilla tactics, the operation of single “fronts” in the rough hinterland far from the transport and 
communication networks of cities and from the modernization processes, the guerilla’s deficient 
weapons procurement and not least the determining influence of the Communist Party, which at the 
time promoted “all forms of fighting for the revolution” including legal means. 
 The question arises if the possibility of resorting to WMEs came up during the VIIth 
Conference in 1982. It cannot be ruled out as, apparently, the guerilla group had reached a stage 
where the leadership, dissatisfied with its previous development, discussed how to speed up the 
revolutionary process and how to gain more power and resonance. However, after having decided to 
expand and deepen the path to the takeover of power (increasing troop size and the number of 
“fronts”, territorial expansion, finding additional financial resources, improving weaponry and 
opening up a legal path with the founding of a political party), there is not much reason to believe 
that on top of all that the use of WMEs was considered. The path to success, which the FARC 
planned for themselves with these resolutions, seemed to have rendered the utilization of WMEs 
redundant, irrespective of the fact that it would have clashed with the organization’s long-term goal 
of one day sitting at the negotiating table with the government. This has changed in the meantime. 
The FARC’s growth has slackened since 1998 and has, after 2000, resulted in an indisputable loss of 
military power and therefore also of its political potential. Underground organizations with strong 
resources that begin to have serious difficulties are especially dangerous, because they will endeavor 
to cover up or compensate for the loss of real power through spectacular attacks that rouse the 
public’s attention. It is no accident that the number of FARC's terrorist attacks in major cities has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See for example the interview with Jacobo Arenas in Arango 1984, pp. 37ff., 45. There and elsewhere the FARC’s idea 
of revolution is reflected at length. 
38 On Barco’s offer of amnesty and peace and on the dissolution of M-19 see Waldmann 2007 (“government reaction”). 
39 Taleb 2007. 
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increased in recent times. Does this mean that a large-scale attack that falls under the category of 
WME is likely? 
 I put this question to two colleagues, both experts on the FARC who have been following 
and studying the group's development in depth over a long period of time. Both do not think it very 
likely that the FARC will use WMEs because such a move would contradict the premises of its 
previous strategy. It is more likely that the organization will enter a kind of regression, a return to 
former methods of flexible guerilla warfare, surrendering dispensable areas that the FARC 
previously occupied. Does this mean that they will also be ready to forego economically and 
strategically important bastions? Can some kind of desperate attack be ruled out with which they 
free themselves from their defensive position and try to regain the initiative? Only time will tell. 
 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VI  !114 
References 
 
Allemann, Fritz René. Macht und Ohnmacht der Guerilla. Munich: Piper, 1974. 
Arango, Carlos. FARC veinte años: De Marquetalia a la Uribe. Bogotá: Ed. Aurora, 1984. 
Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda,  and Gonzalo Sánchez, eds. Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: 
Waging War and Negotiating Peace. Wilmington: SR Books, 2001. 
Fischer, Thomas. “40 Jahre FARC in Kolumbien: Von der bäuerlichen Selbstverteidigung zum 
Terror.” Sozial.Geschichte N.F. 20.1 (2005): 77-97. 
Krumwiede, Heinrich-W.  Politik und Kirche im gesellschaftlichen Modernisierungsprozeß: Tradition und 
Entwicklung in Kolumbien. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1980. 
Lair, Eric. “Reflexiones en torno al conflicto Colombiano.” Analisis Político 37 (1999): 64-76. 
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1987-2002. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006. 
Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. “Revolutionary Guerilla Groups in Colombia.” Violence in Colombia: 
The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. Eds. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and 
Gonzalo Sánchez. Wilmington: SR Books, 1992. 169-91. 
Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. Kolumbien: Aktuelle Situation und Zukunftsperspektiven für ein Land im 
Konflikt. Analysen und Berichte 4. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2001. 
Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. Una democracia asediada: Balance y perspectivas del conflicto armado en 
Colombia. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004. 
Rangel Suarez, Alfredo. Colombia: Guerra en el fin de siglo. Bogotá: TM Editores, 1998. 
Richani, Nazih. “The Political Economy of Violence: The War System in Colombia.” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39.2 (1997): 37-82. 
Sánchez, Gonzalo, and Donny Meertens. Bandoleros, gamonales y campesinos: El caso de la Violencia en 
Colombia. Bogotá: El Ancora, 1985. 
Sánchez, Gonzalo. Guerras, Memoria e Historia. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e 
Historia ICANH, 2003. 
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random 
House, 2007. 
Villamizar, Darío. Aquel 19 sera: Una historia del M-19, de sus hombres y sus gestos. 2nd ed. Bogotá 1995. 
Waldmann, Peter. “Colombia and FARC: Failed Attempts to Stop Violence and Terrorism in a 
Weak State.” Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. Eds. Robert J. Art and Louise 
Richardson. Washington, D.C.: USIP,  2007. 221-60. 
Waldmann, Peter. “Cotidianización de la violencia: El ejemplo de Colombia.” Analisis Político 32 
(1997) : 34-50. 
Waldmann, Peter. “Die zeitliche Dimension des Terrorismus.” Determinanten des Terrorismus. Ed. 
Peter Waldmann. Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2005. 139-87. 
Waldmann, Peter. “How Terrorism Ceases: The Tupamaros in Uruguay.” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 34 (2011): 1-15. 
Waldmann, Peter. “Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?” Terrorism and Political Violence 19.4 
(2007): 593-608. 
Zinecker, Heidrun. Kolumbien und El Salvador im longitudinalen Vergleich: Ein kritischer Beitrag zur 
Transitionsforschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007. 
Zuluaga Nieto, Jaime. “De guerillas a movimientos políticos.” De las Armas a la Política. Eds. Ricardo 
Peñaranda and Javier Guevero. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1999. 1-71. 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VII  !115 
APPENDIX VII: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
 
Prof. Zachary Abuza, National War College at the National Defense University in Washington, 
DC. He is on leave from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at 
Simmons College, Boston.  He received his B.A. from Trinity College (1991), and M.A.L.D. (1994) 
and Ph.D. (1998) from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Professor 
Abuza specializes in security issues and politics in Southeast Asia. He is the author of Conspiracy of 
Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (2008), Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (2006), Militant 
Islam in Southeast Asia (2003), and Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (2001). His most recent 
publication, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, 
and the Impact of National Politics was just published by the Institute of National Security Studies. 
 
Dr. Javier Argomaniz, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), 
University of St. Andrews. Dr. Argomaniz’s general interests lie in the application of quantitative 
methodologies to the study of terrorism, international cooperation in counter-terrorism and the 
European Union (EU) security policies. In particular, he focuses on the way counter-terrorism has 
become institutionalized as an area of EU involvement. Dr. Argomaniz completed his PhD in 
International Relations at the University of Nottingham. He has undertaken research at a variety of 
national and international projects, including a UK Home Office-funded national evaluation scheme 
and has published in the areas of European Studies, Criminology and International Security. He has 
recently published a monograph for Routledge on the coherence of the European response to the 
threat of transnational terrorism. Currently he co-directs with Orla Lynch an EU-funded project 
studying Terrorism Victims Associations in the UK and Spain. 
 
Maj. Paul Brister, Air Force Special Tactics Officer (active duty). He recently earned his PhD in 
Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, after completing a 
dissertation entitled “Ku Klux Rising: Towards an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist 
Campaigns.” Major Brister is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a Masters degree 
in Defense Analysis/Irregular Warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Dr. Adam Dolnik, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Previously, he was 
the director of terrorism studies at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention at the University 
of Wollongong in Australia. Dr. Dolnik served as chief trainer at the International Centre for 
Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, and as a researcher at the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism Research Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in 
California. His writings include Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technologies, Tactics, and Global Trends 
(London: Routledge, 2007) and Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (Westport CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2007). He has a forthcoming book on Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A 
Guide (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2012). Dr. Dolnik also serves on the editorial boards of 
Terrorism and Political Violence and Perspectives on Terrorism. 
  
Prof. Richard English, Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at 
the University of St Andrews. Previously at Queen’s University in Belfast, Northern Ireland, he is 
the author of six books, including the award-winning Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (2003) 
and Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (2006).  He is also the co-editor of five books 
and has published more than forty journal articles and book chapters. He is a frequent media 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VII  !116 
commentator on terrorism and political violence, and on Irish politics and history, including work 
for the BBC, ITN, SKY NEWS, NPR, RTE, the Irish Times, the Times Literary Supplement, 
Newsweek and the Financial Times. In 2009 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy (FBA) and 
a Member of the Royal Irish Academy (MRIA).  His most recent book, Terrorism: How to Respond, 
was published in 2009 by Oxford University Press. 
 
Dr. Mohammed Hafez, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. He specializes in Islamic social movements, Middle Eastern and North African politics, and 
violent radicalization. He is the author of Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom 
(United States Institute of Peace, 2007); Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers (United States Institute of Peace, 2006); and Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the 
Islamic World (Lynne Rienner, 2003). Dr. Hafez earned a Ph.D. in international relations from the 
London School of Economics (LSE) and is the recipient of major research grants from the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Harry Frank 
Guggenheim Foundation, United States Information Agency (USIA), and Department of Homeland 
Security’s START Consortium. He has made several appearances on the Jim Lehrer News Hour, C-
SPAN, and National Public Radio. 
 
Mr. David Hamon, Principal with Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER) of Arlington, VA.  Currently he 
is seconded to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) within the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) as Director of the Office of Strategic Research and Dialogues (OSRD).  He 
conceives, manages, and integrates the future oriented research activity focused on Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect.  From 2002-2005, 2007-2010, he served DTRA as the 
Deputy Director for Research and Studies of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO). 
Mr. Hamon advises the U.S. Navy on HIV/AIDS in uniformed service populations, has worked 
with Argonne National Laboratory, and consults for the private sector on international logistics.  He 
is a Contributing Faculty for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.  He is a board 
member of an international relief NGO and several local non-profits supporting educational 
scholarships for high school students in music and history.   Mr. Hamon holds a M.A. in 
International Relations from Northeastern University in Boston, MA, and a B.Ed in Vocational 
Education/Speech Communication from Colorado State University.  He also holds certificates from 
two UN courses on Civil-Military Coordination.  
 
Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara, Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University in Sydney. He served as an advisor to the Sri Lankan 
government delegation conducting peace negotiations with the Tamil Tigers from 2002-2006. Mr. 
Jayasekara was a recipient of the British Chevening Scholarship awarded by the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. He holds a M.Litt in International Security Studies from the University of 
St. Andrews and has a Bachelor of Commerce from Griffith University, Brisbane. He was awarded 
the START Fellowship for 2008-2009 by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, a centre of excellence of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
in support of his research on weapons procurement networks of ethno-nationalist armed groups. 
Mr. Jayasekara is a Co-Editor of the Asian Conflicts Report (ACR) published by the Council for 
Asian Terrorism Research (CATR).  
 
Mr. Thomas H. Johnson, Research Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School as well the Director of the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies 
(CSS). Under his direction, the CSS program coordinates research activities on Afghanistan and 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VII  !117 
other countries of South and Central Asia. For two decades, Mr. Johnson has conducted research 
and written on Afghanistan and South Asia.  He is a member of the Afghanistan Editorial Board of 
the National Security Archive. His publications have appeared in the American Political Science Review, 
International Security, Foreign Policy, Military Review, Journal of Politics, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 
Central Asian Survey, China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Strategic Insights, The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Strategic Review, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science, Journal of 
Modern African Studies as well as numerous scholarly edited volumes and texts. His commentaries 
have appeared in numerous media outlets, including the Atlantic Monthly, Washington Post, Wall Street 
Journal, Newsweek, Christian Science Monitor, Newsday, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune, San Francisco 
Chronicle, the Telegraph and on PBS Jim Leher NewsHour, CNN’s Christiane Amanpour Show, TVO’s 
Agenda, BBC Channel One, NPR All Things Considered, Press TV, CNN Radio, and Voice of 
America. Mr. Johnson has taught at the University of Southern California and the Foreign Service 
Institute, and frequently lectures at Service Academies. Before joining the faculty of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, he served on the faculty of George Mason University.  
 
Dr. Michael Knights, head of the Iraq programme at the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy. He received his PhD on Iraqi military history from the Department of War Studies, King’s 
College London. He has published work on Iraqi and Gulf security and politics since 1997, first as a 
journalist for oil industry and defense publishers, and later as an academic. Dr. Knights has extensive 
experience in Iraq and Yemen, two areas where he supported the oil industry and government 
agencies with advice on security and practical community engagement initiatives.  
 
Dr. Peter Lehr, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), School of 
International Relations, University of St. Andrews. He is also Visiting Lecturer at the South Asia 
Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany. Before taking up his current position in September 
2007, he researched the nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism as Lloyd’s Maritime 
Intelligence Group Research Fellow, also at the CSTPV, from September 2004 to August 2007. 
Prior to that, he was Lecturer at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, from September 
1996 to August 2004. Being a regional specialist on the Indian Ocean, he currently specializes on 
research in the following areas: Maritime Safety and Security in the Indian Ocean/Asia-Pacific 
(focusing on piracy and maritime terrorism); Political Violence and Terrorism in South and 
Southeast Asia; and Organized Crime in South and Southeast Asia. He also works on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, with a focus on Air- and Seaport Security. He is the editor of Violence at 
Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (Routledge 2007) and co-editor (together with Rupert Herbert-
Burns and Sam Bateman) of Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (Taylor & Francis 2009). 
Currently, he is working on a book manuscript on piracy from ancient to modern times, to be 
published by Yale University Press in Winter 2012/13. He earned his PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) from the 
University of Heidelberg, Germany. 
 
Prof. Ariel Merari, Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University (emeritus). He received a B.A. 
degree in psychology and in economics from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and a Ph.D. in 
psychology from the University of California, Berkeley. From 1989 until his retirement he was the 
Director of the Political Violence Research Unit at Tel Aviv University. Previously, Professor Merari 
was a Senior Fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, where he established and directed the 
Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict Program. He was a visiting professor at Berkeley and Harvard, 
and a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School’s International Security Program of the Belfer Center. 
He has studied political terrorism and other forms of political violence for more than thirty years 
and has authored, co-authored or edited several books and many articles, monographs and chapters 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VII  !118 
on these subjects. In addition to his academic work, he established Israel’s Hostage Negotiations and 
Crisis Management Unit and commanded it for more than 20 years. Recently, he has been the 
Scientific Director of a study of suicide terrorism. In 2010, Oxford University Press published 
Professor Merari’s book, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism. 
 
Col. Richard Morales, PhD candidate in the Centre for Strategy and Performance at Cambridge 
University and is attached to the US Defense Attaché Office in London.  His experiences as an 
Army leader in armor, infantry, and cavalry units includes leading a platoon in Desert Storm, 
commanding a US sector as part of Balkan UN peacekeeping operations, and repeated tours in Iraq 
where he was decorated for both merit and service and awarded the Purple Heart. Most recently, he 
commanded a 900-solider combined arms task force responsible for security, development and 
governance efforts across one third of Baghdad. Previously, Col. Morales served as a White House 
Fellow assigned to Office of Management and Budget, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security.  He holds degrees in engineering, 
business, and security studies from the US Military Academy, Yale, and the Naval War College. 
 
Dr. Cerwyn Moore, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Birmingham. His 
work focuses on post-Soviet security, with a special interest in conflict and terrorism in the North 
Caucasus. Dr. Moore has published widely on aspects of terrorism, particularly the use of suicide 
attacks, radical tactics including hostage taking, the role of foreign fighters and the influence of 
militant Islam in Chechnya. He undertook fieldwork in Russia, including in the North Caucasus in 
2004 and 2005. Some of his major work in Chechnya includes a single-authored monograph, 
Contemporary Violence: Postmodern War in Kosovo and Chechnya (2010), as well as articles such as “Foreign 
Fighters and the case of Chechnya” [with Paul Tumelty], Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; and 
“Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya: From Communism and Nationalism to Islamism and 
Salafism” [with Paul Tumelty], The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. His forthcoming 
works include, “Suicide Attacks: Chechnya, The North Caucasus and Martyrdom” and “Mass 
Hostage-Taking from Budonnovsk to Beslan.” 
 
Dr. Maria Rasmussen, Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at 
Naval Postgraduate School. She taught at Yale and the University of Vermont, and has lectured at 
universities and military institutions in a variety of countries. She is the author of Argentina’s Lost 
Patrol. Armed Struggle, 1969-79, has recently completed a volume on negotiations with armed 
oppositions to the state, and is at work on a retrospective look at the Northern Ireland conflict 
1969-2007. Rasmussen has led a number of research and NGO teams, and has received funding 
from the Ford Foundation, Organization of American States, United States Agency for International 
Development, Olin Foundation, and various organizations within the U.S. Department of Defense.  
 
Prof. Andrew Silke, Chair in Criminology at the University of East London, where he is the Field 
Leader for Criminology, and the Programme Director for Terrorism Studies. He has over 100 
publications on issues to do with terrorism and counter-terrorism. His most recent books are 
Terrorism and the Olympics (co-edited with Anthony Richards and Pete Fussey) and The Psychology of 
Counter-Terrorism. Professor Silke serves on the European Commission’s European Network of Experts 
on Radicalisation and formerly on the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation. 
He has provided invited briefings on terrorism-related issues to Select Committees of the UK House 
of Commons and was appointed in 2009 as a Specialist Advisor to the House of Commons 
Communities and Local Government Committee for its inquiry into the UK Government's 
  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II !
Appendix VII  !119 
programme for preventing violent extremism. In 2010 he gave invited oral testimony before the 
Canadian Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism.   
 
Dr. Chris Smith, Associate Fellow with the Asia Programme at Chatham House.  He is also a 
Senior Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Governance at the University of Bristol, Visiting Research 
Fellow at the Centre for Research in Innovation Management (CENTRIM) and a Visiting Fellow at 
the Institute for Commonwealth Studies. Previously, he has been a MacArthur Foundation Research 
and Writing Fellow, a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex and the United Nations University, and a Visiting Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in 
Washington.  In 2001 he was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in 
Colombo and a Visiting Professor at the University of Wollongong in Australia. He was the founder 
director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College, London, which works 
closely with leading policy researchers in developing countries. Chris Smith has published widely on 
South Asian conflict, security and development issues, light weapons proliferation, the military utility 
of landmines and security sector transformation. His book, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal, was published by 
SIPRI in 1994. Chris Smith is currently working as a freelance consultant as Director of 
Development Partnerships and Outcomes.  He was recently the lead person for the Technical 
Design Team for the AusAID Australian Community Rehabilitation Programme in Sri Lanka. 
 
Prof. Jonathan Tonge, Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool. Previously, he served 
as Chair of the Political Studies Association in the U.K. before he became its president in 2008-
2011. Professor Tonge has published fourteen books and over fifty articles and chapters on British 
and Irish politics. He has completed five Economic and Social Research Council and Leverhulme 
Trust-funded research projects on Northern Ireland parties and paramilitaries during the last decade. 
He was also director of the ESRC’s Northern Ireland 2010 General Election survey.  
 
Prof. Charles Townshend, History department at Keele University and a Fellow of the British 
Academy. He has held fellowships at the National Humanities Center in North Carolina and the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC. He has specialized in the study of 
political violence and civil emergency, and the history of modern Ireland and Palestine. Amongst his 
previous publications are histories of political violence in Ireland, public order and public security in 
Britain, and British counter-insurgency in the twentieth century. He has written Terrorism: A Very 
Short Introduction (revised edition 2011), and Easter 1916: the Irish Rebellion (2005). His most recent 
book was When God Made Hell: the British Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq 1914-1921 
(2010, published in the USA as Desert Hell, 2011).  
 
Prof. Peter Waldmann, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Augsburg, where 
previously he was the Director of the Institute of Iberian and Latin American Studies He studied law 
and sociology in Munich and Paris, and his research focuses on the political sociology of Latin 
America, and on terrorism and political violence. He has published ten books and some 110 articles 
in German, Spanish and English. 
 
